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Abstract 
An emerging consensus in the academic literature explicitly recognises large 
corporations as political actors. Against this background, this research investigates 
how corporate power operates through political practices in international multi-
stakeholder governance processes and how it is legitimised. The central focus of 
research is the EITI, a sophisticated and well regarded international standard for 
natural resource governance in which corporations from the extractive industries and 
institutional investors have been granted decision-making rights at the Board level. 
Moreover, the research aims at understanding the consequences of corporate power 
on the Standard’s design and performance. Relying on a conceptual framework 
based on the writings of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, this thesis proposes a 
refined theoretical approach to corporate power by introducing the concepts of 
corporate symbolic authority and corporate political practice. This research was 
undertaken using a mixed-methods approach consisting of content analysis, 
interviews and participant observation. The findings suggest that companies are 
privileged partners in the EITI while members from resource-rich countries are 
effectively disadvantaged. The companies’ privileged status is legitimised through 
taken-for-granted-assumptions portraying them as positive, responsible and 
exceptional agents. It rests on possession and deployment of various forms of 
resources, and is enshrined into EITI’s principles and procedures. Thus, despite 
EITI’s emphasis on transparency, inclusion and equality (in decision-making), the 
Standard ultimately reflects and perpetuates the existing power asymmetries which 
cause disempowerment and poverty of people in resource-rich countries in the first 
place. This effectively undermines EITI’s impact and outcome. In conclusion, the 
argument is presented that by including corporations into international governance 
processes already influential actors not only gain direct access to decision-making, 
but additionally to symbolic authority. This further enhances and consolidates 
corporate power with substantial consequences for legitimate and effective 
governance at the international level. Therefore, this thesis enhances our 
understanding of corporate power and its deployment in multi-stakeholder 
governance at the international level. 
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1. Introducing business in international politics 
These days the multinational business corporation has become a symbol for the 
worldwide dominance of the capitalist global economy, with corporate power 
pervading various aspects of peoples’ economic, political, environmental and cultural 
reality. As a result, there is hardly any other actor at the international stage whose 
power and legitimacy is more controversially discussed and whose activities are 
more suspiciously observed by academics, civil society and the public. 
The general focus of attention when it comes to questions about corporate power is 
not so much on the millions of small and middle-sized enterprises (SMEs), but on the 
large-scale multinational business corporation, often simply referred to as 
transnational (TNC) or multinational corporation (MNC).1 This is a form of business 
organisation which in the most basic understanding ‘controls income-generating 
assets in more than one country at a time’ (Chandler and Mazlish 2005: 3). More 
comprehensively, the authors add that ‘an MNC has productive facilities in several 
countries on at least two continents with employees stationed worldwide and 
financial investments scattered across the globe’ (ibid.). As with business 
organisations in general, it is assumed that multinational business corporations are 
driven by a motive to maximise shareholder value.  
Today, large corporations such as Apple, Google or Facebook play a regular and 
often indispensible part in the everyday private and public life of consumers and 
citizens all over the world. A development which allows for a strategic influence over 
how millions of people conduct their daily lives: ranging from the ways by which they 
connect and communicate with people, to the products they consume, the job market 
they have to engage in to the state of the environment they encounter. These names 
are prominent today; however, they can easily be substituted with Nike, Coca Cola 
or Microsoft from the previous decades.  
                                               
1 The phenomenon of international business has been captured in the academic literature by a variety 
of definitions, as Wilkins (2009: 2) notes: ‘Most (not all) students of the history of international 
business have used the terms international, multinational, transnational, global, as the adjective; and 
business, company, corporation, enterprise, firm, as the noun that it modifies’. This study uses the 
nouns corporation interchangeably with firm, company or business actor, mostly for the simple reason 
of making the reading less repetitive but nevertheless implying that this study’s focus rests on the 
large MNCs as defined further above. 
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The emergence of the large corporation as commonly know today – established for 
managing cross-border production and international contracts – is, from a business 
history perspective, and as these brands already suggest, embedded within a US-
dominated economic and political context. As a result, discussions on and 
evaluations of MNCs tend to reflect US experiences and developments with these 
players, with illustrative examples including national public policy responses to 
oligopolistic markets and antitrust regulation (see for example, Dunning 2001; 
Wilkins 2009). However, renowned historical examples illustrate the existence of 
influential and internationally operating companies in previous centuries and beyond 
the US context: An excellent example is the Dutch East India Company which 
operated far beyond core business activities by establishing effective public 
administration and basic infrastructure in colonial territories (Ottaway 2001: 45).  
The last two decades, however, witnessed a previously unprecedented change in 
numbers, scope and size of large corporations which marks a qualitative change.2 
From their previous existence as instruments for national growth and wealth, MNCs 
have expanded into a form of giant organization independent from or only loosely-
tied to geographical boundaries and national sovereignty3 – a change which 
challenges the conventional perception of the corporations as ‘creature of the state’ 
(Wilks 2013: 3). 
By the simplest common denominator, the growth of the MNCs has been 
phenomenal. There has been increasing concentration at the top, marked by 
mergers and acquisitions, resulting in huge global corporations whose size 
(measured by value added) rivals that of many nation-states (Chandler and Mazlish 
2005: 3). 
TNCs have grown in number and, more dramatically, in size. UNCTAD (2000) 
reports the existence of approximately 63,000 TNCs with 700,000 foreign affiliates. 
Moreover, TNCs command financial and human resources of a magnitude previously 
unknown. The last wave of mergers that started in the late twentieth century has led 
to the development of new economic units with gigantic budgets and staff sizes 
(Fuchs 2007: 2). 
In addition, MNCs occupy a strategic and outstanding position within the global 
capitalist economy which is understood to further strengthen their position.  
                                               
2 The most commonly used indicators for assessing the size of MNCs are: ranking MNCs according to 
their annual revenues (Fortune 500); relate revenues to national GDPs; ranking MNCs by the value of 
their foreign assets (UNCTAD); or their employment numbers. Their geographical spread and the 
scope of their activities is assessed in production sites or more commonly Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) (Roach 2005: 6-7). 
3 A similar line of argument was suggested by Vernon (1971). 
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Today’s global economy is characterized by global value chains (GVCs), in which 
intermediate goods and services are traded in fragmented and internationally 
dispersed production processes. GVCs are typically coordinated by TNCs, with 
cross-border trade of inputs and outputs taking place within their networks of 
affiliates, contractual partners and arm’s-length suppliers. TNC-coordinated GVCs 
account for some 80 per cent of global trade (UNCTAD 2013: x). 
This proliferation and expansion of MNCs was not only accompanied by 
groundbreaking technological revolutions, the production of new consumer goods 
and accelerated generation of value. It also resulted in higher degrees of market 
concentration, the spread of gruesome practices of exploitation associated with the 
term “race to the bottom” and higher degrees of environmental degradation. These 
ambiguities of corporate existence have fuelled and renewed ongoing debates about 
the role of corporations in democratic capitalist societies and their influence vis-à-vis 
the state. This is mostly explicit in discourses on globalization which portray MNCs 
as drivers and winners of the process. The following factors are understood to have 
increased the political influence of MNCs and thus to have challenged the previously 
exclusive status of public actors as authorities at the international stage:  
Firstly, their potential to close global governance gaps: Whereas MNCs’ expansion is 
generally interpreted as a signal of how much large corporations have profited from 
globalization, it is states’ capacities to fulfil central governance tasks which is 
understood to have decreased at the same time (this argument will be discussed in 
greater detail in the following section). This reduced ability to perform central 
governance tasks is particularly associated with “global” issues, e.g. problems such 
as international terrorism, climate change or infectious diseases, which ‘transcend 
state borders and are not responsive to traditional, unilateral state policy action’ 
(Cusimano 2003: 2). Secondly, the ability to avoid or override national regulation in 
today’s competitive global economy. Most operations of MNCs are characterised by 
a large degree of flexibility and mobility. This translates into opportunities to move 
productions sites into different, less-regulated markets as strategic options to avoid 
stronger regulations or reduce their tax burden (including the political power which 
comes with threatening such a move) (Roach 2005: 34-35ff.). In consequence, ’the 
mobility of modern MNCs means that corporations can effectively bring nations into 
competition with each other for corporate investment and employment opportunities’ 
(ibid.: 35). Moreover, there is also the option to push for regulative standards at the 
international level which favour large-scale MNCs and which can override 
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unfavourable national regulation, for instance through provisions in international 
trade agreements (ibid.: 36). And thirdly, the observable tendency of MNCs to take 
on rule- and standard setting, interpreted as an attempt to reduce regulative 
uncertainty and establish a level playing field amongst the competitors. All of these 
factors are understood to have increased corporate power in the last decades.  
It is therefore not astonishing that the giant internationally operating business 
corporation has become the tangible adversary in an otherwise faceless economic 
structure in critical and radical discourses on globalization and alternatives to 
capitalism, epitomised for example by Naomi Klein’s (2000) No Logo, or Robin’s 
(2010) The World According to Monsanto. 
Notwithstanding ongoing debates about how to measure and assess corporate 
power (for an overview, see Roach 2005: 132ff.), it is precisely companies’ ability to 
influence and shape regulation at the international level which finds its expression in 
terms such as ‘global rulers’ (Korten 1995; Büthe and Mattli 2011), ‘global governors’ 
(Avant et al. 2010), ’leviathans’ (Chandler and Mazlish 2005) or ‘private empires’ 
(Coll 2012). Thus, the academic literature seems to have established a consensus 
which explicitly acknowledges the political role of corporations based on their ability 
to contribute and perform towards what is conceptually defined as governance 
(Haufler 2001; May 2005; Bernhagen 2007; Fuchs 2007; Brown et al. 2010; Wilks 
2013). In particular, the literature on global governance has engaged with the 
company’s influence and contribution to the challenges and complexity of 
international and national governance processes in a globalized world and more 
specifically with their contribution to political decision-making (prominent examples 
include Cutler et al. 1999; Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Haufler 2001; Levy and 
Newell 2005; Fuchs 2007; Falkner 2008; Ougaard and Leander 2010; Büthe and 
Mattli 2011). 
This thesis welcomes and shares this renewed interest in the business corporations 
and particularly their political influence at the international stage. Broadly speaking 
this research aims at investigating how corporate power operates in political 
practices at the international level. Based on a conceptual framework inspired by 
French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, this thesis uses a mixed-method approach 
including document analysis, participant observation and interviews for 
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understanding the political practices of major corporations from the extractive 
industries4 in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). EITI is an 
international standard for transparency and accountability in natural resource 
governance.5 This research describes and analyses the ways in which large 
resource companies influence the international regulation of natural resource wealth; 
it focuses on the individuals representing corporations as Directors at EITI’s 
international Board; and incorporates their representatives’ motivations, experiences 
and reflections on these political practices and the Standard. Furthermore, the 
consequences of corporate power on EITI’s design and performance are evaluated. 
In asking questions about corporate political practice and power with reference to 
international natural resource governance, this study is located at the intersections 
between several related academic disciplines: The investigation of what can broadly 
be described as the ‘influence’ of corporations on international governance 
processes, mostly associated with the literature on International Relations (IR) and 
International Political Economy (IPE); the scholarly articles engaged with the causes 
and consequences of development and poverty, particularly focusing on the 
resource curse6; and the business studies literature examining the origins, 
establishment and enforcement of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), 
particularly Management Studies and the literature on Business Ethics. Over the 
years, these disciplines have produced a plethora of theoretical frameworks and 
provide valuable insights into the subject, and this introduction could not possibly 
                                               
4 The term extractive industries denotes actors engaged in the industrial depletion of finite natural 
resources for economic reasons. It encompasses companies from the oil and gas sector, such as BP 
or Chevron, as well as mining companies, for example AngloAmerican, or the world’s most famous 
diamond retailer DeBeers.  
5 Broadly speaking the term natural resources refers to resources or raw material present in the 
natural environment which can be used in a variety of ways for human development. Generally, there 
is a distinction made between resources such as forestry, fishery, the sun or wind which are 
commonly known as renewable resources (either, as in the first case, because when reasonably and 
sustainably sourced and managed they can be harvested without lasting damage to the environment 
or because, as in the latter, their usage is arguably infinite and non-exclusive). However, in this study 
the term natural resources denotes the second category alternatively referred to as finite or non-
renewable resources, e.g. oil, gas and minerals. It requires a highly industrialised process of 
extraction. Natural resource governance is consequently defined as the political process by which this 
extraction is authorised, regulated and legitimised. 
6 The phenomenon described as resource curse, paradox of plenty or natural resource trap (Auty 
1993; Karl 1997; Collier 2008), describes a paradoxical developmental situation of a resource-rich 
country which is a) characterized by lower rates of economic growth and higher rates of poverty than 
comparison to resource poor countries, in addition to b) a strong economic dependence of the state 
apparatus on the resource revenues (Gary and Karl 2003: 21-23; Stiglitz 2006: 176). For a broader 
contextualisation, see Gary and Karl (2003: 25ff). 
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provide a comprehensive review of all of these theoretical and methodological 
perspectives while at the same time taking account of their empirical insights.7 
Therefore, the literature on global governance is selected as the conceptual entry 
point. This perspective is useful as it focuses on a variety of modes of regulation at 
the international and global level while stressing the important role played by 
companies in the establishment of these rules and standards. 
The first part of this chapter introduces insights from the literature on global 
governance on corporations as political actors on the international stage. This is 
followed by problems and lacunas identified in the academic literature on the 
questions of corporate power and corporations as political actors. In the second 
section, approach and research questions of this study are introduced, while the final 
section outlines how this thesis will proceed. 
1.1. The business corporation as political actor on the international stage 
Understanding business corporations as political actors or governance institutions at 
the international stage has become an established position in academic discourses 
in recent years, mostly prevalent in the literature on global governance. Empirically, 
this consensus is in fact accompanied by an existing trend towards greater inclusion 
of business actors into national and international governance process, identified by 
authors such as Rittberger et al. (2008: 18-9) and Huckel et al. (2007: 118). As such, 
the global governance perspective can be introduced as a scholarly perspective in 
International Relations (IR) which is interested in the establishment of mandatory 
and voluntary rules in the absence of an overarching global political authority. 
According to James N. Rosenau (1995: 46):  
(....) Global governance is conceived to include systems of rule at all levels of human 
activity – from the family to the international organization – in which the pursuit of 
goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions. 
This perspective follows a liberal tradition of thought in IR, namely highlighting the 
prospects for improved economic and political stability and prosperity through 
international cooperation and international law. However, the distinguishing feature 
from more conventional theoretical approaches, such as regime theory (see Krasner 
et al. 1983; Hasenclever et al. 1997) or liberal institutionalism which focus 
                                               
7 For a review on the role of business in social science literature, see Ougaard (2010: 1-36).  
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exclusively on state-action, is the recognition of a variety of governing constellations 
available – not only simultaneously on various levels (i.e. regional; national; 
international; global) but also by various actor constellations. According to Rosenau 
and Czempiel (1992) this includes a) governing activities by what are conventionally 
referred to as public actors8 (governance by government) which encompasses 
governance through bi-lateral agreements or international organisations, such as the 
United Nations; b) governance activities through a cooperation between public and 
private actors (governance with government), in the form of public-private 
partnerships (PPPs) or multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs); and c) governance 
performed entirely by non-state actors, i.e. companies or civil society (governance 
without government), for example through private standard-setting mechanisms or 
codes of conducts.9 Thus, from a global governance perspective the idea of political 
action is tied to the conceptual notion of governance which, as the quote by Rosenau 
above further indicates, centres on rule-making. This might result in formal and 
binding regulation but can also take the form of voluntary standards. Therefore, what 
comes to the forefront in discussions on the political role of business is a form of 
businesses’ activity in which companies contribute towards rule-setting and perform 
additional tasks which can conceptually be subsumed as contributing to governance, 
such as agenda-setting or implementation.10 
Alternatively to Rosenau and Czempiel, political engagement of corporations is also 
differentiated along the lines of self- vs. co-regulation (see for instance in Haufler 
2001: 12; Parker 2002; Conzelmann and Wolf 2007). Thus, self-regulatory efforts by 
business actors establish standards or codes of conducts which come in two forms: 
They either stipulate ethical guidelines for a particular company (so-called internal 
codes of ethics/conduct which are regarded as standard these days and can be 
found on every company’s homepage), or expressed as guiding principles for entire 
                                               
8 Based on a dichotomy between public and private actors, the conventional literature on global 
governance distinguishes between public actors, such as governments and intergovernmental 
organisations, and private or non-state actors, such as civil-society organisations and business (see 
Higgott et al. 2000: 2; Karns and Mingst 2004: 15ff.). As a result, a number of studies in the global 
governance literature focus on the interplay between public and private actors for solving global 
governance issues (see, for instance, Strange 1996; Kaul et al. 1999, 2003; Higgott et al. 2000; 
Haufler 2001, Hall and Biersteker 2002; Levy and Newell 2005; Pattberg 2005; May 2006; Fuchs 
2007; Avant et al. 2010; Ougaard and Leander 2010). 
9 More recently, the concept of non-state market-driven mechanisms (NSMD) is used, for example in 
Elbra (2014). 
10 For a broader introduction into global governance, see Wilkinson (2005). 
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sectors, usually with national or geographical focus. An example for this is 
Responsible Care, an initiative of the global chemical industry for improving 
environmental, health and security standards.11 Haufler, for example, illustrates how 
‘the pharmaceutical industry has strict standards for marketing drugs, because bad 
practices will undermine consumer trust and potentially weaken the market’ (2001: 
9). The internationally most prominent examples of codes of conduct are arguably 
the United Nations Global Compact (GC, see further below) and the Voluntary 
Principles on Security and Human Rights (VPSHR). The latter, for example, have 
been ‘designed to guide companies in maintaining the safety and security of their 
operations within an operating framework that encourages respect for human 
rights’.12  
Co-regulatory efforts depict participation in processes of rule- and standard-setting or 
implementation as collaborative activities with governments, civil society or 
international organisations. These collaborative efforts have been conceptualised as 
public private policy partnerships (Vaillancourt Rosenau 2000), global public policy 
networks (Reinicke and Deng 2000), or, as already mentioned, PPPs (Cutler et al. 
1999) or more broadly MSIs (see Bäckstrand 2006). However, all terms usually refer 
to a collaborative effort by what is referred to as public and private actors centred on 
a particular issue. This encompasses diverse topics such as global health in the 
case of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis (Brown 2009); flood 
control and dams in the case of the World Commission on Dams (Dubash 2009); 
forestry and timber certification (Dingwerth 2008); private food governance (Fuchs 
and Kalfagianni 2010); or climate change in the case of the Greenhouse Gas 
Protocol (Green 2010).13 The literature provides three main theoretical explanations 
for the establishment of these collaborations as summarised in Schäferhoff et al. 
(2009: 456): Firstly, a Neo-Gramscian perspective which stresses how PPPs are part 
of a corporate strategy for political hegemony; the constructivist approach14 which 
                                               
11 Responsible Care homepage. Available from: http://www.icca-chem.org/en/Home/Responsible-
care/. 
12 Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights homepage, available from: 
http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/. 
13 For an overview and evaluation of the literature on PPPs, see Schäferhoff et al. (2009). 
14 Please note that Social Constructivism (in capital letters) as a theory concept in IR is part of a 
tradition that seeks to apply constructivist thoughts to world politics (see Giddens 1984; Finnemore 
and Sikkink 1998, 2001; Wendt 1999, 1995; Fearon and Wendt 2002). This approach provides a 
perspective on world politics in which norms and institutions, i.e. ideational, non-materialist structures, 
play an important part in shaping social reality and facilitating change. Social constructivism in social 
21 
highlights how changes in the international normative structure affects actor’s identity 
and interests; and finally the predominant approach which relies on rationalist and 
functionalist arguments highlighting, for example, companies’ preference for stability 
and certainty which is supposed to favour international regulation, or the 
compensation of lacking public resources through corporate contributions. The 
sociological, Bourdieusian-inspired approach applied in this research rests on the 
social constructivist tradition. 
Paralleling the previously mentioned growth in size and numbers of TNCs, the 
UNCTAD World Investment Report (2012: 93) highlights a proliferation in codes of 
conduct:  
Across a broad range of industries, it is now common for TNCs to set supplier codes 
of conduct that detail social and environmental performance standards for their global 
supply chains. Since 2000s, there has been a significant proliferation of CSR codes 
in global supply chains, both individual TNC codes and industry-level codes. 
This trend towards collaboration in governance and the aforementioned tendency 
towards inclusion of business actors can be illustrated with reference to the literature 
on the United Nations (UN) and business which retraces and evaluates the steps 
towards a cooperative status quo between the world’s largest international 
organisation and individual business actors (for a comprehensive review, see 
Bäckstrand 2006). Authors such as Utting and Zammit elaborate how, under the 
guidance of former Secretary-general Kofi Annan, a number of UN agencies 
established a variety of partnerships with business actors. This development 
occurred presumably under the influence of popular neoliberal ideas in addition to 
the pressure to increase financial resources required to solve urgent development 
problems, such as poverty or environmental sustainability (Zammit 2004: 46-49; 
Utting and Zammit 2006: 2-3). The most prominent example for this development 
has been the establishment of the already mentioned United Nations Global 
Compact (GC) – a voluntary initiative which aims to set a global standard for human 
rights, and environmental, labour and anti-corruption standards launched in 2000.15 
From a brief historical perspective, the GC resulted from an acknowledgment of the 
                                                                                                                                                  
science research in general can be understood as a meta-theoretical framework based on 
hermeneutics and the phenomenological tradition, in addition to drawing on insights from post-
modernism and post-structuralism which calls for an interpretative approach of social reality. 
15 Numerous studies have analysed the GC from a variety of perspectives (see Kell 2005; Deva 2006; 
Thérien and Pouliot 2006; Bremer 2008; Rasche and Kell 2010).The Compact’s homepage is 
available from: https://www.unglobalcompact.org/.  
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potential contribution of business actors towards the normative goal of ‘sustainable 
development’ (see chapters four, five and eight for discussion on this discourse) by 
policy-advisers, political activists, in the media and last but not least political 
representatives which was publically articulated at the Earth Summit in Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992. An explicit call for inclusion of the business community was 
subsequently expressed by the UN for the following World Summit in Johannesburg 
in 2002. As a result, this event saw an unprecedented involvement of business 
actors in international politics, ranging from individual companies to institutional 
investors and business associations, such as the World Business Council on 
Sustainable Development (WBCSD) (see Clapp 2005 for additional information).16  
As already indicated in the discussion on governance and political action above, it is 
important to highlight that the involvement of business actors in institutional 
frameworks did not stop with granting observer and participatory rights which would 
allow them to influence agenda-setting and decision-making processes of 
government representatives. This would correlate with the classical understanding of 
corporate political power conceptualised as lobbying. Initiatives such as the already 
mentioned Global Fund and the EITI examined in this thesis, are in fact examples of 
internationally operating governance mechanisms in which business actors have 
been granted equal decision-making rights at the international Board level (Nelson 
2002: 47) and thus direct decision-making power. Here business actors do not aim at 
influencing representatives, they send representatives. They do not influence 
decision-making, they take decisions, thereby establishing international rules on 
behalf of the institution – a qualitative shift which takes the partnership in governance 
idea to a different level. This direct political influence of companies poses important 
questions about power and legitimacy of business in governance, questions which 
have yet to be explored in detail. In addition, in discussions about the corporation as 
political actor from a global governance perspective the focus usually lies on the 
institution, for example the establishment of a standard for a particular problem. In 
contrast, the company’s self-image, intentions and experiences are not a subject of 
                                               
16 The official homepage of the summit estimates that: ’Over 2,000 representatives of businesses and 
business organizations are thought to have participated in the summit and parallel events in 
Johannesburg, half of which were from overseas. Business groups estimate that there were 700 
companies represented and that there were 40-50 CEO’s.’ For a contextualisation: Overall, the 
summit was attended by 22,000 general participants out of whom 10,000 were accredited delegates. 
Also present were 2,000 representatives from major group organisations such as for example NGOs. 
Available from: http://www.johannesburgsummit.org/html/basic_info/faqs.html#joburg4. 
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interest although they might provide an additional and insightful perspective on the 
phenomenon at hand, as will be demonstrated in chapters five and six. 
Morton Ougaard, in reviewing the existing academic literature on business and 
global governance, proposes a classification into three sub-themes of interests 
instead of a differentiation along methodological and conceptual lines. The author 
classifies studies approaching the topic as based on an interest in regulation, based 
on an interest in corporate power or orientated towards a partnership-approach (see 
Ougaard 2010: 20-26).17  
The first category, as the name already suggests, deals with the question of 
international business regulation. It ‘is concerned with the question of how 
international policy regimes for business have been created, modified, non-created 
or unmade in political processes (...)’ (Ougaard 2010: 21) by state and non-state 
actors. This category shares an interest in the establishment of international regimes 
with the liberal tradition in IR (Krasner et al. 1983; Hasenclever et al. 1997) but 
focuses on business-related case studies. The most prominent and arguably most 
comprehensive example in this category is Braithwaite and Draho’s (2000) Global 
Business Regulations. Case-specific, more recent examples include for instance 
studies on environmental regimes (Clapp 2005; Levy and Newell 2005; Falkner 
2008), or on the financial sector (Porter 2007, all cited in Ougaard 2010: 21). 
The second category includes studies focusing on corporate power. These 
approaches have been categorised by Doris Fuchs (2007) in her volume on 
Business Power in Global Governance as direct/instrumental, structural and 
discursive dimensions of corporate power (see Fuchs’ work also discussed in the 
concluding chapter). Studies interested in direct power investigate cases of classical 
lobbying, by individuals or collectively (for instance in Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). 
In addition, and linking back to classical pluralist and neo-corporatist traditions (see 
Wilks 2013: 24ff. for more detailed elaboration), these studies depict corporations as 
legitimate but exceptional actors due to their structural power at the international 
level (the most prominent examples include Strange 1996; Levy and Newell 2005; 
Fuchs 2007; and Falker 2008; all also cited in Ougaard 2010: 22). This structural 
                                               
17 For an alternative review of the literature on corporations specifically focusing on corporate power, 
see Wilks (2013: 21ff.) or Dunning (2001). 
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power is attributed either to companies’ ‘centrality to economic growth and thereby to 
societal wealth and economic well-being in capitalist societies’ (Ougaard 2010: 22) 
or to the specialized expert knowledge required for understanding and assessing 
complex technological and production processes vital for setting-up effective 
regulatory mechanisms (ibid.). The non-materialist or ideational and discursive 
structure legitimizing corporate power has been investigated by Neo-Gramscian 
approaches (Cox 1987; Gill 1990; Soederberg 2010), or more recently in 
constructivist accounts (Kollmann 2008; Woll 2008; Best 2010; Blyth 2010). Finally, 
and outside Fuchs’ differentiation, the most far-reaching arguments about corporate 
power have been articulated from the perspective of theories on elitism by authors 
such as Useem (1984), Van der Pijl (1998) or Sklair (2001). Sklair (2001), for 
example, proposes the existence of a transnational managerial or capitalist class 
which includes high-profile individuals from public-management, the judicial and 
executive sector and civil society and which through their closeness to power and by 
promoting business-friendly principles exercise tremendous influence on the 
international level. 
The third, and arguably much broader, category includes approaches in which 
corporations are depicted as partners in governance (see previous sections), which 
according to Ougaard is linked to the broader literature on Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR). This perspective ‘is concerned with wider societal and 
environmental consequences of business activities and goes beyond the regulation 
of these activities per se’ (Ougaard 2010: 25). In order to ‘reflect recent changes in 
the socio-economic conditions for economic actors in a globalizing world‘ (Richter 
2010: 625), the literature on Business Ethics has, for example, recently expanded its 
concepts of CSR and Corporate Citizenship in an aim to acknowledge the political 
role of companies (see Parker 2002; Matten and Crane 2005; Moon et al. 2005; 
Scherer et al. 2006; Scherer and Palazzo 2007; Crane et al. 2008; Rasche et al. 
2008).18 This category of studies focuses on the already described codes of conduct, 
PPPs and MSIs, predominantly raising questions about their development and 
effectiveness (Ougaard 2010: 24). Additionally, however, this literature articulates 
questions about legitimacy and accountability of these mechanisms (Koenig-
Archibugi 2004; Dingwerth and Pattberg 2009). 
                                               
18 For critical reflections on these concepts, see Néron (2010) and Van Oosterhout (2008). 
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The most prominent studies in this regard stipulate the emergence of ‘private 
authority’, (Cutler et al. 1999; Hall and Bierstecker 2002), ‘a new role for the private 
sector’ (Haufler 2001) or ‘transnational private governance’ (Graz and Nolke 2008), 
explained predominantly with instrumentalist and functionalist arguments: The 
conventional literature on global governance, for example, highlights a ‘power shift‘ 
in favour of private actors (Mathews 1997), based on their superior resources, such 
as financial capital, and related to their expertise, such as managerial and technical 
skills. Public actors, particularly the state, are attributed with a loss in power, e.g. 
governance capacities, apparently demonstrated by the increased demand for 
solving global governance problems which were perceived to be neither manageable 
by a single state nor by state action alone (Strange 1996; Mathews 1997; Cusimano 
2003). Arguing against the background of diminishing state capacities attributed to 
the consequences of globalization, the emergence of private authority is linked to 
fulfilling governance tasks such as the collaborative provision of ‘global public goods’ 
(Kaul et al. 1999). According to this line of argumentation, private actors are granted 
authority because they have the capacities, due to financial and technical resources 
and skills, to effectively solve particular problems. This problem-solving capacity 
translates into a specific, “private”, type of authority which is not required to be 
legitimised by votes but includes a formal or informal element of delegation (Ougaard 
2010: 24, further studies on private authority include, for example, Hall and 
Bierstecker 2002; Rittberger et al. 2008; Avant et al. 2010). 
To summarise this section, it can be stated that in recent years the academic 
literature has seen a proliferation in studies on business and politics which aim at 
explaining and assessing the trend towards increased inclusion of corporations into 
international and global governance mechanisms. This trend is particularly evident in 
the literature on global governance. Nevertheless, it is important to note that 
investigating internationally operating corporations as political actors in their own 
right (Ougaard 2010: 4), as already called for by Eden (1991), is still a comparably 
recent phenomenon: ‘The business corporation is arguably the most influential and 
the least studied institution in contemporary political life’ (Wilks 2013: 1).19 
                                               
19 However, despite the fact that business has ’only recently become a central research theme in its 
own right (...) there is a long history of scholarly interests in aspects of the topic’ (Ougaard 2010: 2), 
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Against this background, the following section will illustrate and identify two sets of 
limitations and the corresponding gaps still prevalent in the literature on business in 
global governance. The first set of problems argues that conventional theoretical 
frameworks, which rely on a fixed-image of the corporation, impose several 
problematic limitations on the research. The second set of problems particularly 
outlines the limitations in current approaches to corporate power. 
The first set of limitations is arguably indebted to the overall reliance on conventional 
theoretical frameworks such as liberal institutionalism, pluralism or neo-corporatism. 
As much as these perspectives have provided valuable insights into the role of 
business and corporate political power, it is also important to note that they limit the 
researcher’s viewpoint in ways which might prevent a more nuanced and complex 
picture of corporations as political actors: Firstly, these studies are usually designed 
as ex-post facto explanations of corporate power. Thus, corporate power is 
conceptualised as dependent variable to be explained while the conceptual 
framework suggests a set of potential explanatory factors which serve as 
independent variables. Although generating insights into the effects of corporate 
power, these approaches offer only limited conceptual tools which would help to 
identify and understand the operation of corporate power in practice and in real-time. 
However, as this research argues, these aspects of corporate power are important to 
access for a more comprehensive picture of the manifold ways by which corporate 
power operates.  
Secondly, there is a tendency to reproduce established dichotomies such as 
state/market, public/private or economic/political and thus predetermine our 
understanding of the agency, role and contribution of corporations. A good illustrative 
example is Virginia Haufler’s (2001) A Public Role for the Private Sector in which the 
value and scope of industry self-regulation is pinned against the conventional modes 
of governance by authoritative governments.20 Dichotomies, however, as the post-
structuralist literature has established, are intrinsically hierarchical and therefore 
                                                                                                                                                  
such as incentives for and impact of FDI to national economies or a focus on GVCs (for a review of 
this early literature, see Ougaard 2010: 3-20). 
20 A more recent example would be Benedicte Bull’s chapter ‘Rethinking Multilateralism’ in which the 
author presents the following argument ‘PPPs are examples of what may be termed ‘market 
multilaterlism’. In terms of process, it describes the emergence of a system that coordinates relations 
not only between states, but also between private for-profit and non-profit actors. The boundaries of 
this collaboration tend to beset by the interests of key market actors, that is: large corporations’ (Bull 
2010: 182, quotation marks in the original). 
27 
problematic (see for example Walker 1993). Their underlying message suggests that 
one side of the dichotomy is more legitimate or should be privileged which results in 
discriminatory practices. The public-private dichotomy, in particular, has been at the 
forefront of criticism from a feminist perspective (examples include Pateman 1983; 
Thornton 1991). In the literature on globalisation, for instance, the strength of private 
actors is assumed to build on the weakness of public actors. For example, it is 
against a background which privileges public regulation against which Haufler’s 
research questions are developed:  
How should we view these developments? Do they signify a new trend in how 
corporations behave and what expectations society has of them? Or are they simply 
an effort to distract attention from an underlying disconnect between the interests of 
the private sector and those of the public? (2001: 14). 
The third limiting tendency includes the explicit or implicit reliance on and prevalence 
of a fixed actor-image of business corporations as ‘atomised, unitary and essentially 
rational’ (Amoore 2000: 185; Palan 2000: 15).21 This depiction does not reflect the 
variety of corporate agents in terms of size, activity, governance and culture and in 
many ways reflects the treatment of states as like-units or unitary actors in IR.22 
Lacking variety and complexity, the literature consists of either collective approaches 
referring to industries, e.g. the extractive industries, the pharmaceutical companies, 
or (occasionally) single company case studies. To the author’s knowledge, there is 
no global governance study on individual corporate representatives. How prevalent 
this depiction still is can be illustrated by a special issue of Business & Politics (2010) 
on ‘Private Regulation in the Global Economy’. Editor Büthe summarises the findings 
in the literature with regard to the question of why business actors might demand 
private regulation, with classical rationalist findings such as seeking to increase 
efficiency, reduce costs or secure commercial opportunities (2010: 4).23 Arguably, 
this tendency for reliance on a fixed actor-image is tied to macro-structural 
                                               
21 For a brief critical review of theoretical approaches on corporations, such as Transaction Cost 
Analysis, refer to Phillips (2000), for a more comprehensive account, see Dunning (2001). 
22 This is predominantly done in the rationalist IR tradition, namely neo-realism and neo-liberalism 
theoretical frameworks which treat states as like-units or black-boxes with rational and predictable 
behaviour. For a more detailed elaboration on merits and limitations of treating states as persons refer 
to Wendt (2004), Ashley (1984), or Skinner (1999).  
23 Constructivist authors, such as Brown et al. (2010), argue that in order to understand the 
motivations of business actors for engaging in political activities, research needs to open up the black-
box proposed by the unitary, rational actor theory. In addition, it needs to assess external structural 
factors, such as political or legal frameworks, which shape the decision-making process within the 
corporations and enable processes of socialisation into norms (see also Hofferberth et al. 2011). 
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theoretical approaches and their quest for generalisations at the expanse of 
relational, in-depth case-studies which would allow for taking the idea of business as 
an independent actor seriously. This is not only evident in the literature on IPE24 but 
also in IR’s development and policy-orientated literature, for example on the 
resource curse. It can also be found, for instance, in Fuchs who explicitly positions 
her book on Business Power in Global Governance as a ‘birds-eye perspective’ 
(2007: 5).25 In contrast, it is the constructivist literature which provides a glimpse into 
the existing variety of business in politics: Cornelia Woll illustrates how, far from 
being pre-determined, firm’s interests should rather be understood as socially 
constructed through sense-making under the condition of uncertainty: ‘When faced 
with new stakes, firms are initially confused and need to learn about their nature and 
functioning’ (Woll 2010: 153). At the same time, Kelly Kollman elaborates on the 
regulatory power of business norms, identifying a ‘(...) bias in political science 
against viewing firms as social or socializable institutions’ (2008: 397). In addition, 
Carola Kantz (2007) illustrates how the diamond industry became an active 
participant in the establishment of a certification scheme for conflict diamonds, 
known as the Kimberley Process, which is traced back to the ‘power of socialization’, 
and authors such as Flohr et al. (2010) elaborate on the prospects of firms acting as 
norm-entrepreneurs in areas of limited statehood or conflict, thereby promoting 
norms and standards which have not yet been established by the local authorities. In 
more general terms, authors such as Abdelal et al. (2010) highlight the potential 
contribution of constructivist approaches for understanding and explaining economic 
processes and behaviours against the limitation of the predominant materialist and 
instrumentalist explanations (2010: 2f.). According to these authors, the 
constructivist approach reflects much better on the existing empirical reality since it 
allows researchers to focus on the agency of corporations, aims to conceptualise 
them as norm-sensitive actors, and furthermore takes a look inside the firm to 
investigate motivations. What is ultimately missing, so the argument presented, is a 
direct engagement with business actors as embedded in a particular social context 
                                               
24 Leander summarises for instance, how ‘approaches to the firm, and the behaviour of multinationals, 
most commonly referred to in IPE, centres on oligopolistic market conditions, market imperfections, 
and strategic behaviour (Gilpin 1975; Kindleberger 1979, cited in Leaner 2000: 193), on 
neoinstutionalisms (Dunning 1988, cited in ibid.) and on product cycle arguments (Casson 1987, cited 
in ibid.) 
25 To Fuchs’ credit, the author aims at establishing a comprehensive theoretical framework against 
identified weaknesses in existing empirical case-studies which lack such a “big picture” perspective. 
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which includes companies’ experiences, perceptions and reflections of their political 
practice.26 In IPE, constructivism has gained prominence in recent years, as 
demonstrated by the number of examples included above.  
The second set of limitations is linked to the necessity for further research into 
corporate power despite recently increased interest by authors such as May (2006), 
Bernhagen (2007) or Wilks (2013). Firstly, corporate power is either still 
predominately conceptualised as direct and/or structural, focusing on companies’ 
lobbying capacities or agenda- setting power or approached through what is 
described as the regulative power of norms in the constructivist literature: 
’Adherence to a norm excludes particular actions by defining what is possible and 
impossible to say and thus do in a given context’ (Abdelal et al. 2010: 13). This 
indicates that even in the constructivist literature the question of corporate power is 
often not directly addressed, and that there has not yet been much inclusion of or 
engagement with postmodern or post-structuralist concepts which indicates the 
potential for expanding and refining existing conceptual approaches. Such limitations 
are evident in studies centred on materialist and ideational structures, such as 
hegemonic ideas privileging business (examples include Dashwood 2012; Blyth 
2010; Chwieroth 2010; Flohr et al.2010).  
Consequently, Best identifies the necessity to “bring power back in”: 
We cannot gain an adequate understanding of the power relations at work in the 
contemporary global economy without (...) integrating into constructivist analysis 
some of the insights of the more critical and postmodernist variations of constructivist 
theory (2010: 194).  
Secondly, in most studies on corporate power, individual companies and corporate 
agency are rarely the focus. In studies on international elitism, for example, 
corporate power is not approached as a singular phenomenon but as integrated into 
structuralist frameworks in which influential corporations and their leading individuals 
become part of a dominant class or elite, again subsuming individuals and individual 
companies into broader categories (see Sklair 2001). At the same time, a number of 
studies focus on the effects of corporate power in a particular field rather than being 
interested in corporations as actors per se. An illustrative example is Fuchs and 
Kalfagianni’s study on private food governance (2010). In other studies corporations 
                                               
26 A view also stressed by sociological institutionalism, as summarised in Leander (2000). 
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become strategic instruments of states, a perspective which denies them individual, 
independent agency, for example evident in an article by Soederberg’s article on the 
Global Compact:  
The point that Ruggie, like many mainstream global governance theorists, tends to 
ignore is that the ‘global reach and capacity’ of corporations is not a natural 
occurrence driven by the unstoppable forces of globalization, but instead a social 
construct authored and legitimated by bourgeois states across the globe to serve 
particular class interests’ interests (Soederberg 2006, cited in Soederberg 2007: 
503). 
In summary, further research on the internationally operating business corporations 
is required, as this is arguably the least well studied actor at the international stage 
when compared to states, international organisations or civil society. Furthermore, 
more refined approaches to corporate power are required which a) enable the 
researcher to depict and understand the political practice of individual companies 
and corporate representatives in greater empirical detail, e.g. in practice, while b) 
taking the companies’ self-image, experiences and perceptions into account.  
1.2.  Approach and case study 
Reflecting on the promises and limitations of the renewed interest in business actors 
and the literature on corporations and global governance, this project investigates 
corporate political practice and corporate political power from a sociological 
perspective (see chapter two on concepts and methods). For approaching both 
phenomena, corporate political practices and power, this study found in the writings 
of Pierre Bourdieu a promising theoretical framework which, re-elaborated, guides 
the fieldwork and interpretation. With Bourdieu this research shares an interest in 
power and its sources of legitimacy and assumes that power relationships are 
established and maintained through practices. 
Bourdieu has produced a fascinating and extensive body of work which centres on 
the workings of power and domination in French society. However, in recent years, 
the potential of Bourdieu’s conceptual framework has been re-discovered in various 
academic disciplines such as Organisational Analysis (see Emirbayer and Johnson 
2008) or Management Studies (for example McLean et al. 2006), and more 
interestingly for this project, in the international realm in International Political 
Sociology or IR (see Bigo 2011; Adler-Nissen 2013). In Bourdieu’s relational and 
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context specific framework practices play an important role for understanding social 
action. This emphasis on ‘things people do’ (Leander 2008: 14) has been re-
introduced into social science and particularly the study of world politics by seminal 
books and articles such as Schatzki et al. (2001), Neumann (2002) or Pouliot (2008). 
This focus became known as the “practice-turn”.27 Thereby, the probably most 
coherent elaboration on how practices can be conceptualised within a constructivist 
framework for understanding world politics has been elaborated by Emanuel Adler 
and Vincent Pouliot (2011a and b). 
Bourdieu’s conceptual framework provides an interesting entry point for the analysis 
of power by stressing in particular the importance of practices and the function they 
perform for establishing and maintaining power-relations and hierarchies in social 
situations. Following his line of thought, practices reflect the structure against which 
they are performed. For Bourdieu,there exists a specific ‘background knowledge’ 
(Pouliot 2008: 258) which enables actors, according to their resources and given 
their intuitive understanding of the field, to act and react in a social situation. As 
Pouliot puts it, the basic advantage of this approach lies in conceptually grasping a 
previously inaccessible dimension of social action, the idea ‘that most of what people 
do, in world politics as in any other social ﬁeld, does not derive from conscious 
deliberation or thoughtful reﬂection – instrumental, rule-based, communicative, or 
otherwise. Instead, practices are the result of inarticulate, practical knowledge that 
makes what is to be done appear “self-evident” or commonsensical’ (2008: 258, 
quotation marks in the original).  
In this project the focus is on particular practices – what is defined as corporate 
political practice – meaning institutionalised activities, including decision- and rule 
making, performed by representatives of companies at the international level. This 
study aims for approaching, depicting and interpreting these practices by applying a 
mixed-method approach relying on text-analysis, interviews and participant 
observation. In order to provide an in-depth, ethnographical account of corporate 
political practices at the international level, a multi-stakeholder initiative was selected 
according to the following criteria: a) it operates at the international level, b) it aims at 
regulating a particular issue of international relevance and c) it grants decision-
                                               
27 Please note, however, that these writings do not exclusively focus on Bourdieu.  
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making rights to MNCs at the international Board level. The Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) was selected, a Standard which serves as an excellent 
example for the promises, challenges and pitfalls associated with the inclusion of 
MNCs into international governance processes as the course of this research will 
demonstrate. 
The EITI is discussed in depth in chapter three. The Standard can be described as a 
sort of “prototype” of a MSI at the international level. It is composed of stakeholders 
from civil society, business and governments which are granted equal decision-
making rights. Moreover, EITI was launched at the WSSD held in Johannesburg, 
South Africa, in 2002, at the peak of the partnership-rhetoric (see previous section 
on corporations as political actors on the international stage). Furthermore, an EITI 
case study leads to the investigation of corporations from the extractive sectors (in 
addition to institutional investors), which have already been well studied, as will be 
detailed in the following paragraph. 
Arguably, what makes the EITI an exciting and promising case study is the issue 
area in which it operates and the problem it addresses: the extraction and 
governance of natural resources. The Standard operates against the background of 
a perplexing empirical phenomenon: according to an estimation by the EITI almost 
75% of the world’s impoverished population live in developing countries such as 
Botswana, Congo or Cote d’Ivoire, that are rich in non-renewable natural resources, 
such as crude oil, gas or minerals (i.e. coltan, gold, copper or diamonds). The story 
goes that an economically efficient and sustainable management of these resources 
would not only allow these countries to reduce poverty and increase the standard of 
living of their citizens but at the same time generate economic growth, as impressive 
examples such as Norway or Sweden are understood to have demonstrated. In 
contrast, and also illuminated by various present and historical case-studies, 
ineffective governance leads to an increase in poverty, corruption and the likelihood 
of conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2000; LeBillon 2001). With the latter being much more 
frequently observed, the phenomenon became known as the resource curse or 
paradox of plenty (Auty 1993; Karl 1997). Broadly speaking, a country affected by 
the resource curse is characterised by lower rates of economic growth as well as 
higher rates of poverty than resource-poor countries, in addition to a strong 
dependence of the state apparatus on the resource revenues. Today, countries 
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affected by the resource curse are predominantly geographically centred in central 
Africa (examples include Sierra-Leone, Congo), the Caucasus (Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan), and in Latin-America (Venezuela, Peru).  
Since the 2000s, it can be observed how the formerly domestic problem of weak 
governance performance by national and local institutions and authorities has 
become a global governance problem tackled by a number of MSIs. All of these new 
governance mechanisms are linked by the involvement of non-state actors and aim 
to promote good governance and sustainable development (see both concepts 
discussed in chapter four). The most prominent examples with regard to the 
extraction of natural resources are: The Kimberley Process that aims to prevent the 
re-financing of rebel armies by the illegal trade of so-called “blood diamonds” through 
the mechanism of certification (Kantz 2008; Wright 2004). The Chad-Cameroon Oil 
Pipeline is a project initiated by the World Bank based on the idea that private 
investment can induce public investments into sectors such as health or education 
(Horta 2012; Pegg 2006).28 More recently, the Natural Resource Charter has been 
established, a set of guiding principles for governments and civil society, proposed 
by the Natural Resource Governance Institute. In the decade since its inception, the 
EITI Standard has constantly increased in scope and numbers, and is these days a 
prime example of voluntary disclosure by multi-stakeholder governance. 
Moreover, the case of resource-management in developing countries is particularly 
interesting for an inquiry on corporate power, since an established literature on 
extractive industries already exists which indicates that the relationship between 
resource-rich countries and large-scale extractive business is highly asymmetrical in 
terms of knowledge and negotiation skills as well as financial capacities. These 
asymmetries often result in long-term mining-contracts that are regarded as not 
suitable for the public good since they generally favour the corporations involved and 
the governing elite of the country (Gary and Karl 2003; Stiglitz 2006). Assuming the 
standard rational economic actor model it should be expected that for the extractive 
industries the incentive to participate in this new initiative as well as of sticking to the 
rules in general is not too tempting, because they would gain a much larger profit by 
                                               
28 More detailed description of the World Bank’s project is available from: 
http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64283627&piPK=73230&theSitePK=40941
&menuPK=228424&Projectid=P044305.  
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maintaining the previous situation. Nevertheless, there are numerous examples of 
companies participating in MSI aiming to regulate this issue are. The academic 
literature thus identified a number of particular characteristics which make extractive 
industries differ from other companies. Characteristics which presumably also 
contributed to the existing variety of studies on the extractive sector (see Soares de 
Oliveira 2007; Frynas 2009; Zimmer 2010; Dashwood 2012).  
Firstly, the extractive industries are usually selected in academic studies due to their 
size, impact and public visibility which automatically pose questions about their 
intentions, their influence and the consequences of their political engagement. This 
is particularly evident with regard to the oil and gas companies which are regular 
targets of civil society campaigns and media coverage. Secondly, due to the nature 
of their business, they are assumed to be more interested in political stability than 
other sectors and some authors even call on the extractive industries to participate in 
conflict prevention (Nelson 2002: 515; Banfield et al. 2003; Gyarmati 2004). In 
contrast to other corporations, such as the textile industries, extractive industries 
neither have the same choice of locations, nor a similar degree of flexibility. They 
need to operate in areas where natural resources can be found which frequently are 
conflict-prone or authoritarian countries. At the same time, the extraction of natural 
resources is linked to comparably high initial investment cost, needed for instance to 
establish plants, secure transportation routes and build pipelines, in consequence 
this is said to cause extractive industries to calculate their operation in a long-term 
run. Withdrawing from a country because of political instability or even violent conflict 
is therefore always extremely costly. This leads to the consequence that extractive 
industries usually establish contracts which are long–term and have to be negotiated 
with public actors, usually government representative (Ottoway 2004: 124-155: Böge 
et al. 2006: 11). Thirdly, a number of academic studies have suggested that the 
presence of natural resources increases the likelihood of violent conflict as well as 
corruption and mismanagement. This puts the focus on national-level operations of 
extractive industries, as well as on the social and environmental consequences for 
the local population and the country’s political stability (Collier and Hoeffler 2000; 
Gary and Karl 2003; Banfield et al. 2003; Bailes and Frommelt 2004; Ballentine and 
Nietzschke 2005; Deitelhoff and Wolf 2010). In summary, these characteristics make 
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the extractive industries are a very promising candidate for research on corporate 
power and corporate political activity in international governance processes. 
1.3.  Research questions and outline 
Against the background of an emerging consensus on MNCs as political actors at 
the international level which is accompanied by a presumed increased in political 
power, this research aims at understanding how corporate political power operates in 
practice. Thus, it focuses on a single governance institution, the EITI Standard, and 
a particular sector, e.g. major proponents of the extractive industries. 
This research project is guided by the following main research questions: 
 How does corporate power operate through political practices in international 
multi-stakeholder governance processes, such as the EITI Standard? 
 How is corporate political power legitimised in international natural resource 
governance? 
 What are the consequences of corporate power on EITI’s design and 
performance? 
 What can be concluded about the political role of the extractive industries in 
the EITI Standard? 
As stated in the previous section, this research primarily aims at accessing, 
describing and interpreting corporate political practices in the EITI. Therefore, this 
study not only examines how corporate political representation actually works on the 
international stage of the EITI but also how corporate power can transcend 
governance mechanisms more broadly. This includes how individuals participate and 
contribute to the process as international Board Directors of the EITI and how they 
experience and understand the practice and their role; how the extractive sector and 
institutional investors are represented collectively as a stakeholder group subsumed 
under company constituency, and how this form of representational practice works; 
the interpretation of underlying shared beliefs which empower and legitimise the 
corporations as political agents in the process; and finally the investigation and 
interpretation of the ways in which individual corporations and their representatives 
hold and exercise power.  
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This thesis is organised as follows: This introductory chapter outlined the dominant 
role of large corporations in the global political economy and their increasing 
contribution to global governance. The following chapter two elaborates the 
conceptual framework and the methods for approaching and assessing corporate 
power. The first part of chapter two introduces the concepts of corporate symbolic 
power and political practice based on Bourdieu’s broader conceptual framework. The 
second part presents how the methods have been applied for accessing these 
practices, mapping the arena and identifying legitimizing beliefs. EITI will thus be 
examined as a social arena characterised by underlying power-structures between 
the players which are fundamentally based on an unequal distribution of material and 
non-material resources. It is assumed that the dominant position of large 
corporations as described in the beginning paragraphs of this chapter translates into 
a privileged position for the companies in the arena, and becomes directly 
observable in practices at the expense of other, not well-resourced players. 
Chapter three starts by outlining EITI’s history as a means of understanding the state 
of the power-struggle between the players at the time of EITI’s inception, thereby 
particularly highlighting the role the business community played throughout EITI’s 
establishment. This is followed by a brief description of how EITI functions at the 
national and international level. In the final section EITI’s performance is evaluated 
and the Nigerian EITI experience is introduced as a case study for assessing the 
effects of national level implementation. Chapter three thus provides the first building 
block in understanding the inner workings of EITI as a social arena, including the 
players, the functioning and the history of the process. It outlines how the business 
community managed to essentially shift the focus of regulation from business to 
governments – an early demonstration of the industry’s influence on the process 
which paves the way for a substantial privilege (as the following chapters will further 
demonstrate). The evaluation concludes that EITI’s output has significantly increased 
the amount of information available on resource revenues in implementing countries. 
At the same time, however, there is limited evidence suggesting the Standard has 
had the intended outcome and impact, i.e. makes a positive contribution towards 
improved living conditions and poverty reduction in resource-rich countries. This 
raises fundamental questions about EITI’s legitimacy and the Standard’s ability for 
reformation.  
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Chapter four aims at understanding how the companies’ status and participation is 
legitimised, assembling another building block for understanding the inner workings 
of the Standard and the role played by companies therein. In this chapter, three 
“shared beliefs” are traced and examined which underline broader international 
discourses on natural resource governance. Following a Bourdieusian line of 
thought, the argument presented suggests that these beliefs function as background 
knowledge legitimizing companies. They transport an arbitrary, business privileging 
perspective on natural resource extraction and the problems attached to it which 
portrays business players as positive, responsible and exceptional, e.g. partners in 
regulation rather than objects of regulation. This perspective has a tendency to 
down-play companies’ agency, prevents a more comprehensive ethical debate on 
the causes and consequences of poverty, conflict and environmental degradation 
linked to resource extraction and at the same time places the primary burden for the 
problems on the shoulders of governments. These beliefs are observable in 
discourses and practice in the EITI as well as identifiable in the Standard’s principles 
and procedures as the following chapters will demonstrate. 
Chapters five and six present findings regarding the collective and individual 
representation of companies at EITI’s international level. Chapter five begins by 
elaborating on the business cases for EITI participation for oil and gas, the miners 
and the investors. It continues by summarizing the requirements for EITI participation 
and the different degrees of engagement with the EITI, before exploring in greater 
detail how the companies are collectively represented in the Standard as company 
constituency. The final section elaborates on inconsistencies displayed, and 
interprets them against the background of the shared beliefs elaborated in the 
previous chapter. Chapter six then specifically explores the representational practice 
of the individual corporate Board Directors, examining their education, recruitment, 
mandate and personal qualities. It explicitly takes into account corporate 
representatives experiences and reflections on EITI participation. In addition, the 
leadership role played by some members of the company constituency is interpreted 
against Bourdieu’s concept of political capital. Thus, it becomes evident that the 
granting of decision-making rights at EITI’s Board table has provided companies with 
access to a symbolic form of authority. After tracing EITI’s history and evaluating its 
performance in chapter three as well as investigating shared beliefs legitimizing their 
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status and influence in chapter four, chapters five and six provide insights into the 
actual practice of company’s political representation and action and thus further 
complement our understanding of the Standard. It becomes evident that corporate 
political practice is based on economic, social and cultural forms of capital. In 
addition, the argument is presented that the companies’ superior access to these 
types of capital, particularly EITI-specific expertise in addition to the symbolic 
authority which stems from decision-making rights, further enhances their already 
privileged position in the process. 
Against this background, chapter seven examines the multiple consequences of 
corporate power on the EITI, thereby confirming the expectations deduced from 
Bourdieu’s framework in the previous chapters two and four, while helping to 
understand EITI’s limited performance on the ground. These findings confirm that 
businesses’ privileged position is consolidated and constantly perpetuated in the 
Standard, mostly at the expense of the representatives from resource-rich countries 
and particularly members of local civil society – the least-well resourced, and thus 
disadvantaged, players in the arena. The effects of corporate power are directly 
observable in EITI’s decision-making and strategy, and less directly observable in 
the Standard’s principles and procedures. Consequently, this research concludes 
that the EITI, far from levelling the playing field as the emphasis on transparency and 
inclusiveness would suggest, ultimately reproduces underlying power asymmetries in 
the broader field of international natural resource governance. Moreover, this re-
enforcement, particularly of business power, explains the Standard’s limited ability to 
improve the living conditions of ordinary people in developing countries, as it was 
precisely this asymmetry of power which was at the centre of the problem in the first 
place, as chapter one has illustrated. 
It is against the background of a global capitalist economy which enabled the rise of 
MNCs as influential political actors at the international stage, against which an 
examination of corporate political power becomes of paramount importance and 
towards which this research aims at contributing theoretically and empirically. At the 
same time this global economy is driven by and prospers only from an ongoing 
hunger for natural resources while international organisations, donor agencies, 
policy-makers and development academics still search for a cure of the resource 
curse and engage in the global fight against poverty amidst growing rates of 
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inequalities. In consequence it becomes evident that the international level 
governance of natural resources is an important issue area in which the EITI 
Standard takes central stage. In many ways, the EITI can be portrayed as a “model”-
multi-stakeholder institution, in which large extractive companies hold the same 
voting- and decision-making rights as representatives of small local communities in 
African countries; and which upholds transparency, inclusiveness and voluntariness 
as fundamental principles of collaboration. Therefore, this research’s findings can 
provide valuable lessons not only for understanding how a dominant position within 
the world economy translates into actual political practices, but also, as the following 
chapter will begin to demonstrate, for assessing the very possibilities for effective 
and accountable multi-stakeholder global governance in the face of corporate power. 
Chapter eight, the conclusion, comes back to this argument. It also summarises how 
the thesis responds to the research questions outlined above. 
  
40 
 
  
41 
2. A sociological approach to corporate political power in practice 
The introductory chapter established how corporate power, and more precisely the 
political influence of MNCs, is assumed to have increased since the mid-1980s due 
to a growth in numbers, size and scope. It is evident that increased corporate power 
at the international level calls for investigation into the phenomenon. In particular, the 
engagement of corporations into rule- and decision-making requires in-depth 
empirical engagement guided by comprehensive conceptual frameworks. In order to 
overcome some of the limitations of research on corporations as outlined in the 
previous chapter one, this research proposes a sociological approach, in which 
corporations and their representatives are examined as agents embedded within a 
particular social setting. This perspective applies ethnographical methods and allows 
for understanding of the practices involved in exercising and maintaining power 
relations. This chapter relies on the writings of Pierre Bourdieu as a leading 
contemporary sociologist and critical intellectual. It is composed of two main parts 
which complement each other. In the first, the reader will be introduced to the 
conceptual framework, the second elaborates on methods and fieldwork.  
The chapter starts by introducing Bourdieu’s work more broadly, before discussing 
field, habitus and capital as key conceptual tools in his analytical approach and 
introducing the ways in which the concepts are applied in this study. Moreover, for 
approaching and interpreting companies’ participation and influence in international 
governance mechanisms, the concepts of corporate symbolic authority and 
corporate political practice are elaborated. Finally, expectations for the fieldwork are 
deduced from the conceptual framework. 
The second part, elaborates on how Bourdieu’s practice approach has been applied 
in order to identify, depict and understand corporate political practice and ultimately 
corporate political power. It starts by summarizing Pouliot’s (2013) suggested way 
forward and emphasises the complementary function of a mixed-method approach 
which consists of document analysis, participant observation and qualitative 
interviews. Moreover, it describes the encounter with the EITI Standard and its 
participants. The chapter closes by explaining how applying mixed methods was vital 
for generating the findings and ultimately answering the research questions.  
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2.1. Conceptual framework 
This research relies on a Bourdieusian-inspired approach to power. However, 
Bourdieu’s work, although in many ways exceptional, has not been the only 
approach towards conceptualizing power, and more relevant for this study, corporate 
power. As already discussed in the introductory chapter, corporate power is often 
approached in analytical terms which differentiate between structural, instrumental 
and discursive dimensions (see Fuchs 2007; Wilks 2013) or favour one dimension 
over the other (see Caroll 2010 or Soederberg 2010 for a structural approach; 
Bernhagen 2007 for an instrumental). The following sections propose a relational, 
practice-orientated approach to corporate power which is inspired by Bourdieu’s 
writings and which will contribute to a more nuanced, more detailed understanding of 
how corporate power operates and manifests in the EITI (see research questions in 
the previous chapter). In addition, the suggested conceptualisation of corporate 
power also relies on more recent elaborations of some of Bourdieu’s key concepts 
which have been developed for the context of the international realm.29 
2.1.1. A short introduction to Pierre Bourdieu’s work 
In his writings, French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002) approaches social 
reality with a keen interest in depicting and understanding the operation of power, 
mechanisms of domination and the establishment of hierarchies in society. Sensitive 
to existing limitations in the theoretical approaches and metatheoretical debates of 
his time,30 Bourdieu developed a comprehensive conceptual framework, re-
elaborating concepts and thoughts by Weber, Marx and Durkheim. In focusing on 
understanding corporate power in political practice at the international level (as 
elaborated in the introductory chapter) it is evident that this research shares with 
Bourdieu a general interest in power and practices which signals the suitability of this 
conceptual framework for this study. Another component which indicates that 
Bourdieu’s work could enhance contemporary understanding of power and 
contribute towards improving this study’s research outcomes is a particularly 
distinctive feature of his conceptual framework: Bourdieu shifts the conventional 
                                               
29 Particularly helpful has been Adler-Nissen (2013) Bourdieu in International Relations. Rethinking 
Key Concepts in IR. 
30 Such as between proponents of subjectivism and objectivism, see Bourdieu (2005), editor’s preface 
for greater detail. 
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focus of investigations of power from discourses and representations, things 
identifiable via communications and documents, in favour of the ‘things people do’, 
the practices, as Leander puts it (2008: 14). His conceptual framework consists of 
three core concepts31 – field, habitus and capital – in which social reality is 
represented as a complex network of power relations, agents and structures.32 They 
will be elaborated in greater detail in the following sections of this chapter.  
Broadly speaking, Bourdieu attempts to understand and explain how hierarchies and 
power relations are developed and maintained in a given social situation through a 
variety of conscious and sub-conscious ways of thinking, acting and communicating 
by all actors involved, sometimes even to a degree where the dominated perpetuate 
their own powerlessness (Leander 2008: 13). The two most important examples of 
this approach are The State Nobility. Elite Schools in the Field of Power (1996), 
where he examines how the French higher education system serves as an 
institutionalised mechanism for maintaining and reproducing the powerful influence 
of a small elite over the French state. And Distinction: a Social Critique of the 
Judgement of Taste (1984), in which Bourdieu brings into light the relationship 
between social status and personal preferences, for example in music, food or 
architecture, arguing that taste and aesthetical judgements result from an individual’s 
position in society rather than originate from personalised or individual opinion.  
As these examples indicate, Bourdieu is generally known for his outstanding 
contribution towards understanding elites and elitism in French society, and as a 
result it took a while for social science scholars to engage with his legacy for two 
reasons in particular: Firstly, there has been the assumption that Bourdieu’s 
conceptual framework is too closely tight to France and French society, e.g. 
somewhat ‘nationally grounded’ as Bigo puts it, to be accessible for research on 
global topics or applicable at the international level (2011: 226).33 Secondly, what 
                                               
31 Leander (2008) calls them “thinking tools” in the title of her textbook chapter on qualitative methods. 
Swartz refers to them as ‘master concepts’ (2013: 20). 
32  As Bourdieu’s writings are manifold, this short section can neither elaborate in detail on the author 
nor on his body of work in an attempt to pay tribute. For a much broader introduction to Pierre 
Bourdieu’s life and writings see Jenkins (2002) or Grenfell (2004). For a discussion on how Bourdieu’s 
concepts can enrich the study of international relations, see Pouliot and Mérand (2013). 
33 Highly illustrative in this regard is the very first sentence of the preface to the English-language 
edition of Bourdieu’s Distinction in which the author chose to start as follows: ‘I have every reason to 
fear that this book will strike the reader as “very French” – which I know is not always a compliment’ 
(1984: xi, quotation marks in the original). 
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makes Bourdieu’s approach so unlike conventional theories, particularly in IR, is that 
even from a brief examination of his work it becomes obvious that Bourdieu has 
never bound himself to either a particular philosophical or sociological tradition, such 
as Postmodernism, Marxism, Subjectivism or Objectivism, nor one single method of 
investigation, instead he proposed a complex and rather unique conceptual 
framework and was a methodological pluralist, using ethnography and quantitative 
statistics in the same study. In a discipline that even today finds itself in the middle of 
a debate between positivism and post-positivism, a scholar such as Pierre Bourdieu 
is neither easy to categorise nor uncomplicated to include, a ‘strange animal in IR’ as 
Pouliot and Mérand describe him (2013: 25).  
However, it appears that such reservations have been mostly overcome these days 
as there is a notable trend in constructivist and postmodern social science research 
of various disciplines to refer to and apply the writings of Bourdieu in a similar way as 
it used to be fashionable to include Michel Foucault in the previous decade. Against 
the background of Bourdieu’s astonishing body of work as a sociologist, 
anthropologist and public intellectual, there is reason to assume that IR and IPE 
have only just begun to discover the potentials of his writings for approaching and 
understanding international politics.34 
2.1.2. The “thinking tools”: Field, habitus and capital 
This section introduces, as the title suggests, field, habitus and capital as the main 
concepts of Bourdieu’s framework. It aims to present the reader with this research’s 
interpretation of the concepts and indicating how they will be employed in this 
research. The reader will particularly note that it is intended to employ Bourdieu’s 
triangle of field, habitus and capital selectively. Essentially, field and habitus are 
used as supportive “thinking tools” serving the function of helping to depict and 
interpret the context in which the more central concepts of political capital and 
symbolic authority are embedded and in which corporate political practice takes 
place. 
 
                                               
34 For recent examples of such introductions, see Bernhard (2011), Hamati-Ataya (2012), Adler-
Nissen  (2011, 2013), Dezalay and Garth (2011), Eagelton-Pierce (2011, 2013), or Senn and Elhardt 
(2014). 
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The EITI as social arena 
Bourdieu’s framework approaches social reality through the entry point of a concept 
he denotes as field, in alternative framings referred to as ‘game’, ‘network’, 
‘configuration’ or ‘space’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 97ff), ‘market’ or ‘arena’ 
(Bourdieu 2005: 14). In analytical terms, the concept is defined as:  
(...) A network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions. These 
positions are objectively defined, in their existence and in the determinations they 
impose upon their occupants, agents or institutions, by their present and potential 
situation (situs) in the structure of the distribution of species of power (or capital) 
whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the 
field, as well as by their objective relation to other positions (domination, 
subordination, homology, etc.) (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 97, emphasis in the 
original). 
More to the point, a field is:  
A structured space of positions in which the position and their interrelations are 
determined by the distribution of different kinds of resource or ‘capital’ (Bourdieu 
2005: 14, quotation marks in the original). 
In the secondary literature, the essence of this concept is summarised as follows: 
‘Individuals are surrounded by space – physical and social – with degrees of 
proximity – close and distant. This space is differentiated and is structured’ (Grenfell 
2004: 27, emphasis in the original). In addition, Swartz highlights that a struggle for 
power, and thus control of the valued resources, is a field’s characteristic feature 
(1997: 122). 
The concept of field captures how Bourdieu anticipates social reality on a very basic 
level: agents are engaged in a constant struggle for domination which takes place 
within a confined space, or field, which is structured and structuring at the same 
time, as he calls it. Based on an understanding of social relations as embedded in a 
web of hierarchies, he presumes this space to reflect on the agents’ unequal 
standing or position vis-à-vis other agents (e.g. the field is structured). At the same 
time Bourdieu suggests that the way agents relate and respond to these structures 
shapes the agent’s identity and actions (e.g. the field is structuring). Thus, it is 
important to note for clarification that, contrary to an intuitive understanding, the 
concept of field does not depict a geographical territory but refers to a broader 
conceptualisation of a social relation which encompasses intertwined material and 
immaterial structures.  
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The applicability of the concept of field for this research is limited in two ways: Firstly, 
Bourdieu stresses that a particular field needs to be understood in relation to the 
broader or bigger field, in his vocabulary ‘vis-à-vis the field of power’ (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992: 104-105). In Bourdieu’s original settings, French or Algerian 
society, this broader field of power is the state as a superior organisational structure. 
Obviously, such a structure does not exist in the international realm as there is no 
global authority in the form of a world hegemon or super-state. As a result, this 
analytical tool which Bourdieu suggests for identifying the boundaries of a particular 
field is simply not applicable in this research. 
Secondly, reviewing his writings it is evident that fields usually depict rather broad 
spheres of social life, e.g. the economic sphere or the cultural sphere. It would be 
difficult to claim therefore that by investigating a single case study of international 
governance, e.g. the EITI Standard, the field of natural resource governance is 
depicted in its totality. In a re-elaboration of Bourdieu’s field approach for institutional 
analysis, Emirbayer and Johnson (2008) suggest that institutions themselves can be 
understood as fields (for a critique see Bigo 2011). This is an approach which 
appears to have much value, particularly with regard to analytical problems 
regarding identifying a field’s boundaries. However, in order to find empirical 
illustrations of what Bourdieu could have identified as a field, examples that come to 
mind are the World Trade Organization (WTO) (see Eagleton-Pierce 2013) or the 
United Nations System (see Bode 2015), institutions with a long history, 
considerable influence and composed of multiple bodies and actor-constellations. In 
contrast, the EITI is a singular standard-setting multi-stakeholder mechanism which 
does not have the same quality regarding presence and impact at the international 
level. However, as examples of Bourdieu’s work suggest, it is possible to 
concentrate on a particular problem or phenomenon and make broader assumptions 
about the field or fields it is embedded in. In The Social Structures of the Economy 
(2005) for example, he investigates the French housing market for understanding 
how the economic and political field are related, thus comprehensively describing the 
social consequence of more abstract economic structures.  
Reflecting on these limitations, this study assumes that EITI as an organisation 
displays the same mechanisms of domination which are captured by the concept of 
field. However, reflecting on its size and scope, EITI is also understood as operating 
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in the interface of several topics which could themselves be analysed as different 
fields at the international level, such as international security, international energy 
governance, or international development. Therefore, the EITI serves as a case-
study for generating broader observations about the social relations in which 
corporate political power is embedded. To mark this distinction in this thesis, the EITI 
Standard is referred to as an ‘arena’ or a ‘social space’.  
According to Pouliot and Mérand, ‘the field is a social space structured along three 
principal dimensions: power relations, objects of struggle, and the rules taken for 
granted within the field’ (2013: 30, citing Bourdieu 1993: 72-7). In response, this 
study applies the concept of field to the EITI for identifying the underlying power-
structure, more precisely the agents and their standing, the stakes, rules and the 
capital of the game.  
Power relations are dynamic and constantly evolving, as Bourdieu was well aware. 
This makes identifying and employing indicators difficult and the space and time for 
which the findings are valid naturally limited. In the researcher’s interpretation, 
Bourdieu is assumed to argue that it is merely possible to approach power relations 
in a singular moment in time, by employing mixed methods. In this vein, Emirbayer 
and Johnson suggest that institutions can be treated as a ‘structure or a temporary 
state of power relations within what is (...) an ongoing struggle for domination over 
the field’ (2008: 6, emphasis in the original). Following these thoughts it can be 
assumed that EITI’s institutional design reflects the state of the power struggle 
between the agents in the field of international natural resources governance at the 
time of EITI’s inception and can therefore help to identify the agents and stakes of 
the game. Engaging with the Standard through document analysis and interviews 
(see second part of this chapter for more details on methods), this study aims at 
identifying who initially participated in the EITI by engaging with the existing 
documents and press-releases for the time-period before EITI’s establishment in 
2002 and interviewing people who participated at this period of time). 
Moreover, what comes under closer examination for understanding how a social 
arena functions are the stakes of the game, as the following quote suggests:  
 
48 
Fields are defined by the stakes of the game in play, which are specific to each field: 
every field is relatively autonomous from the others precisely because it is the site of 
a specific struggle. To be sure, actors who refine their game within the field and 
engage in its battle will at least agree on one point: be it prestige, material gain, or 
the need to make a name for oneself (Pouliot and Mérand 2014: 30). 
Questions guiding the research will therefore be: What did these actors want to 
achieve or avoid and/or what where they fighting about/for at the time of EITI’s 
establishment? Furthermore, identifying the fundamental principles on which all 
actors have agreed in the EITI arena is relatively straightforward as they have been 
codified as the EITI Principles. These rules of the game do come as part of an 
explicit regulatory framework established and codified by the initiative which will be 
extracted through an analysis of the publically accessible documents and information 
(see following section on methods, specifically the section on document analysis), 
including questions such as: Who is granted access under which conditions? Again 
presuming that the entry qualifications reflect power relations, it should be interesting 
to observe what the requirements are, and to which amount the individual agents 
need to fulfil these requirements in order to be granted access. Furthermore: How do 
individuals become members of the Board? What are the responsibilities of the 
Board Directors, the Secretariat and the constituencies (see subsequent chapter for 
EITI’s institutional design). How precise are the rules and what mechanisms are in 
place to evaluate and reward compliance, punish unaccepted behaviour or even 
exclude actors from the arena. Most of these findings are summarised in chapters 
three and four which depict EITI’s history and functioning and offer an evaluation of 
its performance. In addition, chapter seven analyses EITI’s principles and 
procedures. 
For Bourdieu, social spaces, albeit hierarchically structured, are genuinely dynamic 
places of contestation. Once an institutional framework regarding a particular stake 
is established, it becomes very likely that conflicts and disagreements as well as the 
struggle over resources amongst the agents will result in shifts in power and will 
impact the functioning of the institutional framework. Thereby, the stakes of the 
arena will become visible and such struggles will help to understand the underlying 
struggle in greater detail. In case of the agents experiencing a fundamental shift in 
power relations which would translate into a shift of interests and alliance, the study 
assumes that such an event would also impact the institution, resulting in a 
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modification of aims and rules or even in a bypassing of the institutional framework 
and potentially withdrawal and abandonment of the mechanism:  
(...) Social agents are (…) bearers of capitals and, depending on their trajectory and 
on the position they occupy in the field by virtue of their endowment (volume and 
structure) in capital, they have a propensity to orient themselves actively either 
toward the preservation of the distribution of capital or toward the subversion of this 
distribution (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 109). 
This last quote brings us to the other two important concepts for understanding 
social arenas: habitus and capital. 
Agents and their dispositions 
According to Bourdieu, actors orient themselves within a social structure 
predominantly intuitively. He aims at capturing this mostly unconscious mechanism 
of social adjustment with his key concept of habitus, analytically defined as:  
(...) Systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures 
predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which 
generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively 
adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or 
an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them (Bourdieu 
1990: 53). 
Bourdieu assumes that as a result of previous experiences and socialization, agents 
possess a variety of dispositions which are activated in relation to a social structure. 
These dispositions ‘incline the actor towards one or another practice, which will only 
be effected in a dialectic with the position that the individual occupies in the field’ 
(Pouliot and Mérand 2013: 29, emphasis in the original). As Maton elaborates on 
Bourdieu’s definition, the attribute “structured” refers to the impact of an individual’s 
experience during early socialization, such as family background and educational 
system, on this agent’s perceptions and expectations of the world and other agents. 
At the same time, dispositions are “structuring” in the sense that they provide the 
basis for practices which themselves impact the social world and thus reproduce or 
change the existing structure of the social space, e.g. thereby performing a 
structuring function (Maton 2008: 51). Both functions of the habitus are present at 
the same time.  
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Importantly, the processes of adjustment and anticipation do not have to rely on 
rational, conscious calculations or cognitive effort by the actors (Bigo 2011: 241). As 
Bourdieu puts it: 
Each agent, wittingly or unwittingly, willy nilly, is a producer and reproducer of 
objective meaning. Because his actions and works are the product of a modus 
operandi of which he is not the producer and has no conscious mastery, they contain 
an „objective intention“, as the Scholastics put it, which always outruns his conscious 
intentions (Bourdieu 2000: 79, emphasis and quotation marks in the original). 
In other words ‘actors are not rule followers or norm obeyers but strategic 
improvisers who respond dispositionally to the opportunities and constraints offered 
by various situations’ (Swartz 1997: 100). Therefore, dispositions are not pre-
determining social action. They are not equivalent to a coherent set of norms, 
interests and actions which would allow for prediction of the agent’s behaviour. To 
stress this point again, they instead permit agents to intuitively grasp the underlying 
structures and rules and therefore allow action to happen. Dispositions are ‘a 
“grammar” for practices but never the text of the practices or rules imposing 
themselves automatically. It is a repertoire but not a melody. Thus, it is a generative 
principle of regulated improvisations’ (Bigo 2011: 242, emphasis in the original). 
Pouliot and Mérand therefore summarise that for Bourdieu dispositions enable 
agents to understand and act given a particular field by producing a “self –evident” or 
“natural” logic of social action’ (2013: 31, quotation marks in the original).  
As a simple illustrative example one can think of a teacher entering a classroom 
which in the common and automatic imagination of the situation induces a variety of 
ways by which the atmosphere, the discourses and ultimately the social structure in 
the classroom changes within an instant. Both agents, teacher and pupil, act 
according to the role attributed to them by the broader educational structure: ideally, 
the first aims for embodying authority and knowledge, the latter tries to be attentive 
and inquisitive. Thus, the teacher’s disposition can be said to have been acquired 
through personal experience throughout her own years as a pupil, in addition to 
academic education and subsequent practical training. It is because agents 
automatically absorb and interpret, e.g. understand, a social situation that they start 
behaving accordingly. As noted above, this strongly differs from conceptualisations 
of social action which assume behaviour as result of rational calculation (i.e. logic of 
consequences) or norm adherence (i.e. logic of appropriateness, see Fearon and 
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Wendt 2002). The concept of disposition can be understood as an agent’s repertoire 
for simply being in a social space, for understanding and anticipating one’s owns 
position as well as the position and resulting actions of the other actors in the field.35 
In fieldwork, agents’ dispositions are assumed to be revealed for example when a 
particular action or practice is characterised as ‘traditional’, ‘habitual’ or ‘natural’ 
(Eagelton-Pierce 2013: 52), similarly terms such as ‘conventional’, ‘straight’, ‘right’ or 
‘correct’ might be used (ibid.: 66). 
Of Bourdieu’s comprehensive conceptual framework, habitus is the most difficult to 
operationalise and apply, requiring intense ethnographical fieldwork in order to grasp 
these unconscious modes of social adjustment (this is particularly the case for 
understanding practices at the international level).36 This research nevertheless 
argues that there are in fact two ways by which the analytical insights of this concept, 
obviously combined with the concept of field, can be made fruitful in this study: Not 
only for approaching and analyzing certain aspects of the individuals representing 
companies in the EITI (see chapter six), but also, supplemented by Bourdieu’s 
concept of doxa (see subsequent sections), for understanding the general status of 
companies and particularly the extractive industries. In order to reflect this selective 
application in our vocabulary, this study generally refers to dispositions for habitus 
and shared beliefs for doxa. 
Guided by the concepts of arena and disposition, the following assumptions about 
individual corporate representatives in the EITI Standard are made: Firstly, it is 
assumed that corporate representatives enter and establish an institutional 
framework (“start playing the game”) due to an interest in the issues at stake. This 
interest will most likely be primarily mandated by the corporation they are 
representing. However, businesses’ interest are not likely to come in detailed 
prescriptions about how the corporate representative should engage and behave in 
this specific institutional framework, although it might very well provide some 
guidelines on priorities, goals and limits. The representatives’ level of engagement 
                                               
35 Habitus has originally be designed by Bourdieu as a category to ‘sidestep the alternative between 
the individual and society, and thus between methodological individualism and holism’ (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992: 126). As a consequence, it does not exclusively tell us something about the agent, it 
is an analytical framework designed to help us understand the relation between the agent and a social 
space.  
36 It would, for example, be difficult to claim that observing representatives on two or three occasions 
is sufficient to identify and depict a particular type of habitus if contrasted with the months or years 
Bourdieu and other sociologists and ethnographers spent in the presence of their objects of study. 
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and her particular interest in the game will most likely be influenced by a) the 
intensity of the corporation’s interest towards the stake of the game and b) the 
amount of capital the actor holds in the game (see also next section).  
Each field calls forth and gives life to a specific form of interest, a specific illusio, 
as tacit recognition of the value of the stakes of the game and as practical 
mastery of its rules. Furthermore, this specific interest implied by one’s 
participation in the game differentiates itself according to the position occupied in 
the game (dominant vs. dominated or orthodox vs. heretic) and with the trajectory 
that leads each participant to this position (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 117). 
Secondly, this study presupposes that the corporate representative as an individual 
agent will most likely enter the game with a number of dispositions. These 
dispositions might have been gained in the educational process or the social 
environment she is working in, e.g. the internal structure of the corporation. It is 
reasonable to expect to find that individuals trained as engineers have a very 
different understanding and approach to the EITI than, for example, those trained as 
lawyers or economists. At the same time, Bourdieu’s relational approach also allows 
for the assumption that social spaces impact on agents. It is therefore assumed that 
companies’ Board Directors have a much more profound understanding of the 
complexity of natural resource governance than peers which have not been 
privileged enough to be granted access to the same arena.  
Thirdly, the political activities of corporations in the EITI Standard are conceptualised 
as a practice, referred to as “corporate political practice”. Practices are defined by 
Adler and Pouliot as: ‘(...) Socially meaningful patterns of action, which, in being 
performed more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly 
reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world’ (2011b: 4). 
They can be differentiated from actions and behaviour as distinct types of practical 
activity. According to Adler and Pouliot, behaviour can be understood as a simple act 
in a particular context, such as running or sitting. Once behaviour is acted out based 
on a specific understanding or interpretation of the situation at a particular time, the 
authors would categorise this as action. In contrast to behaviour and action, 
practices are not limited to a specific time and space, although they are embedded in 
a particular context. Key for understanding the difference is the characterisation of 
practices as patterned and ‘embedded in an organizational context’ (Adler and 
Pouliot 2011b: 5). According to the authors, this requires practices not only to be 
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assumed as adapted by individuals via processes of socialisation and thus 
recognised by others as competent performance in a specific context, but also to be 
institutionalised in a way that enables reiteration and thus repetition (ibid. 5ff.). Put 
differently, this study assumes that the inclusion of business actors into international 
institutions can be conceptualised as the institutionalisation of a particular practice in 
world politics, identifiable as corporate political practice. As such, corporate political 
practice will be distinguishable as recognised, institutionalised patterns of action 
performed by corporate representatives. It will be identified and interpreted in the 
course of this study through participant observation and qualitative interviews in 
addition to a qualitative document analysis (see second part of this chapter on 
methods). 
Combining information available through public sources and insights gained via 
semi-structured interviews with corporate representatives, this study aims at 
providing new findings into the individuals representing corporations in international 
governance mechanisms (see second part of this chapter for more details on the 
methods). Approaching these individuals, this research is interested in their personal 
and professional background (thus inquiring after age; gender; educational 
background; how particular individuals became the companies representative; how 
representatives keep up to date with the process; how they feed the information back 
into their company). Moreover, as the introductory chapter lamented a lack of 
engagement with the corporate perspective in the academic literature, this study 
aims at enquiring specifically after the individual’s perceptions, experiences and 
understandings of the process and their reflection on the practices involved (see 
chapters five, six and seven for the findings). 
This section has elaborated Bourdieu’s key concepts of field and habitus and 
illustrated how these concepts guided the approach towards the EITI Standard and 
individual representatives. The next section focuses on Bourdieu’s definition of 
power as capital, thereby introducing the core concept capital and doxa as auxiliary 
concept. Furthermore, it establishes the notion of corporate political power as 
symbolic authority. 
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2.1.3. Introducing corporate political power as symbolic authority 
For Bourdieu, power is equivalent to the possession of resources which he calls 
capital. Although he generally differentiates between economic, cultural and social 
capital, the important factor is that, depending on the setting, particular resources 
become instruments of domination and their possession a source for conflict and 
struggle. The following sections will illustrate this line of argumentation in greater 
detail, elaborating on what resources are and the role they play in an arena before 
particularly emphasising the notion of symbolic capital/ authority employed in this 
study. 
The section starts by introducing this study’s application of power, which relies on 
elaborations by Stefano Guzzini on Bourdieu’s understanding of power: Power is 
understood as ‘the control of resources which correspond to and reproduce the 
organising principles’ (2013: 80) of the arena, e.g. the EITI Standard. As already 
stated, for Bourdieu power is relational and context-specific and can be thought of as 
a form of capital. He assumes that every social arena is characterised by underlying 
power-structures which are reflected in an unequal distribution of capital between the 
players. Capital is defined as ‘a resource, specific to a field (such as cultural or 
political capital) which actors aim to accumulate and benefit from’ (Pouliot and 
Mérand 2013: 36). As Guzzini elaborates further, power for Bourdieu denotes ‘a form 
of (relational) capital (...) which is tied to the control of resources (...) (2013: 80), and 
importantly, ‘power is not to be found in ‘objective’ resources but in relations of 
recognition’ (ibid: 85, quotation marks in the original).37 What counts as capital in a 
specific arena has to be traced by the researcher in fieldwork, through engagement 
with the actors and the game, instead of being pre-assumed in advanced:  
People are at once founded and legitimized to enter the field by their possessing a 
definite configuration of properties. One of the goals of research is to identify these 
active properties, these efficient characteristics, that is, these forms of specific capital 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 107-8, emphasis in the original).  
For corporate power this means that the amount of power held by companies and 
their individual representatives in the EITI cannot simply be deduced from the rank of 
                                               
37 As Pouliot and Mérand elaborate in relation to Barnett’s and Duvall’s differentiations of power 
approaches, Bourdieu would probably not object to their definition of power as ‘production, in and 
through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances 
and fate’ (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 42, cited in Pouliot and Mérand 2013: 38). 
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a company in the Fortune 500, for example, or calculated through the amount of 
material resources companies generally hold, or by comparing a company’s annual 
revenues to a county’s annual GDP (refer back to introductory chapter). Corporate 
power needs to be understood in relation to what is valued and recognised as 
essential resource or capital in the specific arena.  
In general, capital comes in three different forms: 
As economic capital, which is immediately and directly convertible into money and 
may be institutionalized in the forms of property rights; as cultural capital, which is 
convertible, on certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized 
in the form of educational qualifications; and as social capital, made up of social 
obligations (‘connections’), which is convertible, in certain conditions, into economic 
capital and may be institutionalized in the forms of a title of nobility (Bourdieu 1986, 
emphasis in the original).38 
Thus, as Swartz summarises, economic capital is associated with money and 
property; cultural capital with education, knowledge and information; and social 
capital with acquaintances and networks (2013: 34-5). In addition, there is a superior 
or more influential form of capital Bourdieu labels symbolic. It is associated with 
legitimacy, authority and prestige (ibid.). Symbolic capital in itself is not a new form of 
capital but based on the very same resources already categorised: 
I have shown that capital presents itself under three fundamental species (each with 
its own subtypes), namely, economic capital, cultural capital and social capital. To 
these we must add symbolic capital, which is the form that one or another of these 
species takes when it is grasped through categories of perception that recognize its 
specific logic or, if you prefer, misrecognize the arbitrariness of its possession and 
accumulation (Bourdieu 1986b, cited in Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 119). 
Symbolic capital is superior insofar as it does not operate openly, for example in 
form of coercion39 or even consent40, instead it establishes a particular vision of 
reality, a specific logic for the game which is based on doxa.  
Rather than in consent or reason Bourdieu thinks of the “premodial political belief”- 
the doxa – of a social order as a “pre-reflexive agreement”, rooted in the 
incorporations of the dominant vision of order in the bodily disposition of habitus 
(Bourdieu 1994: 15, cited in Swartz 2013: 33, quotation marks in the original). 
                                               
38 This article is online available from: 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/bourdieu-forms-capital.htm#n3). 
39 Which would convene to the conventional understanding of power-as-domination also classified as 
compulsory power (for a typology of different approaches to power in IR, see Barnett and Duvall 
(2005). 
40 Consent is generally conceptualised as the pre-requisite for the establishment of “power as 
authority” which is assumed to translate into a form of legal accountability (for a discussion of the 
concept in IPE and IR, see Cutler 1999: 62ff and Leander 2010). 
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Symbolic capital translates into meanings and practices which present an arbitrary 
view point or a particular way of doing things as the “natural”, “legitimate”, “self-
evident”, “universal” or “logical” way (see Moore 2008 for a comprehensive 
discussion). The doxa in international diplomacy, for example, establishes ‘mental 
constructions that require little if any, effort to be grasped by (...) officials that are part 
of the diplomatic game’ (Eagelton-Pierce 2013: 60). This functioning of doxa is 
problematic because it tends to favour particular arguments, agents and practices 
and therefore establishes what Bourdieu describes as ‘principles of misrecognitions’ 
or ‘hierarchies of discrimination’ (Moore 2004: 103). In the first concept, principles of 
misrecognition, the (dominated or disfavoured) agents do not recognise the 
established vision as biased and serving particular interests, or even as ‘product of a 
historical struggle’ (Eagelton-Pierce 2013: 51). Instead the existing order is referred 
to as the natural, common-sense or legitimate order of things. The second notion, 
hierarchies of discrimination, captures the structural dimension of symbolic power. It 
refers to the establishment of material and cognitive structures which, far from 
having been established from a neutral or functional perspective, in fact serve the 
interests of the dominant players. As these elaborations indicate, this form of power 
is fundamentally relational as it requires an element of recognition by the 
subordinated:  
For symbolic power is that invisible power which can be exercised only with the 
complicity of those who do not want to know that they are subject to it or even that 
they themselves exercise it (Bourdieu 1991: 164).  
Symbolic capital translates into the ability to impose particular meanings and 
practices as legitimate, with the effect of limiting alternative categories of thought and 
closing-off options for other forms of action. In fact, these cognitive and materialist 
structures can be so effective that they are taken for granted to the extent that the 
specific historical contexts in which they have emerged are forgotten (Deer 2008: 
135). In other words: ‘It (symbolic capital) “naturalizes” or “universalizes” what in fact 
is historical and contingent or, in Bourdieu’s language, “arbitrary” (Swartz 2013: 89, 
content in brackets added for clarification).  
What occurs in practice is that agents which are subjected to symbolic power have a 
tendency to acknowledge and recognise that the dominant agents of the field hold 
the most valued resource in that specific arena. They struggle for this resource and 
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position themselves in relation to it. However, they do not realize that in doing so 
they automatically perpetuate their subordination and, at the same time, re-establish 
the underlying-power structure simply through recognition and active participation in 
the game (even in cases in which the dominated actively oppose the rules of the 
game, they still engage with the game’s logic). This situation is described as ‘doxic 
subordination’ (Guzzini 2013: 82) or, in Bourdieu’s terminology, ‘symbolic violence’.  
If one comes back to the classroom example, a rebellious student can be imagined, 
constantly challenging the teacher by not paying attention and chatting with others. 
According to a Bourdieusian line of thought, these acts of rebellion can only be 
performed, and in fact only make sense, in the classroom. In a different context, 
imagine a coffee bar for instance, this would probably be classified in more neutral 
terms as just a form of social behaviour amongst others, like drinking coffee or 
reading the newspaper. But being recognised for what it is by the teacher, by the 
particular student and everybody else in the classroom – as rebellious behaviour 
against the educational authority – the classroom’s existing power-structure is 
reflected and re-established by everybody present, albeit perhaps neither 
intentionally nor consciously.  
The illustrative example of the teacher representing the educational system hints to 
the fact that symbolic capital is extremely effective when institutionalised, or 
‘objectified’ in Bourdieu’s language, which is captured better by the term symbolic 
authority. Therefore, a very interesting form of symbolic capital with regard to this 
study is political capital, i.e. the authority which comes with acting in a 
representational way for others.41 From an analytical point of view political capital 
has a personal and delegated component. The personal element subsumes an 
individual’s ability to exercise exceptional political guidance and leadership, often 
called for in situations of crisis. It is based on knowledge and practical experience 
gained through years of dedicated work but can also be composed of an element of 
charismatic leadership which is attributed to valued personal qualities of the 
individual, such as superior social skills (Bourdieu apparently draws on Weber’s 
concept of charisma as leadership quality here). Political capital through delegation 
shifts the focus from personal qualities to ‘authority granted by a political institution’ 
                                               
41 The following depiction of political capital relies on elaborations by Swartz (2013: 64-7). 
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(Swartz 2013: 66). Therefore the individual embodies or represents the accumulated 
authority of the institution: 
The delegation of political capital presupposes the objectification of this kind of 
capital in permanent institutions, its materialization in political “machines”, in jobs and 
instruments of mobilization, and its continual reproduction by mechanisms and 
strategies (Bourdieu, 1991: 196, cited in Swartz 2013: 65, quotation marks in the 
original). 
Generally speaking, if corporate power is effective, than the following expressions of 
power can be expected: Firstly, this study assumes that the dominant status of the 
corporations in this issue area is reflected in dispositions or shared beliefs which are 
shared by the agents. These structures are the background knowledge on the topic 
of natural resource governance which is taken-for-granted. It is the basis which 
establishes the extractive industries in natural resource governance as legitimised 
agents and enables corporate political practice to take place (see chapter four). 
Secondly, this research expects that business representation will be observable and 
recognizable as institutionalised and organised practice which is based on political 
capital. Thus, political capital is observable as a) recognition of corporate Board 
Directors as legitimate players based on the fact that they are the selected and 
delegated representatives of this industry and b) individual corporate representatives 
being in a position in which their personal qualities are positively recognised and 
appreciated, e.g. in a position in which they have a good reputation or are attributed 
leadership qualities (see chapters six and seven), and c) the effect of corporate 
political authority is a position for the companies in which their privileged status 
within the Standard has become taken-for-granted and individual representatives 
have a wide range for strategic manoeuvre and interpretation (see chapters five and 
six). 
Thirdly, it is expected that the privileged status of the companies vis-à-vis other 
stakeholders is enshrined in EITI’s institutional structure, e.g. reflected and 
reproduced by its principles and procedures (for these findings see chapter seven). 
In addition, companies’ influence should be directly observable in outcomes. 
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2.2. Ethnographical mixed-methods approach 
Investigating corporate power in political practices at the international level required 
the selection of a promising case-study and methods which correspond to the 
conceptual framework. 
The main reasons why the EITI Standard was selected were already outlined in the 
introductory chapter. This section presents a few key features of the initiative which 
are important background knowledge for the discussion on methods (for details on 
the functioning of the EITI see the following chapter three). Broadly speaking, The 
EITI Standard calls for transparency and accountability in natural resource extraction 
and public governance in developing countries. Launched in 2002, it is set-up as a 
MSI comprised of representatives from governments, civil society and the 
corporations form the extractive industries. As a “global standard”, as the homepage 
states, EITI stipulates requirements which need to be implemented by resource-rich 
countries in order to comply and be granted the status of “EITI Compliant Country”. 
The Standard has a permanent Secretariat which is based in Oslo, Norway, a high-
profile chair and an international Board as the key decision-making body which is 
incumbent for two years and meets at least three times per year at various locations. 
It is important that corporations and institutional investors have not only been 
granted access to the EITI in general terms, i.e. they can attend or contribute to EITI 
related conferences, workshops or meetings. In addition, and as a reflection of the 
multi-stakeholder character, extractive industries are a recognised constituency with 
institutionalised rights (see chapters five and six), one of which is to select and sent 
representatives to EITI’s international Board. The fact that corporate representatives 
can be EITI Board Directors means these individuals participate in formulating and 
revising the Standard, e.g. agenda- and rule-setting at the international level, and 
have a say in the evaluation of the performance of implementing countries, e.g. 
implementation and evaluation. These institutionalised political rights for corporations 
make the EITI Standard a promising case study for investigation of corporate political 
practice as conceptualised in the previous part of this chapter and for the inclusion of 
corporations into international governance processes as described in chapter one. 
Reflecting on the research questions, this study is particularly interested in 
individuals representing companies, the functioning of the constituency and the 
effects of these practices on the standard. 
60 
Bourdieu’s comprehensive but therefore also complex conceptual framework 
requires a profound empirical engagement with the case study and the generation of 
a variety of different types of “data”, ranging from evidence in discourses, to insights 
into participants’ experiences, to detailed knowledge of practicalities. This density of 
empirical insights would have been difficult to obtain by relying on a singular method. 
Thus, a mixed-method approach consisting of text and document analysis, 
participant observation and qualitative interviews was selected in an attempt to 
provide more comprehensive findings. This research aimed firstly at accessing 
corporate political practices and identifying the knowledge or ideational structure 
necessary for allowing and understanding them, i.e. the shared beliefs (see first part 
of this chapter). Secondly, these practices needed to be situated and understood in 
and against the specific context in which they are embedded, so as to allow for an 
assessment of the effects of symbolic authority and corporate political practices on 
the EITI Standard. This approach was inspired by and loosely corresponds to the 
practice theory approach outlined by Pouliot (2013: 48-54).  
2.2.1. Accessing practices  
Directly through participant observation 
According to Pouliot, practices are best accessed directly through participant 
observation: ‘The method of choice, here would be ethnographical participant 
observation, which involves the researcher’s direct and sustained participation inside 
of a social setting and its everyday dynamics’ (Pouliot 2013: 48, paraphrasing Schatz 
2009). This is also described as ‘immersion into a community, a cohort, a locale, or a 
cluster of related subject positions’ (Schatz 2009: 5). Thus, the researcher functions 
as an “instrument”, using presence and senses for understanding the situation.  
Access to and presence in the field is assumed to provide a more profound 
experience and understanding than other methods as it is based on the researcher’s 
direct experiences and reflections: 
(...) The researcher is potentially able, physically, emotionally, and verbally, to access 
participants’ experiences – of grief and fear, monotony and exhaustion, or solidarity 
and laughter – and the local knowledge that is embedded and carried in these, 
including the tacit knowledge underlying embodied practices. Reflecting on these 
participatory experiences may bring initial expectations or assessments into sharp 
relief, suggesting other ways of understanding than what the researcher initially 
anticipated. (Schwartz-Sheah and Yanow 2012: 101-2). 
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Interested in the company’s political practices in the EITI Standard, this study aimed 
at attending as many EITI Board meetings as the researcher would be granted 
access to and limited financial resources would allow for.42 As “global” Standard, the 
international EITI Board meets three to four times a year for two to three days in 
various locations all around the world (out of which one is usually in Europe). 
Between 2012 and summer 2013, the period fieldwork was conducted, the Board 
met in Wiston House, UK (an estate in Sussex), in February 2012; in Lima, Peru, in 
June 2012; in Lusaka, Zambia, in October 2012; in Oslo, Norway, in February 2013; 
as well as in Sydney, Australia, in May 2013. Despite the fact that this project was 
funded through a scholarship by the politics department of the University of Exeter 
(with an additional annual research allowance of £200), making arrangements to 
attend all the meetings would have overstretched the budget. Aiming for two to three 
opportunities for observation in Europe, the EITI International Secretariat was 
contacted and formally asked for permission to participate in upcoming EITI 
meetings. Participant observation was conducted at the 19th EITI Board Member 
Meeting, which took place in Wiston House, UK, from 14-15 February 2012, as well 
as at the 22th EITI Board Member Meeting which took place in Oslo, Norway, from 
26-27 February 2013. 
As anticipated by Pouliot, in studies at the international level direct access to 
practices is usually unattainable or limited for a variety of reasons, such as ‘financial, 
organizational, legal, geographical or historical reasons’ (2013: 48).43 The author 
therefore proposes ‘methodological proxis’ used in interviews and text analysis for 
accessing practices indirectly: ‘The rationale is that, even when practices cannot be 
“seen”, they may be “talked about” through interviews or “read” thanks to textual 
analysis’ (Pouliot 2013: 49, quotation marks in the original). 
 
                                               
42 As ethnographical methods required direct engagement with individuals, this research needed to 
secure the approval of Exeter University’s Ethics Committee for Social Science Research. For more 
information, see 
http://www.exeter.ac.uk/media/universityofexeter/corporateresponsibility/pdfs/Ethics_Policy.pdf. 
43 Consequently, participant observation as a research method is not very common, neither on the 
topic of corporations, nor in general in the disciplines of IR and IPE (for a critique on application of 
ethnographical methods in IR, see Vrasti 2008). Thus, however, conducting an ethnographical case 
study on the political practice of corporations in international MSIs is one of the original contributions 
to knowledge of this project (see concluding chapter). 
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Accessing practices indirectly through interviews and text analysis 
For accessing practices indirectly, qualitative interviews with members of the EITI 
Board were conducted.44 For understanding personal perceptions, experiences and 
interpretations of representatives, it was decided to conduct semi-structured, 
qualitative interviews described as ‘in-depth or intensive interview, which (is) are 
focused on the meanings that life experiences hold for the individuals being 
interviewed’ (Warren and Karner 2009: 115, emphasis in the original). This 
translated in practice into a prepared set of questions (generally 8-10), with 
additional time anticipated for the conversation to develop. As the number of people 
targeted was relatively small, it allowed for a personally tailored-approach which 
focused on the particular individual (and their respective constituency) and an 
interview questionnaire which changed from person to person while at the same time 
evolving over time. As already mentioned, Pouliot (2013: 49) specifically suggests 
asking interview partners to recount their everyday practices and describe the 
practices of their colleagues, a technique which was successfully employed in the 
interview process and provided fascinating insights into the practices of individual 
corporate representatives as well as the perspectives on this practices by the other 
stakeholders. In total, 16 interviews were conducted in the period between February 
2012 and April 2013. The interview sample included former as well as at the time of 
fieldwork incumbent members of EITI’s international Board and Secretariat.45 The 
average interview length was 60min.46  
                                               
44As background information it is important to highlight that in contrast to large international 
organisations, such as the UN or the WTO, the EITI is of comparably small size and considered fully 
operating since 2006/2007 (please see chapter three for greater detail on EITI’s history and 
structure). As a result, the number of people available for interviews was naturally limited: the 2009-
2011 international Board, for example, consisted of 39 individuals (including the Chair Peter Eigen). It 
was therefore decided that it would make sense to conduct what the literature calls an “elite interview 
process”, focusing on present and past members of the Board from every stakeholder group, the 
previous and present Chair and members of the international Secretariat. As the Board was re-
elected every two years at that time, this meant members from the 2007-08, 2009-1, and 2011-13 
Boards were eligible. To increase variety, it was also decided to include members of the broader EITI 
family which were not formal members of the Board. This led to two supplementary interviews with 
individuals from the World Bank and two complementary conversations with individual who preferred 
not to be formally interviewed but agreed to meet up for informal conversations.  
45 Interviews were conducted in person or alternatively using phone or Skype.  
46 Given the small sample of individuals available for interviews, it was decided to make all interview 
partners anonymous. However, for contextualisation, quotes are related to constituencies, e.g. civil 
society constituency interview. Note, however, that it is not indicated whether the interview partner 
was a present or former member of EITI’s Board or Secretariat. 
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The text and document analysis conducted for this project provided additional 
opportunities for identifying and describing corporate political practice, particularly 
regarding rules and procedures guiding this practice and indicators of contributions 
to discussions and decision at the Board table in the minutes (see following sections 
for more information on the content analysis). Combined, the application of these 
methods resulted in a detailed description of a) the rules and procedures guiding and 
limiting companies’ participation and contribution according to EITI’s institutional 
design, b) the functioning of the company constituency as collective representational 
body of the extractive industries, and c) insights into the everyday representational 
practice of the individual corporate representatives (see chapter five and six). 
2.2.2. Mapping the arena, identifying shared beliefs 
Although identifying and depicting corporate political practices is important, following 
the line of argumentation proposed by Bourdieu, further analytical steps were 
needed to a) contextualise them into the broader ideational or knowledge structure 
by identifying the shared beliefs, and b) to map the functioning of the EITI Standard 
more generally by identifying the important forms of capital in the arena. This 
research proceeded with both steps simultaneously, thereby primarily relying on text 
analysis and interviews as methods. However, the findings were supplemented with 
observations generated through participation (as described in the previous sections). 
A “qualitative content analysis” was performed which served several, complementary 
purposes:  
Firstly, it was important to learn as much about the workings of the EITI and the 
practicalities of the company’s involvement as possible. This knowledge provided the 
background against which general understanding of EITI’s stakeholders and 
processes was enhanced and which allowed the researcher to enter the process and 
formulate informed interview questions. Secondly, the findings generated were used 
to map EITI as a social arena. Bourdieu’s concept of field stipulates that institutional 
designs reflect the underlying-power structure and the status of the players, e.g. the 
distribution of capital in the arena. Therefore, the focus was on a) the principles 
underlying EITI (see chapter seven for the findings) and b) the rules and procedures 
guiding and facilitating corporate involvement (see chapters three and five). It was 
particularly important to identify the form of capital/ resource which was essential for 
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participating as a corporate representative in the EITI (see chapters six and seven). 
Thirdly, the study aimed at identifying the underlying structure of shared beliefs 
which legitimises the company’s status in natural resource governance (the findings 
are presented in chapter four; for an elaboration of how this research proceeded, see 
further below).  
By the start of the project in 2010, a quick review made evident that the academic 
literature on the EITI Standard was very limited at this point, with only a handful of 
articles to cite (see Aaronson 2010; Gillies 2010 and Haufler 2010b as noticeable 
exceptions).47 As transparency initiative, the EITI makes a variety of documents, 
guides, minutes and reports publically available via the homepage, maintains a blog 
in which members can comment on recent developments and links to academic and 
media coverage of the initiative. At the same time, the researcher’s engagement with 
the EITI was welcomed by the staff of the international Secretariat, who were well-
informed, available for interviews and questions and kept the researcher in the 
information loop (more on the role of the Secretariat see chapters three, seven and 
eight). The analysis concentrated on primary sources made publically available via 
EITI’s homepage which were generally grouped into two categories:  
On the one hand were the “normative documents”, usually published by the 
Secretariat and often collaboratively written with stakeholders. These were 
interpreted as transporting a message or expressing a particular normative view on 
the EITI Standard, e.g. how the initiative was supposed to operate and evolve in an 
“ideal” or “desired” way. This category included documents elaborating on the 
principles, rules and procedures guiding the Standard, for example laying out the 
requirements for a successful implementation process such as the EITI Rules 2011 
Edition or elaborating on the constituency selection process. In addition, the category 
encompassed guides elaborating on how particular stakeholders can participate and 
contribute to the process, some came in the form of factsheets and summaries such 
as the ‘How to-guides’ (e.g. how to become a supportive company, how to become a 
candidate country, etc.), others were longer publications such as the Business 
                                               
47 In the meantime, academic as well as specialised mining/ resource/ energy journals have caught up 
with the development, and the EITI is these days frequently mentioned (see also chapter three, part 
two on media coverage). 
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Guides (2008, 2013) or the EITI Guide for Legislators (2009) in (prospective) 
implementing countries.  
The second group of documents provided more practical insights into the everyday 
operations of the Standard, current developments and topics discussed. This 
category mainly included the minutes of the previous 23 Board meetings; reports 
from the six Global Conferences; the Report by the International Advisory Group 
(IAG, 2006); various reports by the Secretariat; and the Board committees. In 
addition, the researcher was included into the internal mailing list for the strategically 
important Board period 2011-2013 (see chapter three for details on EITI’s evaluation 
process), receiving emails and documents in preparation for the meetings which 
provided additional insights and more detailed clarifications on particular topics.48 
In order to reflect and understand the variety of perspectives on the Standard as well 
as the broader discourses on natural resource extraction, statements, press-
releases, speeches and reports by civil-society groups and corporations in the EITI, 
government institutions and associations as well as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) were searched and included (all of which are 
members of the EITI). An outsider perspective was brought in mainly via the results 
of EITI’s external evaluation which was conducted by the Norwegian consultancy 
Scanteam (e.g. the EITI Scanteam Report 2011, see chapter three), articles in the 
international press and the perspectives on the topic in the academic literature. 
The analysis proceeded with the following steps: The first step, aimed at identifying 
key texts and documents as well as the main themes and lines of argumentation 
running through them. Thus, a few documents were classified as important. This list 
included the EITI Rules (the 2011 Edition and the Validation Guide); the EITI 
Business Guides (2008, 2013); the “Mining Guide” officially titled Advancing the EITI 
in the Mining Sector (2009); the EITI Report of the International Advisory Group 
(IAG) (2006) and the EITI Scanteam Evaluation Report (2011). This review resulted 
in a more profound understanding of how EITI operates at the national and 
international levels (depicted and evaluated in chapters three and four) as well as the 
opportunities and constrains on companies’ participation. In addition, the shared 
                                               
48 For the content analysis, this study included newly-released documents up until the Global 
Conference which took place in Sydney, Australia, in May 2013 (see the following chapter for 
introducing EITI’s global conferences). 
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beliefs, or doxa, on which corporate legitimacy is based were extracted: the depiction 
of extractive industries as agents contributing to sustainable development, the 
broader discourses portraying companies as sensitive towards broader social and 
environmental issues, and ultimately the linkages of natural resource extraction to 
wider concerns on national security. Combined, these findings portray companies’ 
role in natural resource extraction as that of a resourceful, responsible and 
exceptional, thus ultimately legitimate agent (see chapter four). 
In the second step, the entire sample was analysed, arranging or “tagging” passages 
according to the previously identified patterns and recurring themes. Thus, the 
identified shared beliefs where substantially supplemented by evidence from broader 
discussion in the relevant academic disciplines, such as development economics or 
business ethics.49 Finally, the documents were (re-)reviewed, searching for 
passages and evidence which might indicate inconsistencies in the findings.50 The 
findings were complemented by insights generated through the interview process. 
In advance of the interview process short background profiles of members of the 
Board were put together, combining all the information publically available via an 
internet search including the EITI homepage, company websites as well as 
information made publically available via the career profile LinkedIn. It was decided 
to particularly focus on gender, education, current and previous occupations as well 
as additional engagement in similar efforts at the international scale (for the latter, 
this research found little evidence). It was interesting to observe that in fact there 
was quite little public information available about most of these people, barely more 
than the basic facts. Additionally, this internet search helped to identify the members 
of the Board for which contact information was publically available. The interview 
process started by sending emails with interview requests, including an enclosed 
formal request letter, an information sheet and the ethical approval.51 
                                               
49 This process has been undertaken manually instead of using software such as Nvivo-coding 
software (this was manageable given the quantity of documents). 
50 Undertaking a document analysis in these three steps is recommended as ‘more likely (...) to 
produce trustworthy and convincing interpretations of the data’ (Wesley 2010: 8). However, although 
in theory the three stages are separated, in practice this research occasionally had to step back and 
forth between stages, for instance once a new document became available that was identified as 
important. 
51 In total, over 40 email requests were sent, followed-up by two reminders. After that the person was 
assumed to be not available for an interview. 
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On the analysis of interviews: At the start, the tapes were listened to several times, 
aiming to identify a smaller sample of the most informative interviews. These were 
subsequently fully transcripted. For the rest of the interviews “summary transcripts” 
were written which would include the most interesting topics and potential quotes 
with an exact tape reference.52 The content of the conversations was than generally 
divided into four categories: The first included the identification of important topics 
and themes. The second category referred to exemplary quotes which would provide 
evidence for the particular argument this study would like to make in relation to that 
particular topic or theme. The third category would contain descriptions and facts 
which complemented my knowledge about how the EITI Standard works at the 
international level (for example how individuals are selected as representatives 
within the constituencies). The final category was looking for evidence which might 
contradict initial interpretations and assumptions. In addition, the findings were 
usually complemented and checked against results generated through observation. 
Identifying shared beliefs 
In order to identify underlying shared beliefs particular emphasis was put on tacit, 
common-sense or practical insider knowledge that one would need to have or bear 
in mind for understanding ‘what is going on’ (Pouliot 2013: 51). Thus, Pouliot’s initial: 
‘What would one have to know – as inarticulate as that knowledge may remain – in 
order to feel or grasp the meaning of a given gesture, especially in terms of what it 
does in and on the world?’ (ibid.: 50) was modified into: What are the central 
discourses on natural resource extraction and natural resource governance and what 
are the key assumptions about the role and status of extractive industries?53 
Through text analysis a set of underlying assumptions were extracted which are 
embedded in broader international discourses such as sustainable development, 
good governance and energy security (thereby reflecting, in the Bourdieusian 
vocabulary, broader fields of power) and which portray corporations from the 
extractive sector as positive, responsible and exceptional agents in natural resource 
governance. At the same time, it was identified that these discourses had a tendency 
                                               
52 This decision was mainly based on time concerns and reasons of practicality. It was decided that 
summary transcripts of some of the interviews can be justified as the content has been taped and the 
interviews are not the sole data source.  
53 Please note that the analysis offered is not equivalent to a discourse analysis. 
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to disadvantage agents from resource-rich countries by attributing the problems 
associated with natural resource extraction to them (see chapter four). 
As the previous sections outlined, understanding the distribution of capital between 
the players and interpreting the standing of the corporate representatives in relation 
to the other stakeholders at EITI’s international level, was greatly enabled by 
combining methods. For example, the document analysis combined with findings 
from the interview process provided valuable insights into the contribution and 
influence of the stakeholders at the time of EITI’s establishment, illustrating the vital 
role played by individuals from the corporate sector and particular companies in 
making EITI happen (see chapter three for the findings). The advantageous standing 
of the companies identified in chapter five through text analysis is also present in 
EITI’s transparency principles. Additionally, it is directly observable in the processes 
at the international level (see chapter seven). 
2.3. Conclusion 
This chapter outlined how a Bourdieusian-inspired conceptual approach, built on the 
aspiration to analyse power and domination, will be deployed for examining and 
understanding corporate power in practice through the course of this research. 
Against the increasing influence of large corporations in international politics, 
described in the previous chapter (see chapter one), Bourdieu’s framework will be 
put into practice for assessing corporate power in multi-stakeholder international 
natural resource governance. Consequently, the here presented concepts of 
corporate symbolic authority and corporate political practice will provide us with 
access to individuals and practices and help to refine our conceptual understanding 
of corporate power. 
Following Bourdieu’s logic of social action, this study aims at understanding the inner 
workings of the EITI – as comprehensively as possible – as the social arena in which 
corporate political action takes place. This chapter outlined how social arenas are 
characterised by underlying power-structures between agents, how they centre on 
stakes, and that agents require context-specific resources for engaging in them. The 
following chapters gradually assemble the buildings blocks for a comprehensive 
picture of EITI’s functioning and the role played in it by stakeholder from the 
business community.  
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This chapter also elaborated on how the selected ethnographical mixed- methods 
were employed, consisting of text-analysis, participant observation and interview 
process, and how they provided useful insights. The text analysis proved highly 
effective for understanding the EITI more broadly, and generated particularly 
interesting insights into the broader ideational structure in natural resource 
governance. In addition, findings were generated by using participant observation 
and qualitative interviews: on corporate political practice through observation, 
depiction and conversation, as well as on the individuals representing companies 
through the interviews as well as direct observation of their presence at Board 
meetings. Participant observation provides the researcher with direct access to the 
field and the players, generating a plethora of impressions and personal experiences 
on the atmosphere, the setting, the discourses and the participants. In addition, it is 
an excellent opportunity for approaching potential interview partners. In contrast, the 
interview process provided access to the personal experiences and reflections of the 
individuals, filtered interpretations which helped to clarify questions and deepened 
and complementing the findings. Combined, observation and interviews made a 
much more profound understanding and analysis possible, as the details and 
qualities of the findings could not have been achieved by relying only upon text 
analysis as a method. Ultimately, the combination of methods proved vital for 
answering the research questions and contributing towards a refined understanding 
of corporate political power. 
The investigation begins in the following chapter three by tracing EITI’s history and 
learning about the state of the power-struggle at the time of EITI’s establishment. At 
the same time, the opportunity was provided to learn more broadly about the variety 
of partners engaged in the process and the aims they want to achieve. Moreover, 
EITI’s performance is assessed, helping to deepen our knowledge about the arena’s 
evolution and the challenges EITI is facing. The second fundamental building block 
seeks to understand how the status and contribution of the companies in the EITI is 
legitimised in broader discourses on natural resources extraction and management 
deploying Bourdieu’s concept of underlying shared beliefs which, as disposition of 
agents, enable and limit action. Chapter four thus discovers the background 
knowledge which portrays the extractive industries as positive, responsible and 
exceptional agents and elaborates on the problems attached to it.  
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Chapters five and six, examines closely the companies’ political practices and the 
individual corporate agents engaged in the arena, thereby relying strongly on 
Bourdieu’s concepts of capital and the function he attributes to practices in reflecting 
and re-establishing existing hierarchies. This perspective provides additional insights 
into the underlying power-structure of EITI as a social arena. These chapters focus 
on the companies’ collective and individual representation. They introduce the 
individual sectors, help to understand how corporate political representation 
functions within the company constituency, approach individual corporate 
representatives and learn about their qualifications and qualities, their recruitment 
and mandate as well as their reflections of the process. These insights will not only 
demonstrate the profound political role the companies play in the EITI but also help 
to identify the variety of resources required to effectively participate in the arena and 
thus, following Bourdieu’s logic, the forms of capital on which corporate influence 
und privilege is based. In chapter seven, the degree to which this privilege plays out 
in the EITI and the consequences this has for the Standard is assessed: Firstly, by 
examining EITI’s principles and procedures more closely, thus paying attention to the 
relationship between stakeholder and the everyday operation of the EITI. It is here 
that the relative disadvantage of agents from developing countries becomes evident. 
And secondly by elaborating on the companies’ direct influence on EITI’s strategy 
review in which their political power is directly observable. 
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3. Introducing and evaluating the EITI Standard 
The business of resource extraction and the governance of natural resource 
revenues are at the centre of a collaborative effort by governments, corporations and 
civil society actors at the international level which is the EITI Standard. Launched by 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair at the WSSD in Johannesburg, South Africa, in 
2002 the EITI Standard aims at increasing accountability and transparency of natural 
resource governance. Broadly speaking, the EITI generates rules for a transparent 
and accountable governance of natural resources at the international level which are 
designed as implementation tasks for resource-rich countries at the national level. 
EITI can therefore be classified as a standardizing institution, in accordance with the 
broad definition on standards elaborated by Brunsson and Jacobson, who state that 
‘standards constitute rules about what those who adopt them should do, even if this 
only involves saying something or designating something in a particular way’ (2002: 
4). Two additional features define EITI’s character: Firstly, an emphasis on multi-
stakeholder collaboration at national and international level, as well as secondly, the 
voluntary nature of participation for the stakeholders. Thus, the EITI is a global 
governance mechanism as it is both, an example of voluntary regulation at the 
international level, due to its standard setting, and of a multi-stakeholder initiative, 
based on its composition (Hale and Held 2011: 16-17).  
At the basic level, the idea of EITI is simple. Having identified opacity and a lack of 
information on revenues generated by the extractive sector in resource-rich 
countries, the Standard suggests that a national multi-stakeholder group oversees 
companies’ disclosure of information on how much they paid to the local government 
in a fiscal period and the government’s discloses of how much they received. The 
information is verified externally and the data made publically accessible. By 
providing reliable information on revenues generated by the extractive sector and 
paid to the government, the local civil society and the impoverished population in 
resource-rich countries more broadly can call for the revenues to be invested into 
infrastructure, health and education (see chapter one for a description of the 
economic, political and environmental problems associated with natural resource 
extraction).  
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This chapter introduces the functioning of the EITI in the first part and evaluates its 
performance in the second. Combined, both parts provide the background against 
which the analysis of corporate political practice takes place in the following chapters. 
The first part aims at outlining how the EITI Standard works with a particular focus on 
the international level. In accordance with the theoretical assumptions made in the 
previous chapter, this research seek to understand the EITI as a social arena 
composed of players, stakes and capital which need to be identified. Thus, the first 
part concentrates on two tasks: Identifying the players, e.g. EITI’s stakeholders, and 
the stakes, focusing on the motivations for participating. Particular attention is paid to 
the role of the stakeholders at EITI’s establishment, as this helps us understand the 
state of the power struggle between the players at the time of EITI’s inception.  
The second part evaluates EITI’s performance, taking into account international 
endorsement and awareness about the EITI, the quality and reception of the EITI 
reports, the existing academic literature as well as civil society case studies on EITI 
implementation. The chances and challenges of national-level implementation are 
illustrated through the case-study of Nigeria. 
3.1. History of the EITI and key stakeholders at EITI’s inception 
By the turn of the new millennium, the links between extraction, corruption and 
conflict, became a prominent topic in discourses on global governance, as indicated 
in the introductory chapter. This debate was, on the one hand, based on an 
increased amount of academic research on the consequences of natural resource 
extraction in developing countries or “emerging economies” (amongst the most 
prominent studies are Auty 1993; Karl 1997; Ross 1999, 2012; Collier 2008; Gary 
and Karl 2003; Humphreys et al. 2007).54 On the other hand the discussion was 
additionally supported by investigative case studies conducted by civil society 
organizations.55 The following paragraphs firstly elaborate on developments which, 
as it is argued, facilitated the establishment of the EITI, particularly a momentum of 
                                               
54 For detailed arguments on the link between extraction and conflict, see Collier and Hoeffler (2001), 
Duffield (2001), Le Billon (2001), Ross (2004) or Böge et al. (2005). 
55 Please note that the following narrative of EITI’s inception rests on the PWYP Guide by Mabel von 
Oranje and Henry Parham titled Publish What We Learned. An Assessment of the PWYP Coalition 
(2009). For this report, the authors carried out interviews with ‘around 40 people during the research 
phase’ while ‘more than 10 people from various organisational background and countries commented 
on the draft version’ (2009: 11). Information from this report is supported and extended by additional 
insights generated through this project’s interview process as well as EITI’s homepage. 
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public awareness culminating in the establishment of a civil society campaign called 
Publish What You Pay (PWYP). Secondly, the role played by key the stakeholders in 
EITI’s launch is identified, particularly the Blair government, international civil society 
and Georg Soros, as well as companies and investors. 
Developments prior to EITI’s establishment 
It is without a doubt that civil society played a crucial role in raising awareness of the 
nexus between resource extraction, poverty and corruption. Most prominent amongst 
the players was Global Witness, a London-based NGO founded in 1993 which 
exclusively focuses on the problems associated with natural resource extraction. 
Global Witness published two reports dealing with Angola’s civil war, natural 
resource extraction and the nexus between big business and corrupt elites. These 
reports had a significant impact on the public awareness of the problem: In 1999, 
Global Witness published A Crude Awakening. The role of the oil and banking 
industries in Angola’s Civil War and the plunder of state assets. This was followed-up 
in 2002 by All the President’s Men. The devastating story of oil and banking in 
Angola’s privatized war. Both reports illustrated in shocking and rich details the 
alliances of big business and corrupt elites in times of civil war and beyond, with 
shockingly negative consequences for the local population. Thereby, these reports 
established the degree to which foreign companies were complicit in practices of 
corruption and mismanagement, not only through the apparent exploitation of what 
would nowadays be regarded as a lack of governance capacities by the Angolan 
state, but also, and morally much more questionable, through exploitations of 
situations of violent conflict. At around the same time civil society started a number 
of high-profile public shaming campaigns especially targeting oil companies: The 
most prominent here is certainly the campaign against Shell which accused the MNC 
not only of complicity in the prosecution and subsequent execution of leaders of the 
Ogani-people movement by the government of Nigeria, but also of a severely 
negative ecological, political and social impact of their operations in the Niger Delta 
(Haufler 2001: 21). At the same time, it became apparent that due to opaque fiscal 
practices between companies and local authorities reliable data on the exact amount 
of revenues, details of contracts established and concessions granted were 
unavailable to the public.  
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The latter was interpreted as a good starting point for action: ‘(...) A small group of 
London-based activists’ (PWYP 2009: 14) decided to join forces and started 
campaigning against what they identified as morally questionable business practices, 
demanding transparency of natural resource revenues.56 In 2002, they established 
Publish What You Pay (PWYP), an advocacy coalition composed of various NGOs 
which has the following aims: PWYP seeks to a) raise awareness of the complicit 
role business plays in corruption and mismanagement in resource-rich countries, 
and b) lobby, in the long-term, for mandatory disclosure rules for revenues targeting 
extractive companies. At the point of PWYP’s launch, the topic of ‘revenue 
transparency was a niche issue that was not being tackled by other NGO campaigns 
and was not on the agenda of governments and the business community’ (PWYP 
2009: 34).57  
Consequently, in the early days of the campaign, the strategic first step was to call 
on the big MNCs to acknowledge responsibility for the negative externalities of their 
operations in resource-rich countries and, more importantly, actively demonstrate 
willingness to contribute towards an improvement. As a signal of good will, PWYP 
explicitly demanded a voluntary public disclosure of what the companies paid to 
national governments for their access to natural resources, e.g. publish what they 
pay (this is where the campaign’s name is derived from). In retrospect, it can be 
concluded that PWYP was a driving civil society force pushing the issue of revenue 
transparency into public and subsequently political-administrative awareness more 
generally, and it can therefore be concluded that the campaign generated a 
momentum based on an acute sense of awareness which enabled action, e.g. the 
establishment of the EITI. As a result, PWYP is one of the founding members of the 
EITI and to this day an active and prominent stakeholder of the Standard.58  
                                               
56 The PWYP report identifies: ‘The individuals based in London who played the most active role in 
setting up PWYP as a formal coalition during this period were Katherine Astill (CAFOD), Gavin 
Hayman (Global Witness), David Murray (Transparency International UK), Fiona Napier (Save the 
Children UK), Mabel van Oranje (Open Society Institute), Simon Taylor (Global Witness) and Sophia 
Tickell (Oxfam GB)’ (2009: 34). 
57 In the section titled ‘Why didn’t the Coalition call on natural resource–rich countries to “Publish 
What You Earn”?, the PWYP report states: ‘The ultimate objective of PWYP is to get governments of 
resource-rich countries to publish the revenues received from resource extraction. But at the time of 
PWYP’s launch it was more advantageous strategically to emphasis the demand for company 
disclosure of payments to these governments’ (2009: 29). 
58It is important to clarify, however, that PWYP and EITI are not synonymous: Whereas the campaign 
continues to raise awareness of the problems attached to natural resource governance, ultimately 
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Members of the business sectors responded to the campaign, with BP at the 
forefront. To understand BP’s role, it is important to mention BP’s engagement in 
Angola, the country that was the focus of the aforementioned Revenue Watch 
Reports. At that time BP, under CEO Lord Browne, was publically endorsing a pro-
active agenda on climate change and sustainability. Having suffered reputational 
damage in a blaming and shaming campaign by Revenue Watch and other NGOs 
for its previous complicity in Angola’s poor management of natural resource 
revenues, BP decided in 2001 to provide a demonstration of its commitment to 
transparency. The company privately agreed with Global Witness to ‘publicly 
disclose information on total net production, aggregate payments to the Angolan 
state-owned oil company Sonangol and total taxes and levies paid to the Angolan 
Government’ (PWYP 2009: 33. For more information, see Global Witness 2001: 
41f.), thereby accepting the campaign’s demand to literally and unilaterally publish 
what they paid. As Global Witness prepared to announce BP’s intentions publically, 
BP (as well as every other foreign company operating in Angola) received a letter by 
Sonangols CEO Manuel Vincente.59 In this letter, Vincente warned the company 
against publishing any data regarded as confidential by the Angolan government. It 
was suggested that violating confidentiality clauses of contracts with local authorities 
might result in revoking of licences as well as expulsion (Ghazvinian 2007: 140-141; 
PWYP 2009: 33). BP reacted and immediately stopped the publication. 
Early stages of the EITI process 
The BP-Angola incident brought to the forefront the problematic situation of the 
extractive industries which found themselves in the middle of conflicting demands by 
global civil society and local governments: 
BP was the only company to reply favourably to Global Witness’ demands in 2001 for 
full transparency of payments in Angola. As a result of this particular episode, BP had 
also unintentionally become the most critical player in the public domain (PWYP 
2009: 58). 
                                                                                                                                                  
aiming at mandatory disclosure rules, the EITI emerged against this background as an international 
governance mechanism which proposes an alternative, albeit complementary answer to the problem: 
a voluntary global standard stipulating the ground rules for accountable and transparent governance 
of natural resources. Again, PWYP is an important participant and partner in the EITI. 
59 For a more detailed discussion on the topic, particularly Global Witness’ role, see the explanatory 
box about the incident in the PWYP report (2009: 33). 
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Members of the business community, agreeing that one-sided disclosure as 
advocated by the PWYP-campaign was not the right way forward, started discussing 
alternatives such as making revenue disclosure a requirement for UK listed 
companies. The listing requirement was discussed as a means to prevent the 
confrontation with local authorities provoked by unilateral company action.  
Discussing the role played by the companies with a representative from the company 
constituency who was present in these initial discussions, it was stated:  
Global Witness demanding the companies to disclose what they pay – that was the 
original PWYP – that idea was dead on arrival (...) so the only way that you could get 
the companies to come forward with this information was if it was done under the 
auspices of a broader coalition of interests that included government and civil society 
to legitimise it.  
(Company constituency interview, 31 October 2012) 
The interview partner further recalled to have got in touch with Simon Taylor60 from 
Global Witness and passed on the ideas discussed a) for a more profound 
involvement of the UK government on the issue and b) for making revenue 
disclosure a requirement for UK listed companies61: ‘(...) and three days later, Georg 
Soros had written a letter to Tony Blair, saying: “I call on you to make this a listing 
requirement” (ibid.).‘  
As already indicated in the last paragraph, the business magnet and financier Georg 
Soros and his Open Society Foundation, of which he is founder and chairman and 
which substantially funds PWYP, played an important role in EITI’s establishment: 
George Soros played multiple roles in the launch phase of the campaign. He acted 
as a catalyst bringing interested NGOs together; he effectively served as PWYP’s 
public spokesperson; he promoted the revenue transparency concept with 
governments and extractive companies; and his foundation provided financial 
support for activities such as the launch event (PWYP 2009: 35). 
In addition and as already mentioned, Soros wrote an open letter to Tony Blair. The 
latter, which was privately posted on a Friday and published in the Financial Times 
the following Monday, presented the case for revenue transparency and proposed 
the idea of making the disclosure of such information a listing requirement: 
                                               
60 Taylor was not available for an interview, despite repeated requests. 
61 The idea of making revenue transparency a listing requirement is credited by an interview partner 
from the company constituency to Charles McPherson, a former Senior Advisor at the World Bank 
Group in the Oil and Gas department, at that time seconded to BP. The suggestion was, however, 
dismissed early on for effectiveness as well as political reasons in the business community. 
77 
George Soros’ support helped to attract significant business, government and media 
attention. Most critically, his letter to UK Prime Minister Tony Blair in February 2002 
brought the issue of revenue transparency to his attention and compelled the UK 
Government to take action. This letter became one of the defining moments in the 
foundation of the global resource revenue transparency movement. Mr Soros’ letters 
to oil and mining companies in 2002 urging support was one of the first times the 
extractive industry had been lobbied on the issue of revenue transparency (PWYP 
2009: 36). 
Soros’ engagement on the issue of revenue transparency is generally understood as 
based on his philanthropist engagement for open and democratic societies. 
However, his critical stance with regard to businesses’ responsibility can reasonable 
be assumed to be limited, as his global philanthropist engagements are generally 
characterised as business friendly and the Open Society Foundation was specifically 
created to facilitate the transition of former Soviet republics into capitalist 
democracies basically assuming that liberal markets are a vital ingredient of 
democratic societies.62 
In addition to this direct intervention, it is understood that the good personal 
relationship between UK’s Prime Minister Tony Blair and BP’s CEO Lord John 
Browne facilitated and secured the UK government’s support for the transparency 
movement and particularly the EITI Standard (Browne 2010: 117). Blair, lobbied by 
Soros’ open letter and his close friend Lord Browne, decided to take action and 
assigned his elite policy-unit, the UK Cabinet’s Strategy Unit with the task of 
designing a strategy for addressing the issue of revenue transparency, preferably 
within a timeframe which would allow presentation of a solution at the forthcoming 
WSSD (which was due to be held in Johannesburg, South Africa, in 2002). In the 
course of the following consultations between civil society, business and the UK 
Government, the companies managed to effectively lobby for a voluntary initiative 
and against any directions which could lead to mandatory disclosure by arguing that 
voluntary standardisation decreases the chances for offending resource-rich 
countries. In addition, being publically endorsed by the private sector as a means to 
signal an improved investment climate would dramatically increase the Standard’s 
chances for acceptance by resource-rich countries. 
The UK Government, a keen proponent of partnerships between public and private 
sector, suggested a multi-stakeholder design. It appeared as a win-win-situation for 
                                               
62 For a critical overview of Soros’ political activities, see Cooper (2010). 
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all partners involved: Civil-society got the process of public disclosure of extractive 
industries revenues in resource-rich countries started, companies participated in the 
process interpreting it as a way of avoiding mandatory regulation and at the same 
time maintaining a level-playing field amongst the competitors, and it was suggested 
that governments of resource-rich countries could be encouraged to participate as 
part of their overall strategy to establish a business-friendly investment climate within 
their countries. Thus, it is widely considered amongst the EITI stakeholders that 
bringing the companies to the table at that time was a prerequisite for engaging the 
governments and thus legitimising the entire initiative which otherwise might have 
easily been interpreted as another form of “Western imperialism”. As a 
representative from civil society puts it: 
I think it was necessary to have the companies involved in order to convince the 
governments, because the governments were leaning towards the companies’ 
interests... so I guess it made sense politically (...). If you could go to governments 
around the world and say: ‘Look, the biggest oil and mining companies are backing 
this, institutional investors, the money is backing this, this is not anti-business’ (...) 
and that’s what I mean about the role of the companies at the beginning being 
important to legitimise it. 
(Civil society constituency interview, 9 August 2012) 
As planned, the EITI was official launched by the British Prime Minister in 
Johannesburg, South Africa, in October 2002, at that time without final decisions 
about the exact terms of agreement.63 
Without such a large-scale international event as the WSSD, it is doubtful that the UK 
government would have invested as much energy and as many resources as it did to 
ensure that EITI got up and running. Fortunately, if unintentionally, the event became 
a high-profile gathering that provided a further incentive to the UK government to 
launch EITI (PWYP 2009: 57). 
In addition to the announcement, the UK government further supported the EITI 
financially and through administrative capacities. The first international conference of 
the EITI, in which the stakeholders agreed upon so-called “cornerstones” of the future 
standard, known as the EITI Principles, was sponsored by the UK Government and 
held in Lancaster House in London. In the years 2002-2006, the initiative was run by 
a small unit within the UK Department for Development. The second conference saw 
the forming of an international advisory group (IAG), consisting of private and public 
                                               
63 Interestingly, South Africa as the biggest resource revenue economy on the African continent, and 
host of the Johannesburg WSSD, is not a participant of the EITI (other examples of non-participants 
are discussed further below). 
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representatives as well as high-ranked international experts and scientists, aiming to 
elaborate a more detailed plan regarding the governance structure and overall scope 
of the initiative. The work of the IAG culminated in the forming of the first EITI Board 
2006-2008 at the Third EITI Global Conference in Oslo, Norway, in 2006, which is 
why the EITI is considered to be fully operating since December 2006/ start 2007 
(EITI Scanteam 2011: 1). 
Depictions of EITI’s establishment usually centre on the role played by civil society or 
the UK government which leads to the fact that the EITI is either described as civil 
society-led or government-led initiative. However, BP’s influential role as ‘the most 
critical player’ (PWYP 2009: 58) in the history of PWYP and the establishment of the 
EITI is well known and acknowledged. In addition, Karina Litvack representing F&C 
Asset Management, is widely credited with a leadership role (see also chapter 
seven).  
The reasons for involving the companies were summarised by an interview partner 
as follows: 
So, why were companies even included in this? ‘Cause they were instrumental in 
creating this in the first place. So if it had been done without them, you would have 
had huge resistance. So the way to have it work is to have them be a part of 
designing it. 
    (Company constituency interview, 31 October 2012) 
In summary, it can be stated that EITI’s establishment became possible through a 
collaborative effort by actors from civil society, business and government as the key 
stakeholders. Importantly, however, the role of business can be described as 
influential and even vital, as many crucial points of the narrative are directly linkable 
to actions taken by members of the business community. Although this research did 
not undertake an in-depth investigation of the businesses’ role in EITI’s inception,64 
the evidence suggest that the companies managed effectively to shift the focus of 
attention away from mandatory regulatory efforts imposed on them, towards 
collaborative forms of voluntary regulation targeting resource-rich countries, with the 
latter noticeably absent as key players in the pre-launching phase of the EITI. In 
retrospect it can also be argued that BP and the extractives more generally thereby 
                                               
64 Such an approach could be discourse analysis which certainly would provide more detailed 
evidence on the steps and mechanisms by which this shift has been accomplished. 
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managed to translate the reputational damage which they suffered through the civil 
society reports into a reputational advantage by becoming pioneers of the EITI. 
However, an explanatory variable for business self-regulation put forward by Haufler 
is that participation in international regulatory mechanisms can be understood as an 
attempt to avoid the risks and costs associated with imminent governmental 
regulation following activist pressure (2001: 24). Yet at the time of EITI’s 
establishment there actually was no imminent danger of mandatory regulation, 
PWYP was still in the phase of primarily raising awareness for the problem. As 
Gillies has argued, however, the previous civil society campaigns probably 
contributed to the fact that, among other players, a number of big oil companies saw 
EITI as a potentially helpful tool for mitigating the increased reputational risks 
associated with an emerging norm of revenue transparency (Gillies 2010: 103).  
3.2. Functioning of the Standard 
On recommendations of the IAG, the EITI has been formally established as a 
voluntary multi-stakeholder initiative registered as a non-profit association under 
Norwegian law, presumably relying on Norway’s international reputation as neutral 
country as well as their status as a renown example of how resource wealth can be 
used to benefit the people (for a critical discussion of these countries see chapter 
five).65 
Broadly summarised, the initiative is based on a set of principles emphasising the 
importance of transparency and accountability for sustainable management of natural 
resources to which all participants need to agree. Principle one exemplifies the 
central impetus: 
We share a belief that the prudent use of natural resource wealth should be an 
important engine for sustainable economic growth that contributes to sustainable 
development and poverty reduction, but if not managed properly, can create negative 
economic and social impacts (EITI Principles).66 
The Standard further stipulates requirements which need to be implemented at the 
national level by resource-rich countries applying for candidacy (see next section on 
national implementation). The requirements demand the establishment of a national 
                                               
65 EITI Articles of Association, available from: 
https://eiti.org/files/EITI%20Articles%20of%20Association.pdf. 
66EITI Principles, available from: https://eiti.org/eiti/principles.  
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multi-stakeholder group and ‘the production of comprehensive EITI Reports that 
include full government disclosure of extractive industry revenues, and disclosure of 
all material payments to government by oil, gas and mining companies.’67  
The stakeholders of the initiative are subsumed under three constituencies: 
Countries, companies, and civil society. Countries participating in the initiative are 
divided into supporting countries which, according to article five of the EITI Articles of 
Association, includes ‘states or unions of states that support the objective of the EITI 
Association’68 and implementing countries defined as ‘states that have been 
classified by the EITI Board as either Candidate Countries or Compliant Countries.’69 
The civil society constituency includes internationally operating NGOs such as 
Revenue Watch and Global Witness as well as national NGOs such as Ghana’s 
Wassa Association of Communities Affected by Mining (WACAM). The companies’ 
constituency consists of major players in the extractive sector, such as 
AngloAmerican, BP, ExxonMobil as well as industry associations and institutional 
investors.70 
Supporting and implementing the EITI brings the following benefits for the 
stakeholders: Resource-rich countries are recommended to implement the standard 
as a signal of commitment towards good governance and accountability, thus 
improving predictability and stability and ultimately the investment climate of their 
economies. Citizens and civil society are supposed to make use of the information 
resulting from EITI implementation, hold their governments to account and push for 
investment into public infrastructure and sustainable growth. Business actors are 
supposed to generally profit from an improved and predictable investment climate 
and political stability, in addition to the level playing field provided by EITI 
implementation which guarantees that the disclosure requirements are the same for 
all companies and thus do not result in competitive disadvantages for those 
participating in the process (for more details on the business case(s) for EITI 
participation, see chapter six). It is evident that this line of argumentation follows the 
                                               
67 EITI Requirements, available from: https://eiti.org/eiti/requirements.  
68 Examples included the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Germany (the two latter countries 
applied for candidacy in 2013). 
69 Examples of implementing countries include such diverse countries as Azerbaijan, Ghana, Peru, 
Timor-Leste and Norway. 
70 For a full list of all participating stakeholders from the business community, see 
https://eiti.org/supporters/companies.  
82 
functionalist global governance rhetoric described in chapter one which understands 
MSIs as institutional frameworks by which diverse actors “pool” their resources to 
achieve a common goal. 
As an institution, the EITI is composed of an international Secretariat based in Oslo, 
Norway, an international Board as key decision-making body, and a multi-donor trust 
fund (MDTF) which is managed by the World Bank and relies on voluntary 
contribution by national, international and private donors. Since EITI’s early years, 
the MDTF is predominantly funded by donor countries. EITI’s Scanteam Report 
lamented that ‘a very profitable private sector is not contributing very much’ (EITI 
Scanteam 2011: 57) and suggested an increase in private sector funding against the 
accusation that EITI is an ‘avenue to increase their (e.g. donor countries) influence’ 
(ibid., information in brackets added for clarification). In 2014, the Fund was 62% 
funded by countries and 38% funded by members of the business community.71 For 
a further discussion of companies’ influence through funding see chapter seven. 
EITI stakeholders meet at least every three years for the EITI Members Meeting and 
the Global Conference. Peter Eigen, founder of Transparency International, was 
appointed as first Chair of the initiative and served the Board from 2007-2011. After 
two terms, he was succeeded by the Rt. Hon. Clare Short, former UK Secretary of 
State for International Development, who was elected by the Global Conference in 
Paris, France, in 2011 and is the incumbent Chair of the Board. As overview, EITI’s 
international governance structure can be illustrated like this:  
 
Table 1: EITI’s international level governance structure  
                                               
71 EITI Funding, available from: https://eiti.org/about/funding. 
83 
The Global Conference is usually financed with the help of the host country and is 
open to the general public via registration. It serves as a communication platform for 
highlighting achievements in individual countries and illustrating new or substantial 
developments within and outside the process. The new Board is elected at the 
Members’ Meetings which is open to the three constituencies and usually precedes 
the Conference.72 The following sections will introduce the international and national 
management of the Standard in greater detail. 
International management 
At the international stage, the EITI Board of Directors is the executive body of the 
initiative and consists of 20 members representing the three constituencies. Obliged 
to meet at least twice a year, Board members are elected by their respective 
stakeholders at the EITI Members’ Meeting.73 
Reflecting the multi-stakeholder nature of the initiative; the EITI Board consists of a 
Chair, which is independent of the constituencies; eight Board members representing 
countries,74 five Board members representing civil society as well as six Board 
members representing companies and investors. As stipulated by the Articles of 
Association (2009, Article 15), the Board ‘shall make every effort to adopt resolutions 
by consensus’. However, in case a vote is required ‘resolutions are adopted by a 
qualified majority, requiring 13 votes to be cast in favour of the resolution, and must 
include the support of at least one third of the votes of the Board Members from each 
Constituency’ (ibid.). In practice, decisions are usually taken at Board meetings or 
alternatively via Board Circulars. 
The Board is supported by working groups, so-called committees, according to Article 
14, which draft recommendations in order to facilitate the decision-making process or 
oversee particular aspects of EITI’s functioning. For the period of 2011-2013, seven 
committees supported the Board assigned with a variety of tasks. The seven 
committees are: Outreach and Candidacy committee; Rapid Response committee; 
                                               
72 Up until the time of writing, six Global Conferences took place (in London, UK, 2003 and 2005; 
Oslo, Norway, 2007; Doha, Qatar, 2009; Paris, France, 2011 and Sydney, Australia 2013). 
73 Since March 2014, office holders at the EITI Board are subjects to the EITI Code of Conduct. 
Available from: http://eiti.org/files/Code%20of%20conduct_FINAL_EN_201403_2.pdf. 
74 ‘(…) of which a maximum of 3 Board member should represent supporting Countries and the 
remainder should represent implementing Countries’ (EITI 2009, Articles of Association). Available 
from: https://eiti.org/files/EITI%20Articles%20of%20Association.pdf. 
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Validation committee; Governance committee; Finance committee; Audit committee; 
and Nomination committee. For the period of 2011-2013 the Governance, the 
Validation and the Finance committees were chaired by company representatives.  
In conclusion, this brief description of EITI’s functioning provides initial information 
regarding the forms of capital required for participating as a stakeholder at EITI’s 
international level: The variety of stakeholders involved suggests the importance of 
cultural capital, such as a certain degree of education and social skills which facilitate 
the type of diplomatic and political dialogue which is common at the international 
stage. In addition, as the Board meets at various destinations several times a year it 
is reasonable to assume that participation and Board practices requires substantial 
financial resources, i.e. economic capital, as well as time for preparation and 
travelling.  
An important role for the functioning of the EITI is played by the Secretariat which 
consisted at the time of this fieldwork of 15 staff members, but has since been 
constantly expanding to reflect the increased number of implementing countries. The 
Secretariat is headed by Jonas Moberg who, according to his profile at EITI’s 
homepage was previously Senior Advisor to the UN Global Compact (see chapter 
one) as well as Director of Corporate Policy and Practice at the Prince of Wales 
International Business Leaders Forum, particularly working on Business and 
Corruption. According to EITI’s Homepage, he holds a law degree from the University 
of Stockholm and the London School of Economics, and was a member of the 
Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1996-2002. Deputy Head Eddie Rich was a 
former representative of the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) 
and ‘has worked in development for over 20 years’.75 Regional Directors at the 
Secretariat are all academically educated individuals with experience in development 
work in respective countries. 
                                               
75 At the time of writing, Moberg and Rich were preparing a book manuscript on their experiences and 
reflections with multi-stakeholder processes which is forthcoming for summer 2015. 
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The Secretariat is responsible to the Board, financed via the MDTF and based in 
Oslo, Norway, thus hosted by the Government of Norway.76 According to EITI’s 
homepage, the  
Secretariat is responsible for turning policy decisions of the EITI Board into action, 
and for coordinating worldwide efforts in implementing the EITI. Its role specifically 
includes: outreach and advocacy, communicating and sharing lessons learned with 
stakeholders, managing a resource centre on revenue management and 
transparency, and oversight of the Validation process. It organises, jointly with 
supporting and implementing countries, the biennial EITI Conference.77 
In addition, the Secretariat is tasked with supporting implementation countries and 
facilitating dialogue and exchange amongst the stakeholders. In contrast to other 
MSIs, such as the Kimberley Process (see chapter one), the EITI established and 
maintains a permanent Secretariat, which might be one explanatory factor for the 
consistency and resilience of the Standard in comparison to similar governance 
mechanisms. The Secretariat’s role is vital as it provides a constant point of 
reference and source of support for all stakeholders. In fulfilling its role, the 
Secretariat is responsible for a constant stream of information distributed to the 
Board Members, the publication of guides and factsheets which serve as orientation 
sources for stakeholders, and the minutes of the Board meetings. Moreover, the 
Secretariat exercises a strong influence on the written texts as it often takes on the 
supportive function of drafting requirements and compromises for the Board which 
are based on the Secretariat staff’s interpretation and analysis of the discussions and 
provide the basis for further comments and ultimately decisions taken. In addition, the 
interviews and observations suggest that the Secretariat’s senior staff, particularly the 
head and deputy head, play a proactive, highly influential role when it comes to 
inducing change, either by privately engaging in discussions on certain topics, 
facilitating the dialogue between stakeholders, or by intentionally creating 
opportunities for communication and engagement when agreements need to be 
reached (for the role of the Secretariat, see also chapter seven). 
In summary, this section concludes that for EITI’s performance at the international 
level the Board as the Standard’s key decision-making arena is the most influential 
body. However, it was also highlighted how the international Secretariat plays an 
                                               
76 The Secretariat occupies a floor in the Oslo City Centre, in the same building as the Norwegian 
Development Ministry. 
77 EITI Secretariat, available from: https://eiti.org/about/Secretariat.  
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influential and proactive role through a constant stream of documents and by 
maintain and facilitating the communication between the stakeholders. 
The national level: implementation and validation process  
Although this study focuses on the participation and contribution of companies at the 
international level of EITI, the emphasis of the standard itself lies without doubt at the 
national level, where the process is supposed to be turned into practice and 
contribute to a positive outcome or “change”. Implementation is summarised in the 
EITI Fact Sheet (2011) as follows: ‘To become an EITI Candidate, a country must 
meet five sign-up requirements. It then has 1.5 years to publish an ‘EITI report’ that 
reconciles what companies say that they pay in taxes, royalties and signature 
bonuses, with what governments say they have received. To achieve EITI Compliant 
status, a country must complete an EITI Validation.78 Validation provides an 
independent assessment of the progress achieved and suggests measures which 
need to be adopted to strengthen the EITI process. If the international EITI Board 
considers a country to have met all EITI requirements, the country will be recognised 
as EITI Compliant. If a country has made good progress, but does not meet all of the 
EITI requirements, it may apply to retain its Candidate status. Where no meaningful 
progress has been achieved, the Board will revoke the country’s EITI status’ (EITI 
Fact Sheet 2011: 3).79  
More specifically, the implementation process aims at producing a national EITI 
Report which sets out to announce two figures: the disclosure of a figure on behalf of 
the extractive industries’ on how much they paid a particular government in a specific 
period in tax and royalty payments80, in addition to a figure estimating how much a 
government received by the companies operating in their territory. These figures are 
verified and reconciled by an independent agency (called validator) and publicly 
                                               
78 The EITI Homepage describes validation as ‘an external, independent evaluation mechanism, 
undertaken by a Validator procured by the International Secretariat. It is intended to provide all 
stakeholders with an impartial assessment of whether EITI implementation in a country is consistent 
with the EITI Standard. The Validation report will also address the impact of the EITI, lessons learned 
in implementing the EITI, as well as any concerns stakeholders have expressed and 
recommendations for future implementation of the EITI’ (EITI Validation). Available from: 
https://eiti.org/validation. 
79 In addition, the Board can delist poor performing countries at key decision points or suspend their 
candidacy, as happened for instance in cases of violent conflict. 
80 Over time the particular types of payments have become more detailed, as the debates within the 
EITI have progressed. 
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announced. In a further step, the validation reports are assessed by the Validation 
committee at the international level of the EITI process which then decides whether 
or not a country can be granted compliant status. The general idea driving these 
reports assumes that such financial figures can be used in the countries a) to provide 
a reliable figure stating how much revenues are actually generated in the country by 
natural resource extraction, b) to indicate mismanagement and corruption or potential 
for improved administrative capacities as the financial reconciliation might show 
deficits or miscalculations, and c) ultimately to provide a basis for holding 
governments accountable for their management of resource revenues and demand 
public spending into education, infrastructure, health or simply ‘investing for 
sustainable development’ (EITI Fact Sheet 2011: 2).81 
On the basic level, once a country has publically announced their intention to 
implement, a national multi-stakeholder group is established (e.g. NEITI, the Nigerian 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, see the implementation case study in 
the second part of this chapter) again bringing government, companies’ and civil 
society representatives from this particular country to the table. According to the 
rules, they now have two years to produce a national report. Countries are expected 
to finance their implementation process (with help available from the international 
financial institutions). However, a characteristic of the EITI Standard is the fact that 
every national multi-stakeholder group is relatively free in the way they implement, 
e.g. they appoint a national coordinator and establish the processes and procedures 
under which the group is working collectively. This means that none of the EITI 
implementation processes in 48 implementing countries is like the other: some 
processes include, for instance, revenues of forestry and fishery, others have 
disaggregated numbers for revenue streams and individual companies, others only 
provide information for one specific sector (see the following sections for an 
assessment of the country reports and their effects in implementing countries).  
3.3. Evaluating EITI’s performance 
Since its establishment in 2002, the EITI has seen an astonishing geographical 
expansion. By November 2014, 48 countries worldwide were implementing the 
standard, including such diverse countries as Indonesia, Zambia or Peru, out of 
                                               
81 The implementation process was revised twice, in 2011 and 2013. 
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which 31 countries have been granted compliant and 17 countries candidate status. 
Recent developments include the announcement of France, Germany, Italy and 
Canada to pilot implementation in 2013, and the US, the UK, Albania and Myanmar 
becoming officially candidate countries. Table 2 provides an overview of key 
milestones in EITI’s evolution up to today: 
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2002  October: Tony Blair launches EITI at the WSSD in Johannesburg 
2003 EITI Principles agreed at the first EITI Plenary Conference in London. 
2004 February: EITI Paris Implementation Workshop. 
June: EITI endorsed by G8 leaders at Summit at Sea Island. 
2005 March: International Advisory Group (IAG) formed to decide on the governance and 
future direction at the second EITI Conference. 
June: EITI support and implementation recommended in the Commission for Africa 
Report at the G8 Gleneagles Summit. 
2006 October: First international EITI Board is formed during the 3rd EITI Global Conference 
in Oslo. Peter Eigen appointed as Chair of the Board. 
December: Oslo selected as the location of the International Secretariat. 
2007 September: International Secretariat opens in Oslo with a 'Transparency Week'. 15 
countries welcomed as EITI Candidate Countries. 
2008 February: Validation methodology agreed by Board at meeting in Accra, Ghana. The 
EITI welcomes seven new Candidate Countries. 
2009 February: Azerbaijan became the first EITI Compliant Country and Norway admitted as 
EITI Candidate Country during the 4th EITI Global Conference in Doha. 
May: Four new countries were admitted as EITI Candidate Countries bringing the total 
number of EITI implementing countries to 30. 
December: 97 fiscal periods amounting US$ 200 billion of fiscal revenues covered in 
the EITI reports. 
2011 March: Clare Short appointed Chair of the EITI during the 5th EITI Global Conference in 
Paris. The 2011 EITI Rules were adopted. 
March: Niger becomes a 10th EITI Compliant country. 
September: President Obama announces that the US will implement the EITI.  
October: Australia announces that it will pilot the EITI. 
2012 February: Extracting Data provided a statistical overview of more than 70 EITI reports 
produced by 30 implementing countries in six years. 
July: 10 years of EITI in Nigeria  
October: 100th EITI reconciliation report published. 
2013 April: EU Transparency Directives agreed  
May: More than 150 fiscal periods covered in EITI Reports disclosing US$ 1 trillion 
revenues in 33 countries  
May: France and the United Kingdom declare of its commitment to the EITI at the 6th 
EITI Global Conference 
June: World leaders discuss the EITI during the G8 summit and commit to 
transparency: Italy and Canada announce their commitment to implement the EITI and 
Germany announces its pilot program. 
June: Commonwealth Secretariat announces its support for the EITI.  
July: UK launches EITI process and USA MSG holds its first meeting. 
2014 March: The United States becomes the 44th implementing country. 26 countries are 
Compliant. 
Table 2: Timeline EITI’s history.82 
                                               
82 Adapted from EITI’s homepage, available from: https://eiti.org/eiti/history. 
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The following sections aim at assessing EITI’s performance in three steps: EITI’s 
impact at the international level is assessed based on the following indicators: 
endorsement, public awareness based on media coverage and diversity of 
participation. Furthermore, EITI’s output is examined mainly focussing on the 
information disclosed in EITI reports and discussing quality, findings and readability. 
Thirdly, the existing state of knowledge about EITI’s performance and particularly 
outcome of implementation in the academic literature, civil society reports and the 
EITI Scanteam Evaluation Report is summarised.83 National level implementation is 
exemplified by findings from EITI’s prime example Nigeria. Finally, the findings and 
conclusions on EITI’s performance are summarised. 
This research did not conduct fieldwork in implementing countries. Therefore, the 
assessment relies on findings in the academic literature and case studies conducted 
by civil society. However, although the academic literature on the EITI process has 
increased in recent years there is still comparably little academic engagement with 
the process. Probably due to its emphasis on implementation, the existing academic 
literature predominantly aims for assessing EITI implementation’s effectiveness and 
efficiencies in particular case studies. These studies tend to focus almost exclusively 
on development and progress in implementing countries, e.g. the question as to 
whether or not transparency can overcome the resource curse and how the 
implementation process can be improved (Kolstad and Wiig 2008; Haufler 2010b; 
Caspari 2012; Smith et al. 2012; Corrigan 2013; David-Barrett and Okamura 2013; 
Bleischwitz 2014; Van Alstine 2014).84 There are, however, two exceptions: Gillies 
(2012) study proposing reputational concerns as main factor driving industry 
participation at the times of EITI’s establishment and Aaronson’s (2010) article which 
highlights the insufficient inclusion of civil society actors in national processes and 
elaborates on the different “visions” towards the standard amongst the stakeholders 
in more general terms.  
 
                                               
83 For contextualisation: After an initial trial period which allowed for feedback on the process, the EITI 
Board decided to evaluate the initiative’s performance via an external consulting agency in 
2010/2011, which culminated in the publication of the Scanteam Evaluation Report in May 2011. This 
report assesses the initiative’s international and national performance and makes recommendations 
regarding EITI’s future.  
84 Also, Wenar elaborates on the usually not-much-focused-upon contribution of resource importing 
countries to the resource curse and their role in the EITI (2013). 
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Endorsement, public awareness and diversity of participation 
Despite the fact that the EITI has only been fully operating since 2006/2007, the 
initiative has managed to increase its international profile significantly, indicated by 
the numbers and status of supporters as well as the media coverage. EITI received 
leadership and sponsorship at a high international level most evident in the adaption 
of the UN General Assembly Resolution on ‘Strengthening Transparency in 
Industries’ (2008),85 which specifically mentions EITI implementation efforts by 
resource-rich countries. In addition, however, the ‘EITI has also been endorsed by 
the (…) G8, G20, African Union (AU) and European Union (EU)’ (EITI Scanteam 
2011: 76) as well as the OECD, and is being officially supported by a number of 
financial institutions.86 In addition, media coverage of EITI has noticeably intensified:  
A database search of English-language news and public statements reveals that 
between 2006 and 2008, it was mentioned in about 500 items a year. By 2012 this 
had reached 1,447, nearly a fifths of which relate to Nigeria. Visits to the EITI website 
reached 200,000 in the year to February 2013, up 30 per cent on the year before 
(O’Sullivan 2013: 29-30).87 
This public endorsement and awareness is flanked by a significant increase in 
geographical scope, and these aspects combined demonstrate ‘that the EITI has built 
an important international brand’ (EITI Scanteam 2011: 1). While the majority of 
implementing countries in EITI’s early days were low- to middle-income African 
countries with a negative reputation for corruption, the list was extended towards 
South-East Asia (including Indonesia, the Philippines, and most recently Myanmar), 
Northern countries (including Norway, Canada and the US), and Central- and South 
America countries (including Honduras, Guatemala, Peru and Colombia). EITI is now 
implemented on every continent except Australia.88 At the same time, the numbers of 
supporting companies and civil society organisations are also impressive: according 
                                               
85 United Nations, 2008. Strengthening Transparency in Industries. General Assembly Resolution 
[online]. Available from: http://www.un.int/azerbaijan/pdf/N0748015_transp.pdf. 
86 African Development Bank (AfDB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), European Investment Bank (EIB), Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB), IMF, KfW Group, World Bank Group (see EITI Partner Organisations. 
Available from: https://eiti.org/supporters/partnerorganisations). 
87 Diarmid O’Sullivan is a civil society activist who served the EITI Board for three years representing 
Global Witness. He was later awarded a research fellowship by the Open Society Foundation and 
examined EITI’s overall performance, with Timor-Leste and Liberia as case studies.  
88 Australia has started a pilot implementation but the process is moving forward at a slow pace due to 
national legislation prohibiting the publishing of particular data which would be required by the EITI. 
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to the EITI Homepage over 60 companies have announced their support; while the 
PWYP coalition alone consist of over 300 supporting NGOs worldwide.89  
However, in examining the diversity of participation it is important to mention that 
noticeably absent from the initiative are the regional hegemons Russia, Brazil, India, 
China, Saudi-Arabia and South-Africa. These countries play an important role in 
resource extraction and consumption which is generally estimated to further increase 
in the next decades, but are not active in the EITI, neither as implementing countries 
nor as members of the international Board. Particularly China and the country’s 
national oil companies have significantly increased their overseas investment since 
the 2000s. While Chinese national oil companies do not participate at EITI’s 
international level (although they report in countries implementing, as a more recent 
evaluation has outlined), other national oil companies, such as Petrobras, highlight 
their general endorsement of the EITI Principles in their internet presence but refrain 
from taking on more active, publically visible roles in the initiative by, for example, 
becoming a Board member. In general it becomes clear that EITI as an initiative with 
global outlook suffers from an obvious lack of representation when it comes to some 
of the big players in energy consumption and resource extraction.  
In summary, the EITI secured international support at the highest political level on the 
international stage as well as significantly increased its geographical scope. 
However, there is certainly room for improvement regarding representation of this 
geographical scope at EITI’s international Board level and inclusion of additional 
partners. 
Quality and reception of the EITI reports  
As indicated in the section on implementation, candidate countries are supposed to 
prepare EITI reports on an annual basis. EITI’s homepage proudly states that EITI 
reports cover 233 years accounting for US$ 1.497 billion government revenues.90 In 
contrast to the opaque situation prior to EITI’s establishment, the EITI reports made 
data on resource revenues and their spending available which were previously non-
                                               
89 For a more detailed account of EITI’s History, see http://eiti.org/eiti/history. 
90 EITI Countries, available from: https://eiti.org/countries. For an overview of the report from 2005-
2011, see EITI Extracting Data, available from: http://eiti.org/document/extracting-data.  
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existent.91 This in itself is a major achievement. Morevoer, the reports are regarded 
as “EITI’s ultimate product” which ideally should produce comprehensive, timely, and 
publically accessible data, according to the EITI requirements.92 However, there are 
problems which arise and need to be discussed regarding the quality and the 
reception of the reports (discussed in greater detail in Acosta 2013; or O’Sullivan 
2013). 
Regarding the quality of the reports, it is widely acknowledged that the report’s 
volume and quality vary drastically and make direct access and comparison 
extremely difficult.93 In an attempt to allow for flexibility and national adaptation, the 
EITI Standard calls on implementing countries to meet the EITI requirements, but 
leaves it to the national multi-stakeholder group to agree on the terms and details 
included. As a result, the reports differ for example in volume and degree of 
aggregation: some countries list individual companies94 and individual projects95 (for 
example Burkina Faso and Indonesia) or also include revenues from other extractive 
sectors such as fishery and forestry (for example Liberia). Reports further differ 
regarding the revenue streams included, with some countries disclosing more 
information than required by the EITI, such as contracts96 (for example in Peru and 
Timor-Leste), in-kind payments97 (in Iraq) or licenses98 (in Mongolia). In addition, 
report-size varies from several hundred to thousands of pages as do accounting 
standards. All of this makes access and interpretation of the information contained in 
the reports subject to expert knowledge (preferably a general background in 
international accounting supported by profound knowledge of the political, 
                                               
91 O’Sullivan notes for example how ‘in the Democratic Republic of Congo, it was reported in April 
2013 that the national EITI had identified US$ 88 million in mining revenues received by the 
government in 2010 – which had not been accounted for by the tax authorities’ (2013: 29). 
92 EITI Requirements, available from: https://eiti.org/eiti/requirements. 
93 This issue was extensively discussed at the 22nd Board Meeting. At this meeting, the Revenue 
Watch Institute announced the launch of an online tool box which presents an analysis of EITI data 
based on the reports. Available from the homepage of the Natural Resource Governance Institute:  
http://www.resourcegovernance.org/issues/data-tools). In addition, the Secretariat established a 
Compare Reports Section on EITI’s homepage in 2013 in an attempt to make the data more 
accessible, see: https://eiti.org/countries/reports. 
94 This is referred to as disaggregation by company or company-by-company reporting. 
95 This is referred to as project level or project-by-project reporting, a disaggregation of payments to 
the level of individual payment types and production units’ 
96 Contracts detail the initial agreement between government and companies, specifying what has to 
be paid for natural resource extraction. 
97 Defined as ‘payments made to a government (e.g. royalty) in the form of the actual commodity (oil, 
gas, or minerals) instead of cash’, available from: https://eiti.org/glossary.  
98 Defined as ‘a permission granted by a licensor to a licensee, usually for a time-bound period and for 
a fee’ (ibid). 
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administrative and legal national context in which the reports have been produced). 
Furthermore, time and financial resources are required to analyse the content and 
come to conclusions. As the details are subject to agreements at the national level, it 
can generally be concluded that the reports reflect the diversity of EITI implementing 
countries. These observations obviously stand to some degree contrary to EITI’s 
general aspiration which is to empower the people in resource-rich countries through 
information, and leads to the second dimension which will be discussed at this stage, 
the reception of the reports. 
The EITI Standard is based on the assumption that information on revenues 
generated can empower people and improve the governance capacity in resource-
rich countries, broadly based on the principle of transparency. Academic and civil 
society research on the topic has revealed, meanwhile that the linkages between 
transparency and societal change are not as direct as initially assumed (see 
following section on accountability and impact of EITI implementation). And, more 
importantly in the case of the EITI, that there are fundamental problems regarding 
the reception of the reports which need to be addressed: ‘There are (...) few 
indicators that EITI programmes are so far having impact on dimensions such as 
governance, corruption, poverty reduction or other objectives stated in EITI’s articles 
of association’ (EITI Scanteam 2011: 3). Apparently, simply making information 
available does not do the trick, but in contrast raises a number of follow-up questions 
which need to be addressed regarding the quantity and quality of the data, regarding 
data reliability, accessibility and comparability (see chapter eight for a detailed 
discussion). 
As outlined by O’Sullivan (2013: 30-32): The first problem is the often existing 
distance between report’s contents and the audiences which, as the author argues, 
stems from a rather undifferentiated picture of the target audience when in fact 
different parts of a country’s community require different sets of information. 
O’Sullivan illustrates how at least in a very basic understanding one can assume that 
the members of the national elite in administration, legislation or journalism require 
different information, mostly at the national level, in order to assess and act on 
existing problems.99 In contrast, however, ordinary citizens affected by resource 
                                               
99 In EITI’s early years this problem was even more profound as members of the public and legislators 
might in fact not even be aware that EITI exists, as Aaronson points out (2011: 50). 
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extraction might find information at the regional or local level more helpful. In 
addition, they might have limited resources for accessing the data which brings up 
follow-up questions of presentation and accessibility. In a recent case study on EITI 
implementation in Ghana, Van Alstine notes that ‘multiple interviewees highlighted 
illiteracy and lack of education as barriers to community engagement’ (2014: 30). 
The second problem attached refers to the usage of this information and the actual 
influence of civil society in resource-rich countries. A lot of emphasis is placed on the 
role of civil society as an instrument for analysing the data and reporting it to the 
people while in return channelling their demands and calling on the authorities for 
change. However, the empirical experience shows that the ability of civil society to 
actively induce change and governance reforms, particularly in authoritarian 
countries, is severely limited. This was already highlighted in the EITI Scanteam 
Report (2011), but has since been supplemented by additional findings. Generally, 
as Aaronson concludes, ‘some implementing governments have not allowed civil 
society to participate fully in the process or have not consistently provided civil 
society with the information they need to hold their governments to account’ (2011: 
50). 
In addition, the role of civil society is further constrained by the following factors:  
Activists can be harassed or co-opted by government, or move on to more rewarding 
jobs elsewhere. The NGO sector often lacks specialised knowledge and information, 
depends on the oft-changing priorities of foreign funders and can be vulnerable to 
overstretch, in-fighting and rent-seeking by opportunities (O’Sullivan 2013: 30). 
The observation about the highly influential role of the state is, for example, 
confirmed by findings in a study by Smith et al. (2012) in which the authors 
investigate community representation in EITI implementation and other CSR 
mechanisms in areas of large-scale mining operations in Madagascar. They find 
evidence for active manipulation of civil society representation by the state which, as 
they conclude, effectively dis-empowers local communities.  
This directly leads to the third point: In countries in which neither the conditions nor 
incentives for political change, such as prospects for investment or aid, exist, EITI 
reports are unlikely to make any difference. In the case study from Madagascar, the 
authors conclude that: 
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Resource-rich states’ prime objective is to attract direct foreign investment in the form 
of mineral and hydrocarbon projects. The bottom line is financial: mining royalties 
and tax revenues from trans-national mining companies, in combination with financial 
aid for infrastructure development or extractive industry policy initiatives which fund 
many government posts and projects (Smith et al. 2012: 248). 
A recent statistical analysis conducted by David-Barrett and Okamura on the 
reasons for adopting EITI standards by corrupt countries concludes that 
‘governments see EITI membership as a way of building a reputation for seeking to 
improve governance with the international community’ (2013: 30, emphasis in the 
original). Following David-Barrett and Okamura, EITI implementation becomes an 
instrument of distinction in an international climate in which donor aid is conditioned 
according to criteria for good governance. This corresponds with Scanteam’s 
findings that the typical EITI candidate country was ‘on average a low income 
country with poor credit worthiness (EITI Scanteam 2011: 62). 
In addition, governmental sector reform might be hindered by either a lack of 
capacity (which can be partly addressed through administrative reforms) or simply 
political will: ‘An obvious reason why some governments have not built on EITI 
reporting is that senior officials are complicit in the problems which the EITI is 
supposed to address’ (O’Sullivan 2013: 35). Interestingly, no evidence suggested 
that there was ever an expectation that the companies themselves would use the 
data which confirms the previously mentioned conclusion that the EITI’s focus rests 
entirely on government reforms. 
Recalling the historical background against which the EITI emerged (see first part of 
this chapter), particularly the call for acknowledgement of complicity and 
responsibility of companies for corruption and mismanagement and thus ultimately 
poverty in resource-rich countries, it is interesting to note that in studies evaluating 
EITI’s performance this perspective on the problem seems to have been lost over 
the years in favour of a focus on policy reforms. The role and contribution of 
companies in the national multi-stakeholder processes is neither discussed nor 
evaluated. This section concludes that the empirical evidence on the quality and the 
reception of the reports indicates the existence of severe limitations regarding EITI’s 
ability to generate the change it aims for. However, before summarizing the findings 
on EITI’s performance more broadly, the case study of Nigeria is presented as a 
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prominent example for illustrating how EITI can be implemented and what the 
consequences are. 
Outcomes of EITI implementation: Case study Nigeria 
Much as the reports of EITI implementation vary from country to country, so does the 
implementation process. Before a broader perspective on EITI’s performance on the 
ground is introduced, some of the potentials and pitfalls of implementation are 
outlined by introducing evidence from Nigeria. 
Nigeria is in many ways the typical resource-rich country and therefore a prominent 
example used in discourses relating to EITI. For a glimpse into the importance of 
resource extraction for the country, here the country’s introduction in one of the EITI 
publications: 
Nigeria is among the top 10 oil producers in the world and the leading producer in 
Africa. At more than $50 billion last year, oil alone accounts for as much as 90% of 
government revenues. Meanwhile, valuable lodes of aluminium, gold, tin, iron ore, 
coal, niobium, lead, and zinc mean Nigeria is benefitting handsomely from the global 
commodities boom. But, partly because government does not rely on taxpaying 
citizens for its funding, accountability has been weak for decades and public services 
are weaker still. Over half of all Nigerians – 70 million people – live in poverty (EITI 
Case Study Nigeria 2012: 1). 
In Africa’s most populated state, civil war and military dictatorship followed years of 
colonial rule, until in 1999 a process of democratization began to emerge under 
president and former general Olusegun Obasanjo. In these early years of 
democratization, the extreme extent of rent-seeking, opaque business and bad 
administrative practices in the country’s booming oil sector gave Nigeria a world-
famous reputation for corruption and mismanagement. Against this background, 
Nigeria’s president decided to join the EITI process in 2004, in an attempt to improve 
and access donor assistance, stimulate FDI and secure the support of the people. It 
took Nigeria until 2010 to become the first African country to be granted EITI 
compliant status, while in the meantime the country has made ‘statistically significant 
improvements’ as the Transparency International 2008 Report confirms (cited in EITI 
Case Study Nigeria 2012: 1). Furthermore, in 2007, Nigeria became the first country 
worldwide to make the disclosure of payments in the extractive sector made by 
companies and received by the government mandatory (known as the Nigeria 
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Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Act), thereby enshrining EITI into 
national legislation: 
The NEITI Act established NEITI as an autonomous self-accounting body reporting to 
the President and the National Assembly, and now has a separate post on the 
federal budget (EITI Scanteam 2011: 9). 
Nigeria established a national multi-stakeholder group compromised of governments, 
civil society and companies which started off by undertaking a comprehensive and 
complex first audit of the oil sector value chain. As the EITI Case Study further 
summarises: 
This entailed financial, physical and process audits of the entire oil and gas industry 
for the period 1999-2004, a massive undertaking in a country of 36 federal states 
with little digitalised data, poor infrastructure, a frightful history of record keeping, and 
scores of officials with entrenched interests in the status quo (2012: 1-2). 
Whereas the first audit identified major weaknesses in the management of the sector 
and sparked media and public attention, the second audit which revealed EITI’s 
potential in greater detail, identifying ‘over US$ 800 million of unresolved differences 
between what companies said that they paid in taxes, royalties and signature 
bonuses against what the government said it received. That sum exceeded the 2009 
individual budgets for the Ministries of Education, Health and Power’ (ibid.: 2). 
Particularly delicate was the fact that it was the National Nigerian Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC) which owed the largest amount of money, US$ 4.7 billion, to the 
government for payments of domestic crude. 
NEITI’s effects were assessed independently by Nicholas Shaxson, at that time 
associate fellow with the Africa Programme at Chatham House, in 2009. The 
author’s case-study confirmed that the 1999-2004 reports can be regarded as 
NEITI’s greatest success as they significantly increased transparency. Despite that, 
however, there is little evidence that NEITI has been an important catalytic factor for 
broader governmental reforms. An interesting finding was that the audience which 
made ‘most meaningful use of the NEITI reports are mostly located within the elite 
circles and the government’ (2009: ix; a finding corresponding to the previous 
discussions on usage of the reports). According to Shaxson, NEITI did not emerge 
due to public pressure nor was the data widely used by civil society to call for 
reforms. And in consequence, NEITI was apparently lacking brought public support. 
Therefore O’ Sullivan concludes that as ‘around 2006 Obasanjo’s interest shifted to 
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shoring up his position at home, rather than impressing foreign creditors and donors. 
The reform period ended and NEITI’s momentum began to decline’ (O’Sullivan 2013: 
34). 
By 2013, after four reporting cycles covering 13 years, NEITI additionally 
commissioned an exemplary audit in nine of Nigeria’s resource-rich states on the 
allocation and spending of the extractive sectors revenues by the state, covering the 
period 2007-2011. According to NEITI, US$ 125 billion of extractive revenues were 
paid to the government in this period, which is almost equivalent to 15% of the 
county’s GDP for that period out of which the Federal Government took 56%, states 
24% and the local governments 20% (following an allocation formula under Nigerian 
law). Important findings included a) that the states were extremely dependent on the 
revenues (up to 91%); b) that the revenues are not spent towards improving public 
health, education or infrastructure (for example ‘Imo state allocated only 2.3% of its 
total revenue during the period under review to education and health, but 72% of 
revenues that accrued went to recurrent expenditure covering government running 
costs, wages and overheads’ (EITI Blog 2014, contribution by Zainab Ahmed, 
Executive Secretary of NEITI); c) that at the same time, US$ 41 million allocated to 
the states are unaccounted for while funds set up by the government to improve the 
environmental and social consequences of resource extraction and invest into 
diversifying the economy have been used contrary to their intention (EITI Blog 2014).  
In summary, it can be concluded that NEITI’s audits impressively demonstrate how 
prevalent corruption and mismanagement still are in the country, despite years of 
EITI Implementation. At the same time, the existence of the reports can already be 
regarded as a major achievement compared to the situation prior to NEITI’s 
existence. Supported by its legislative status, NEITI has established itself as a 
permanent, legitimate and combative voice in public discourses. Therefore 
O’Sullivan concludes that the Nigerian experiences points towards the importance of 
political will for inducing fundamental political reforms which can ultimately reduce 
poverty. This illustrates that EITI implementation can only stand at the beginning of 
what needs to be a broader process of public sector reform and accountability. 
The Nigerian findings fit into more general assessments of EITI’s performance. The 
EITI Scanteam Report found that regarding the input dimension EITI managed to 
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establish national multi-stakeholder groups, produced reliable data and public 
access to information on extractive revenues, and in several cases had induced 
changes in national legislation regarding resource management. Positive outcomes 
include an increase in public trust and greater attention towards public sector 
management. However, there is little evidence that EITI implementation had positive 
effects on the everyday lives of citizens (for an executive summary of the findings, 
see EITI Scanteam 2011: 1-5). In a study by Kolstad and Wiig (2008), the authors 
examine mechanisms such as the EITI through which transparency is supposed to 
help reduce corruption, mostly confirming Scanteam’s and later O’Sullivan’s 
observations as well as the findings in Nigeria. Kolstad and Wiig suggest that 
transparency mechanisms need to be complemented by other policies. Furthermore 
they argue that if the aim is on broader reforms in the governance of a state, more 
emphasis should be placed on government spending than on revenues as such (as 
done by the audit commissioned by NEITI, see previous section). A statistical 
analysis by Corrigan (2014) investigating EITI implementation’s impact on economic 
development and quality of governance up until 2009 similarly finds evidence that 
EITI can indeed help countries mitigate or avoid some of the effects associated with 
the resource curse. Albeit not improving the ‘level of democracy, political stability and 
corruption’ (2014: 17). However, the latter findings might point towards the problems 
of measuring and assessing long-term effects and outcomes against the relatively 
short period of EITI’s existence. 
Current events and their effects on the process 
The international discourse on extractive revenues intensified with the establishment 
of mandatory disclosure rules in the US (Dodd-Frank Act) and the EU (Transparency 
Directive) which can be understood as a glorious achievement for the transparency 
movement and coalitions such as PWYP. In July 2010, the US Congress passed a 
groundbreaking regulatory package which became known as the Dodd Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd Frank Act). Section 1504 calls for 
detailed mandatory disclosure of resource revenues of companies registered with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (see also chapters five, six and 
seven). Through the course of the following chapters it will become evident that 
these rules became the cause of much debate and conflict in the EITI as they clearly 
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pose the question of whether the initiative has render itself redundant and what the 
future should bring for the Standard. 
However, already the EITI Scanteam Report’s findings on lessons-learned had 
prompted the EITI to undergo a strategy review process from 2011-2013 (the period 
under investigative focus in this project) which than took place against the 
background of the discussion in the US and EU. The strategy review process 
culminated in the presentation of an improved regulatory framework, presented at 
EITI’s Global Conference which was held in Sydney, Australia, in May 2013. The 
conference saw the launch of improved EITI Rules officially declared as new EITI 
Standard 2013, which included the following changes in the regulatory framework: 
the demand of provision of contextual information to the reports in order to make 
them more comprehensible for readers; the restructuring of the 21 requirements into 
7 (the requirements were made more rigid and explicit, demanding that payments are 
‘broken down by each company and by each revenue stream and, in due course, by 
each project’ (e.g. project-by-project reporting).100 Noticeably, EITI positioned itself 
openly as a Standard (instead of the “initiative” or “process”) for legitimate and 
accountable natural resource governance. The Standard emphasised the global 
outlook, voluntary nature and effective multi-stakeholder governance as distinctive 
features which are not only valued by its stakeholders but also mark the difference 
between the mandatory national disclosure regulations in the EU and US. 
Short-term effects of the established mandatory disclosure rules have been a revived 
and intensified debate on mandatory vs. voluntary disclosure as well as an additional 
imperative for the EITI to develop a coherent strategy. At this point, however, it is 
difficult to assess the long-term effects that the mandatory disclosure rules will have 
on EITI’s performance. At the very best, they could complement and enhance EITI 
reporting, particularly regarding the accuracy of data, or become an incentive for 
more detailed reporting, all of which could further enhance revenue and financial 
transparency. Depending on the quality of the new information, this could also 
ultimately threaten EITI’s legitimacy as long as the empirical evidence suggests that 
EITI’s main achievement lies in provision of reliable information (see chapter seven 
on the principle of transparency). Importantly, however, what the debates and 
                                               
100 EITI History, available from: http://eiti.org/eiti/history.  
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conflicts surrounding these regulations clearly expose is the Western-centred 
perspective on natural resource governance prevalent at EITI Standard’s 
international level which is most evidently and most frequently displayed by the 
members of international civil society and company representatives and which was 
directly called-out by a member of an African-based civil society organisation (see 
chapter seven). 
3.4. Conclusions 
This chapter began to put together the building blocks for understanding how the 
EITI works as a social arena. As chapter two outlined, social arena’s centre around 
stakes, require particular forms of capital for participation and are characterised by 
underlying power-structures between agents. Through the course of this chapter, the 
stakeholders or participants of the process were identified, namely, international and 
national civil society, governments of resource-rich and resource-dependent 
countries, and members of the extractive industries and institutional investors. The 
examination of EITI’s international functioning also brought to the forefront that an 
active participating stakeholder at the international level will likely require access to 
substantial economic and cultural capital, e.g. financial resources and knowledge. 
An investigation into the role of key stakeholders at EITI’s establishment has given 
insights into the state of the power struggle between the participants at this time. 
Moreover, the chapter has elaborated how the civil society campaign outlining the 
complicity of companies to corruption and mismanagement in resource-rich countries 
generated a momentum of attention for the issue of transparency. It can thus 
generally be assumed that the stakeholders engaged in the process for establishing 
what a “legitimate”, i.e. suitable, solution of this problem should look like. 
Interestingly, during the subsequent discussion to coordinate efforts the companies 
and members of the investor community successfully decided to increase the 
number of players and to engage the UK Government. At the same time, the 
business community managed to shift the focus of the call for transparency towards 
the role of governments. Arguing that a voluntary, inclusive approach towards 
changes in natural resource governance endorsed by the private sector is much 
more likely to achieve results, the EITI was set up as a voluntary international 
standard based on multi-stakeholder participation. It becomes evident in this chapter 
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hat EITI’s institutional design can only be understood against the acknowledgement 
of the instrumental role played by the business community in EITI’s inception. It is 
interesting that the participation and contribution of business at this time has neither 
been questioned nor challenged by other stakeholders which, following a 
Bourdieusian line of argument, indicates the presence of underlying shared beliefs. 
This will be explored in the following chapter. 
As Bourdieu would expect, these initial developments pave the way for a highly 
influential position of the business community and will have significant consequences 
for the companies’ roles and rights in the Standard (see chapters five and six), and 
for EITI’s future evolution and performance, as was discussed in the second part of 
this chapter (and as will be further explored in chapters seven and eight). At this 
point it can be concluded that what began as recognition of corporate responsibility 
and complicity in the abuse of power, turned into a business-friendly effort to tackle 
the resource curse on a voluntary basis. This has enabled large corporations to 
further improve their international reputation as progressive leaders in the sector 
while the regulatory effort rests on the implementing governments. More broadly, this 
chapter indicates that the EITI example signals a substantial danger of multi-
stakeholder governance approaches, namely, the potential to shift the focus of 
regulation to serve the interests of the more well-resourced partners (see chapter 
eight).  
At the same time, EITI is the leading example of a functioning multi-stakeholder 
initiative operating at the international level, as an examination of EITI’s performance 
in the second part of the chapter made evident. Moreover, it was concluded that the 
geographical expansion, high-profile public endorsement and increased media 
attention suggest that EITI has in fact established itself as the international voluntary 
standard for transparency in revenue governance. At the same time, it has become 
evident that the passing of mandatory disclosure requirements in the US and EU 
already impacted the discussion in EITI’s strategy review process and will 
presumably pose important questions regarding EITI’s legitimacy and performance in 
the near future. In addition, the quality and reception of the EITI reports was 
examined, and it was concluded that EITI’s biggest achievement is definitely the 
provision of information on resource extraction revenues which were previous to 
EITI’s establishment non-existent or non-accessible. At the same time, it has 
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became evident that the quality and content of the reports varies immensely making 
immediate understanding or direct comparison extremely difficult. Furthermore, the 
existing empirical evidence regarding the reception of the EITI reports was 
summarised. The findings point towards very limited usage by the intended 
audiences, which is local civil society. In addition, only sporadic evidence was found 
for reforms induced by the findings in the EITI reports which could have lead to 
improved governance and accountability.  
In conclusion, EITI’s results are ambiguous. The Standard managed to increase 
transparency of resource revenues in a number of countries but failed to 
demonstrate meaningful progress regarding improved governance and 
accountability. This raises the fundamental question of how this ambiguity can be 
explained and thus EITI’s impact improved, or whether the urge for transparency is 
misleading for the aim (see chapters seven and eight for further evaluations on this 
topic). Learning about EITI’s history, functioning, and partners, and highlighting the 
role the business community plays, raises the interesting question of whether this 
strong influence might play an important part in explaining EITI’s limited 
performance. If the EITI fails to demonstrate its ability to empower citizens through 
information and induce broader public sector reforms in the near future, it might be 
concluded that the Standard is in danger of becoming little more than a “talking-
shop” or an instrument for inflicting business-prone governance reforms in resource-
rich countries (this discussion will be continued in chapters seven and eight).  
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4. Shared beliefs legitimising companies 
The previous chapter explored the functioning and performance of the EITI and 
examined the influential role the business community has played in EITI’s inception. 
This chapter seeks to understand this role’s source of legitimacy by identifying the 
tacit shared beliefs amongst the stakeholders. Following Bourdieu, they are 
supposed to legitimise the status of the companies and thus produce the conditions 
under which social action takes place.  
As Bourdieu was well aware, social arenas are not isolated organisms but operate in 
overlapping material, social and cognitive structures. In consequence, developing a 
‘feel for the game’, which can be done in in-depth ethnography in anthropological 
research, is more difficult in international settings. Therefore, this research combines 
findings from ethnographic observation and the interview process with the method of 
text-analysis. It thereby, became possible to approach the broader discourses on 
natural resource extraction and management at the international level and to 
investigate the key assumptions transported in them about the role and the status of 
companies.101 Essentially, these underlying assumptions are what one would need 
to know in order to understand what makes companies from the extractive industries 
legitimate partners in international natural resource governance and particularly the 
EITI. 
This chapter relies on Bourdieu’s concept of doxa or shared beliefs. As elaborated in 
chapter two, shared beliefs encompass taken-for-granted assumptions about the 
world – in this case about natural resource extraction, the problems associated with 
it and the role played by companies and the other stakeholders in this setting. 
Combined, these beliefs reflect ‘the reality that goes unanimously unquestioned 
because it is beyond any notion of enquiry’ (Deer 2008: 121).  
                                               
101 This research makes use of Dryzek’s definition of the term as follows: ’A discourse is a shared way 
of apprehending the world. Embedded in language, it enables those who subscribe to it to interpret 
bits of information and put them together into coherent stories or accounts. Discourses construct 
meanings and relationships, helping to define common sense and legitimate knowledge. Each 
discourse rests on assumptions, judgements, and contentions that proved the basic terms for 
analysis, debates, agreements and disagreements’ (Dryzek 2005: 9). This definition also helps to 
illustrate the distinction between what is referred to in this study as shared beliefs, or doxa, and a 
discourse inasmuch as it becomes evident that discourse is the broader category of which shared 
beliefs are a fundamental ingredient. Shared beliefs depict the taken-for-granted, tacit assumptions 
underlying the discourse. 
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It is important to note that this chapter does not argue that these shared beliefs have 
been strategically injected into the EITI Standard based on a conscious instrumental 
decision by particular powerful actors or elites – rather, they should be understood 
as a historically constructed background knowledge which provides the cognitive 
structure or ideational basis against which corporate political practice takes place. 
This includes the cognitive categories from which agents perceive and think as well 
as the interpretations and understandings on which they act. As such, the specific 
contexts against which these beliefs have emerged is not traced, which would 
include actors and coalitions who acted as norm-entrepreneurs and pushed for 
certain ideas to be established. Instead, the analysis builds on existing academic 
literature on these topics and interprets it, thereby taking Bourdieu’s understanding 
of doxa seriously, as he assumed it to be most effective when the battles against 
which it was established have been forgotten (Deer 2008: 125). However, as the 
elaboration of the concepts in chapter two importantly stated, shared beliefs reflect 
an underlying power structure and serve a powerful purpose: they facilitate the 
unconscious subordination to power by the dominated as they come to take these 
beliefs for granted. 
Reviewing the literature, three fundamental beliefs are identified. Firstly, the 
assumption that “natural resources belong to the people” which is embedded into a 
liberal political and economic discourse and comes with prescriptions about the role 
of states and companies; secondly, the narrative of the good corporations which is 
encompassed in discourses on good governance and sustainable development 
enriched by debates on CSR and global corporate citizenship; and thirdly the 
assumption that exploitation of and access to natural resources is fundamental for 
societies, an understanding inherent in discourses on energy security. These beliefs 
are embedded in international discourses and describe companies as positive, 
responsible and exceptional agents thus legitimise their standing as vital and 
privileged players. 
4.1.  “Natural resources belong to the people”  
In EITI’s principles as much as in civil society reports, media coverage and the 
academic literature on natural resource extraction and management, there is one 
fundamental assumption which is always present, the claim that “natural resources 
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belong to the people” or, as the EITI Fact Sheet (2014: 1) states: ‘a country’s natural 
resources belong to its citizens’. The following sections elaborate on how this 
assumption’s presumably natural and universal stance is in fact based on liberal 
political and economic principles. This has important implications for the way in 
which the problems in natural resource governance are assessed and for the roles 
assigned to companies and governments.  
In greater detail it is argued that the claim comes with two sets of problems attached: 
The first set, arguably empirically more important for the case at hand, is the partial 
disguise of a normative liberal tradition of thought as a natural and universal 
predisposition, thereby misrepresenting the crucial intermediary role played by 
extractive companies while at the same time introducing a bias against governments 
of resource-rich countries and nationally-owned companies in favour of “private”, 
internationally operating extractive industries. The second category of problems 
refers to the subsequent framing of the discussion in economic terms which prevents 
the consideration of alternative categories of thought and a critical and profound 
engagement with ongoing international debates on justice, sustainability and the 
environment, while at the same time effectively limiting the practical options 
available. This is best illustrated by two fundamental ethical and philosophical 
questions on justice and legitimacy which are pushed to the backseat: Firstly, the 
inter-generational question of justice and, secondly, the egalitarian approach which 
would argue that the planet’s natural resources belong to all human beings equally. 
And albeit occasionally explicitly expressed, the idea of natural resources as 
belongings is very often rather implicitly present rather than openly discussed or 
contested. The line of argument, as this section will illustrate, suggests that the 
assumption’s liberal underpinnings translate into property rights and the right to 
commodify natural resources which limits the available perspectives on natural 
resource extraction and management. 
The assumption’s unquestioned status can for instance be found in academic 
articles, here exemplified by Leif Wenar’s, Chair of Ethics at London’s King’s 
College, in Philosophy and Public Affairs, in which he argues: ‘The idea that the 
natural resources of a country belong to the people of that country is so intuitive that 
most will need no more proof than its statement’ (2008: 10). The author continues by 
elaborating how this principle of ownership is underpinning universal international 
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law, enshrined for example in Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights or Article 21 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
and how it is encompassed in the Principle of National Ownership. He concludes:  
A people's right to its resources is a human right: Like a people's right to self-
determination or a people's right against genocide, this is a human right proclaimed 
in primary documents of international law (Wenar 2008: 15).102 
The assumption is also, however, present in conversations and interviews, as the 
following example demonstrates: A representative from the countries constituency, 
more particularly a supporting or donor country, was astonished by a question 
regarding the origin of this idea, stating: ‘I don’t understand your question.’ Following 
a brief pause, the interview partner, however, continued:  
Yes, I think that whatever is in the ground should benefit the people of the country, I 
fully agree with that concept although I don’t know exactly where it came from. I 
agree that this is a concept on which the whole discussion should be based. 
    (Country constituency interview, 25 January 2013) 
 
First implication: Property rights guaranteed by the state 
Interestingly, Wenar continues his line of argumentation by elaborating how this 
internationally recognised human right practically translates into property rights. This 
right is linked by international law to the principle of sovereignty, and results in a 
general understanding that natural resources fall under the national ownership of a 
country which gives the government the authority to sell this property.103 Wenar does 
neither question the ideational structure nor the historical context by which natural 
                                               
102 Peter Schaber, Swiss philosopher, critically examines Wenar’s position, disagreeing with him on 
two accounts: Firstly, the author highlights that the consumers of resource-rich countries are 
contributing to the problem by buying the resources, and secondly that resource-rich countries’ elites 
are not authorised to sell the natural resources of their country. According to Schaber, the 
responsibility and blame for the resource curse has to be with the government of resource-rich 
countries, as it lies within their duty to protect their people. However, he concludes: ‘But if the state 
does not live up to its duty and the people are not able to stop the violation of their property rights 
without incurring severe costs, as it is the case in, for example, Equatorial Guinea and the Republic of 
Congo, then the international community has to step in’ (Schaber 2011: 193). Another article by Jorge 
E. Viñuales, reflects on the legal perspective against which Wenar and Schaber argue, concluding 
that ’under current legal arrangements, states remain the main guarantors of the public good of the 
people living under their sovereignty’ (Viñuales 2011: 197). 
103According to Wenar this can be highly problematic in authoritarian countries or in situations of 
violent conflict: ’Whoever can maintain coercive control over a country’s population (or in the case of 
civil warriors, over part of the population) is recognized internationally as legally authorized to sell off 
that country’s resources’ (2008: 12). He calls this a “customary rule” which should be abolished in 
favour of more market-prone policies. 
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resources have been linked to the principles of ownership and property rights. 
However, in his further elaborations in becomes clear that it is only a liberal 
economic104 order in which his arguments are valid: ‘(...) The principles of the global 
market system. They are the principles of ownership and sale’ (2008: 16).  
As stated in the introduction of this chapter, this is not the place to reconstruct the 
establishment of liberal economic and political norms at the international level in form 
of international organizations and international law as this has been done elsewhere 
in the literature. Charvet and Kaczynska-Nay (2008) elaborate, for example, in their 
volume The Liberal Project and Human Rights comprehensively how various aspects 
of liberalism in its economic and political understanding have been enshrined into 
international law, tracing the contextual origins of liberalism in thought and practice 
over the Westphalian society to the right to development. More specifically, 
tremendous work has been done in uncovering the liberal underpinnings of the 
concept of property rights by Chukwumerije Okereke in part three of his book On 
Global Justice and Neoliberal Environmental Governance (2008). Additionally, in IR 
and IPE a substantial body of work has critically examined how various institutions 
and norms of the international order have not only been established against the 
background of a particular historical context (see Polanyi 1944; Gill and Law 1988; 
Harvey 2007), but additionally highlight the underpinning of these institutions by 
norms and values embedded in a liberal tradition of economic and political thought 
(for more recent examples examining the emergence and impact of economic ideas 
such as monetarism or neoliberalism, see Blyth 2010 or Boltanski and Chiapello 
2005). 
The fact that there is nothing “natural” about our understanding of what constitutes 
property rights and who has a right to claim them, in addition to the urgent need to 
historically contextualise the establishment of such rights, is easily illustrated by the 
fact that the right to property was either denied for women in the majority of liberal 
European states or legally linked to marital status up until relatively recently.105 The 
right to open a bank account and thus freely dispose of your money without spousal 
                                               
104 According to Charvet and Kaczynska-Nay, ‘liberalism in the economic sphere upholds the rights of 
individuals to make any choices they please in the exercise of their labour and the use of their wealth 
and income so long as they respect liberty, property and contractual rights of others’ (2008: 2). 
105 For examples of the disempowering impact of privatisation and instalment of property rights on 
women in patrilinear developing countries, see Lastarria-Cornhiel (1997). 
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consent was granted to women in Germany only in 1962, the right to work without 
spousal consent in 1977.106 In Britain, it became legal for both, husband and wife to 
inherit property equally under the Law of Property Act from 1922, while only after the 
Sex Discrimination Act in 1975 could women open a bank account, and it took up to 
the 1980s until they were allowed to apply for a loan or get a mortgage without the 
signature of a male guarantor.107  
It could be argued at this point that exploiting natural resources existing in the 
immanent environment, for example in the form of forestry or fishery, has 
accompanied the human evolution from its very beginnings and can therefore to a 
certain extent be understood as “natural”. However, the extraction of natural 
resources as known today – technology-based exploitation centring on oil, gas and 
minerals – is a fairly recent phenomenon. The large-scale industrial extraction of coal 
is linked to the process of industrialization, or the first industrial revolution which 
started in the 18th and 19th centuries and saw inventions such as steam and water 
power. Oil drilling is generally understood to have commenced at the beginning of 
the 20th century. In addition, from a historical point of view, natural resources hardly 
ever belonged to the people living in the area where the resources could be found. 
They have been exploited on behalf of the ruling class/system for centuries with 
examples stretching from the Roman Empire to the British Commonwealth. Today, 
this practice is mostly evident in what Yates describes as ‘nationalization’, a strategy 
observable in some African countries by which the central government seeks to 
establish control over resources by shifting property rights:  
(...) It takes ownership and possession away from the communities who live above 
the resources. Nationalization, by law, expropriates the oil and gas from those people 
who live in Cabinda, in the name of another people, the Angolan, to whom they have 
been forcibly annexed (...) producing an “indigenization discourse” (citing Ukiwo 
2008) which is found elsewhere in Africa, such as the Niger Delta, Southern Sudan 
or Darfur (Yates 2012: 53, quotation marks in the original). 
Understanding natural resources as property of the people presupposes a 
functioning state, receptive to its citizens, guaranteeing and enforcing their rights on 
                                               
106 Available from: http://www.focus.de/wissen/mensch/geschichte/tid-21578/zum-weltfrauentag-
meilensteine-der-frauenemanzipation-in-deutschland-die-erste-frau-die-ohne-erlaubnis-ihres-
ehemannes-arbeiten-darf_aid_605621.html. 
107 Additionally, prior to the Married Women’s Property Act in 1870, ‘women who held property of any 
kind were required to give up all rights to it to their husbands on marriage.’ Available from: 
http://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/transformingsociety/private-
lives/relationships/overview/propertychildren/. 
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the one hand and an engaged public willing to participate and claim their rights on 
the other hand. Both, property rights and democratic states are fundamental 
principles of liberal political thought associated for instance with the writings of 
Thomas Hobbes and John Locke.108 In addition, it can also be noted that the 
assumption does not stipulate explicitly what the consequences should be, e.g. what 
does it mean that the resources are supposed to belong to the people? It implies 
however, and that becomes clear while examining the subsequent policy 
recommendations, that the people should “benefit” from these resources apparently 
in a way which improves their economic status, which is where the liberal tradition 
becomes much more visible and problematic as it again presupposes both a 
functioning (preferably democratic) state and a liberal market economy. 
In summary, it can be argued that the “natural resources belong to the people 
assumption” in fact calls on people to follow a liberal line of argumentation and 
thereby disguises a normative claim into a “natural” presupposition which in reality 
comes with problems attached: In resource-rich countries the assumption faces 
problems when the people do not make direct links between their personal economic 
status and their countries’ natural resource wealth (which is the reason why 
advocacy NGOs need to campaign in some resource-rich countries for the people to 
be made aware of their rights and to make use of them).109 In addition, and much 
more often the case, in many resource-rich countries people have on the one hand 
side in practice no means, by one way or another, to claim their rights (no functioning 
or limited legal system; no or limited opportunities to raise protest; sometimes simply 
no or limited access to information and for instance illiteracy as major challenges) 
and/ or have, on the other hand, no or limited constitutionally granted options to 
choose their authorities. Frynas summarised for the year 2007, based on the 
Freedom House rankings:  
                                               
108 Broadly speaking, political liberalism ‘involves the design of institutions that will provide some 
guarantee of government accountability to the people and will limit the government’s power to attack 
or erode individual liberty’ (Charvet and Kaczynska-Nay 2008: 2), implying the right to chose your 
government. 
109 As illustrated by the following quote from the homepage of the Revenue Watch Institute: 
’The Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI) helps people to realize the benefits of their 
countries’ endowments of oil, gas and minerals. We do this through technical advice, advocacy, 
applied research, policy analysis, and capacity development.’ Available from: 
(http://www.resourcegovernance.org/about). 
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Out of twenty-four oil-producing countries in the developing world, only five – Mexico, 
Brazil, Indonesia, India and Argentina – have political and civil freedom (...). Of these 
twenty-four countries, not a single one has genuinely free press (Frynas 2009: 
149).110  
Although at first glance this might seem like a more abstract theoretical discussion, 
there are two important observations to make: Firstly, where the state is the 
guarantor of people’s rights, it does not come as a surprise that international law 
stipulates a ‘duty for states to protect against non-state human rights abuses within 
their jurisdiction’ (Charvet and Kaczynska-Nay 2008: 74-5) whereas there is only 
secondary responsibility for MNCs apart from exceptions under criminal law.111 
Secondly, this assessment of the problem has important and observable direct 
consequences for the EITI Standard and its effectiveness if linked to the findings in 
the second part of the previous chapter. It was elaborated how the reception of the 
EITI reports is severely limited, precisely because they do not seem to reach the 
intended audiences and these audiences are less influential than originally assumed 
(see chapter three). However, embedded within a liberal political discourse it might 
have initially made sense to presuppose an active and influential civil society as well 
as an interested public.  
Second implication: Commodification and mechanisms of exclusion 
Natural resources are almost certainly approached and thought of within mental 
categories originating from economics.112 They are referred to as “capital” or “goods” 
that need to be incorporated into a country’s economic equation and are subject to a 
                                               
110 In a very grim assessment of the political leadership in oil-rich African countries, Yates 
summarises: ’Nine out of ten rulers in African oil-rent dependent states call themselves “President”, 
but only two came to power through democratic elections: Goodluck Jonathan and Fradique De 
Menezes. Their “Francafrican” counterparts, Ali Bongo and Paul Buya, came to power by means of 
fraudulent plebiscites orchestrated by the French. The remaining six military “praetorian” rulers – 
Obiang, Dos Santos Sassou-Nguesso, Al-Bashir, Deby, and Asis – are professional soldiers who 
seized power by coup d’état and/or war and keep it through the selective use of violence’ (2012: 42). 
111 United Nations Resolution U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 of the Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights reflects this hierarchy: ‘Recognizing that even though 
States have the primary responsibility to promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of 
and protect human rights, transnational corporations and other business enterprises, as organs of 
society, are also responsible for promoting and securing the human rights set forth in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights’ (UN 2008b). A similar line of argument can be found in UN’s Protect, 
Respect and Remedy Framework (2008a) and the Guiding Principles (2011). 
112 For critical voices of these categories, see for instance Ashley’s (1983) seminal article ‘Three 
Modes of Economism’ in which he highlights how three types of economic logics have become co-
constitutive for understanding and analysing politics; or de Goede’s (2003) article ‘Beyond economism 
in IPE’ in which she argues that ‘closer scrutiny of modern finance necessitates a consideration of the 
discursive practices which bring capitalist concepts such as money, profit or capital into being’ (2003: 
81). 
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calculative or rational logic. Dryzek subsumed such an understanding into the 
discourse on sustainable economic growth in which ‘nature is mainly treated as 
something that provides useful services to humans. The ‘natural capital’ methaphor 
is sometimes evoked’ (Dobson 1998: 41-7 and Sachs 1999: 33, cited in Dryzek 
2005: 156). An illustrative example from the academic literature is Carbonnier: ‘The 
window of opportunity to translate extraction into development in low-income 
countries can be rather short, depending on how long it takes to deplete a country's 
natural capital’ (2011: 137). Nobel Prize Winner Elinor Ostrom (1990) refers to 
natural resources as “common goods”.113  
This depiction of natural resources as “goods” has the tendency to exclude options 
for applying alternative categories of thought. Empirical evidence suggests that in 
alternative cognitive frameworks natural resources and the places in which they are 
located, such as a particular forests or mountains can be places of religious 
significance or symbols of people’s social or group identity. As Sawyer and Gomez 
summarise, for example, ‘many contemporary indigenous claims arise from various 
attachments – often attachments that entwine an intimately lived and living 
landscape with a sacred idiom that secures a peoples’ distinct place in the cosmos’ 
(2012: 15). Examples of indigenous people’s struggles suggest that some tribes 
might not have an interest in extracting the resources after all.114  
Such a choice should also be recognised as fundamental right as argued for by 
James Anaya, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples:  
                                               
113 Ostrom (1990) elaborated in her work how, contrary to Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons-thesis, 
there are examples by which common resources have been managed well through collaborative effort 
without privatisation or markets. However, resulting from a logic which is methodologically rooted in 
rationalism, she stresses the importance of clear borders and limits to the “commons” as well as the 
establishment of mechanisms for punishment and exclusion. 
114 This is illustrated by the frequently cited case of Indian tribe, Dongria Kondh which ‘gathers at the 
top of Niyamgiri mountain to celebrate the annual festival of Niyam Raja, the king of the mountain’, a 
case which became popular as the ‘real-life Na’vi’ (see The Time article by Thottam 2010). The 
Kondhs rose to prominence following the release of James Cameron’s blockbuster Avatar in which 
the native tribe of fictive planet Pandora rises up against an invasion of a mining corporation. 
Supported by a London-based advocacy group called Survival International, the Dongria tribe 
managed to appeal to the Indian Supreme Court after plans where revealed that mining company 
Vedanta had obtained a license to start operating in the mountain. Following global public protest, the 
Court backed down: ‘The Supreme Court told Vedanta in 2013 that the Dongria must decide whether 
to allow mining on the Mountain of the Law. The Dongria have answered with an unequivocal “No”.’ 
Available from: http://www.survivalinternational.org/tribes/dongria. For a more detailed case study, 
see Xaxa (2012). 
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Indigenous individuals and peoples have the right to oppose and actively express 
opposition to extractive projects, both in the context of state decision-making about 
the projects and otherwise, including by organizing and engaging in peaceful acts of 
protest (United Nations, 2013).115  
This example serves also as a brilliant illustration for the socially constructive nature 
of human rights, posing follow-up questions of justice and equality. This is indicated 
by the fact that particular rights stipulated under international law might oppose or 
contradict each other (in this case the right to development for which natural 
resources are understood as prerequisite and other fundamental rights such as the 
right to self-determination which if exercised might result in a decision favouring non-
extraction). 
However and as already indicated, the liberal economic perspective is fundamentally 
attached to a rule of law attributing property rights on natural resources which 
subsequently can be traded or sold. Natural resources thus do not only morally 
“belong” to the people or the state, they also do so in legal terms, and they thereby 
become a commodity. According to this line of argumentation, this is understood to 
empower local communities: 
As part of their right to self-determination, “indigenous peoples have the right to 
determine priorities and strategies for the development or use of their lands and 
territories”. This right necessarily implies a right of indigenous peoples to pursue their 
own initiatives for resource extraction within their territories if they so choose. In 
cases in which indigenous peoples retain ownership of all the resources, including 
mineral and other subsurface resources, within their lands, ownership of the 
resources naturally includes the right to extract and develop them (ibid., quotation 
marks in the original, emphasis added). 
As Sawyer and Gomez (2012: 2-3) rightly note, there is a variety of empirical 
evidence which supports these claims. However, there are also case studies in 
which such recognition of indigenous rights has had much more ambiguous effects 
to the extent that it has lead to further marginalization, conflict and co-optation of 
indigenous peoples’ voices (see the case of the Subanons in the Philippines in 
Rovillos and Tauli-Corpuz 2012). 
However, one consequence of the previously described economistic understanding 
of natural resources as commodity is that a success story of natural resource 
extraction is considered one in which the country enhanced its economic 
performance by transforming its abundant natural resources into economic growth 
                                               
115 United Nations Report A/HRC/24/41, Extractive industries and indigenous peoples, point A.19. 
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with Norway and increasingly Australia, Canada and South Africa as the most 
prominent examples (see Larsen 2006; Ville and Wicken). From this perspective, 
natural resource extraction is legitimate and beneficial since it contributes to 
economic growth and thus wealth and development, a view intimately linked to the 
good governance and development narrative which will be elaborated on in greater 
detail in the following section, ultimately legitimizing extraction and implicitly the 
“extractors”, e.g. extractive industries, as potentially positive contributions or 
contributors.  
Moreover, following a liberal line of argumentation: ‘It is the duty of states to make 
sure that the property rights of their citizens are protected’ (Schaber 2011: 194). 
Consequently, the fault for disregard of these rights is placed on the shoulders of 
governments. And although the literature on the resource curse hypothesis 
encompasses various elements, such as a strong economic component generally 
referred to as the Dutch Disease,116 a general tendency to rely on the revenues and 
the extractive sectors,117 as well as also highlights the important role played in 
particular cases by corrupt elites or private actors such as war lords or drug cartels, 
these days the main focus is tackling a perceived lack of managerial and 
administrative capacity on behalf of the state. This focus is in accordance with the 
good governance agenda of the international financial institutions, particularly the 
World Bank who happens to manage the EITI MDTF (for a more detailed elaboration 
on the nexus between development and good governance, see the subsequent 
section). Wenar for instance argues that ‘the resource curse results from a failure of 
institutions: specifically, a failure to enforce property rights’ (2008: 9). Experts on the 
topic, such as Michael L. Ross (et al. 2011), offer advice to resource-rich countries 
on how decentralization and the bringing in of local communities can help to prevent 
                                               
116 Defined by the Financial Times Lexicon as follows: ‘Dutch disease is the negative impact on an 
economy of anything that gives rise to a sharp inflow of foreign currency, such as the discovery of 
large oil reserves. The currency inflows lead to currency appreciation, making the country’s other 
products less price competitive on the export market. It also leads to higher levels of cheap imports 
and can lead to deindustrialisation as industries apart from resource exploitation are moved to 
cheaper locations. The origin of the phrase is the Dutch economic crisis of the 1960s following the 
discovery of North Sea natural gas.’ Available from: http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=dutch-disease. 
For an additional overview of the academic literature on the resource curse and (economic) 
explanatory factors, see Rosser 2006). 
117 As Frynas summarises the factors assumed to contribute to the resource curse: ‘Extractive 
industries exports may undermine good governance and political accountability to society. Given their 
dependence on extractive industries revenue, governance in resource-rich countries may neglect 
non-resource taxation and may have fewer incentives to nurture other economic sectors and improve 
the quality of institutions’ (2009: 135). 
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gross inequality resulting from extraction while Paul Collier has been strongly 
engaged in the establishment of the Natural Resource Charter which also aims at 
giving policy advice. As already mentioned, this is endorsed by the global financial 
institutions, whereby the World Bank and the IMF are not only official supporters of 
these initiatives but came up with similar recommendations themselves (see the IMF 
Guide on Resource Revenue Transparency 2007). This is reflected in the EITI 
Standard which emphasises the role of governments in mismanagement and 
corruption and subsequently aims at improving government capacities and inducing 
reforms (see chapters three and seven). 
A consequence of this focus on state capacity is that the highly-industrialised nature 
of resource extraction which requires large sums of investment and world-class 
technological, economic and personal know-how as well as specialized equipment 
takes a backseat. This argument is particularly valid for the oil and gas sector. It 
excludes for instance a category of extraction which is subsumed under 
“unconventionals” which increasingly plays an important role in the world energy 
supply. This category for example includes deepwater production118 as the building 
block but also encompasses a variety of alternative, unconventional sources, such 
as the increased use of natural gas liquids or oil sands (see Yergin 2012: chapter 
12). What this focus additionally fails to capture are the ways by which natural 
resources are connected to the global markets, including what Yergin describes as 
the “financialization” and “commodification” of oil which has enabled the electronic 
trade of oil, but also introduced new players, such as national wealth funds, traders 
or speculators into the market (Yergin 2012: 167ff.)119 The highly-industrialised, 
highly finance-driven process places business actors as important intermediaries 
between people and governments which is a fact that needs to be taken seriously. 
Ordinary people have neither direct access to exploitation nor to the markets. 
                                               
118 As Yergin summarises: ‘(...) the growth of the deepwater sector worldwide was extraordinary – 
from 1.5 million barrels a day in 2000 to 5 million by 2009. By that point, some 14,000 exploratory and 
production wells had been drilled in the deep waters around the world’ (2012: 248). 
119 The changes become more tangible in contrast: ‘Into the 1970s, there really was no world oil 
market in which barrels were traded back and forth. Most of the global oil trade took place inside each 
of the integrated oil companies, among their various operating units, as oil moved from the well into 
tankers, and then into refineries and into gasoline stations. Throughout this long journey, the oil 
remained largely within the borders of the company’ (Yergin 2012: 167). This process of “integration” 
changed with the introduction of the “paper barrel” in the 1980s and by around 2005 with the 
introduction of electronic paper platforms ‘the paper barrel had become the electronic barrel’ (Yergin 
2012: 174). 
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Governments in a highly competitive global economy need to collaborate with these 
powerful external economic actors even if it is only for the sake of attracting FDI. As 
Lord Browne recalled in his biography, summarizing BP’s experience in Nigeria: ‘The 
reality was we were not wanted but needed. Nigeria, like many countries after 15 
years of nationalising their oil, was seeking help with technology and people skills’ 
(Browne 2010: 122, emphasis in the original). The asymmetrical situation between 
companies and resource-rich countries can be further illustrated by the following 
quotes:  
And although Exxon doesn’t have the power to change things it has the power to 
influence. Not only by releasing some sort of information but also ‘cause host country 
governments who have these resources, well they want to attract the best operators 
and it is clear that the best operators favour an attractive economic environment. It’s 
an incentive for host countries’ governments to embrace the EITI and make it real 
(...) ‘cause even though companies pour into Equatorial Guinea and Angola, they are 
not going to pay as much for those assets as they would, in for instance Norway, 
because it’s a very unsafe place. So everyone is in competition. 
    (Company constituency interview, 31 October 2012) 
When you consider an African oil enclave, one of its single most striking features is 
the domination by and dependence upon foreign multinational corporations (MNCs) 
that own it. They hire their own exploration teams. They build their own offshore 
drilling platforms. They run their own pumping stations, pipelines, refineries, heliports 
and tanker fleets as they please. Their global distribution networks, world-class 
investments, and superior technology give them a kind of sovereign power over poor 
rural African villages located around their enclaves (Yates 2012: 35). 
 
In addition, and despite its normative underpinnings, the debate in general does not 
reflect on the ethical complexity of the problems ahead including discussions on 
environmental sustainability and justice for a variety of reasons: Firstly, within this 
economic mindset, there is no space for non-exploitation or preservation as 
illustrated by the following quote:  
It is reasonable to assume that the citizens of Equatorial Guinea and other oil-rich 
countries have no reason at all to object (to their rulers selling rights to extract natural 
resources) because they have no reason to want their oil not to be sold. Unlike works 
of art, natural resources such as oil are not something you could want to be 
preserved. (...) Oil becomes interesting only when you sell it (Schaber 2011:188).  
Earlier in this chapter, the argument was made that this might not be the case if one 
approaches natural resource from a religious or identity-based value system. 
However, this automatic linkage between natural resources, property rights and 
resource commodification is also problematic from an egalitarian and cosmopolitan 
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perspective which stipulates that the Earth’s natural resources belong to all humans 
equally (the different perspectives are discussed in Miklos 2013, see particularly 
chapter six).120 This would pose serious questions of global distributive justice as 
natural resources are disproportionally extracted in Southern and consumed or used 
in “Western” countries. This argument is much more familiar in discussions on 
tropical deforestation and climate change in which the vital function of tropical rain 
forests as “green lungs” of our ecosystem are answered by resource-rich countries 
pointing out their “right” to cut and sell timber as “their” natural resource for profit 
motives. However, as the striking example of Ecuador illustrates, it is easily linked to 
oil and mining: In 2007 the Ecuadorian government faced the decision of whether or 
not to allow oil exploration to start in its Yasuni National Park which is part of the 
Amazonas Rain Forest – a project which promised the in-flow of massive revenues 
in a country battling immense poverty and inequality. President Rafael Correa called 
on the international community for donations to compensate the loss and preserve 
the park, a pioneering initiative, which ultimately failed due to a lack of donations. In 
August 2013, President Correa approved oil drilling in the territory.121 
Secondly, it can be argued that the liberal approach has a tendency to disregard the 
potential for normative tensions between social justice and environmental 
sustainability.122 As elaborated by Andrew Dobson: ‘It is just possible that a society 
would be prepared to sanction the buying of environmental sustainability at the cost 
of declining social justice, as it is also possible that it would be prepared to sanction 
increasing social justice at the cost of a deteriorating environment’ (2003: 4). 
Practically, as Martinez-Alier suggests, these tensions might emerge in the form of 
“environmental” or “ecological” conflicts, as already described in the previous 
sections on indigenous rights:  
Not all humans are affected in an equal manner by the use the economy makes of 
the natural environment. Some benefit more than others, and some bear a greater 
cost burden than others; hence, ecological distribution conflicts or conflicts over 
                                               
120 In similar vein, at international conferences for regulating the seabed or the global atmosphere 
parties have argued in favour of the establishment of a ‘Common Heritage of Mankind- principle’ 
which was dismissed as incompatible with property and trade rights by proponents of the liberal 
market, particularly the US (Okereke 2008: 133-137). 
121 For more information, see The Guardian (2013). Available from: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/16/ecuador-approves-yasuni-amazon-oil-
drilling#guardian-services-top-menu. 
122 For an elaboration on how environmentalism and liberal market ideas merged in the aftermath of 
the WSSD 1992, see Bernstein 2000.  
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“environmental justice” arise’ (Martinez-Alier 2004: 13, quotations marks in the 
original). 
 
Thirdly, from an ethical perspective another important issue arises almost 
automatically from depletion of finite resources: the question of intergenerational 
justice (see discussed in Dobson 2003: chapter four). Concerns about the well-being 
of future generations are exclusively dealt with in economic terms, and almost 
always limited to individual countries: Predominantly, the topic is brushed-off, 
pointing towards the narrative of the sustainable development equation which argues 
that in an ideal economic development, resource-rich countries transform their oil 
and mineral wealth into economic growth by (re-)investing the revenues (see 
elaborations in the following section). In some resource-rich countries, the issue is 
dealt with by establishing so-called Future Generation Funds, following the example 
of Norway.123  
Finally, perspectives calling for a broadening of discourses on global justice towards 
injustice against non-humans, which would include the environment or other species 
(see Schlosberg 2013: 43), have yet to reach the debate on natural resource 
extraction. The problem is again particularly evident with reference to some 
indigenous cultures which do not understand their own well-being as separate from 
non-human nature. 
In summary, it can be stated that approaching natural resource extraction from a 
liberal perspective tends to overemphasise the role played by national institutions 
and the state while understating the role of the extractive industry. This shared belief 
indicates an imbalance or misrepresentation of the importance of both players in the 
assessment of the problems, which is biased in favour of companies. In addition, this 
belief closes-off options for valuing the resources in a non-commercial way and 
poses serious questions of justice and legitimacy. Recalling the function of doxa, this 
is precisely how shared beliefs operate: they serve as an instrument for establishing 
order and ultimately subordination thus reinforcing the position of the dominant (see 
chapter two for the concepts). 
 
                                               
123 Examples include the Azerbaijan State Oil Fund or Chad’s Future Generations Fund, see Fynas 
(2009: 143ff.). 
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4.2. Discourses promoting the “good corporation” 
This section introduces the “good corporation” belief, an underlying assumption of 
discourses on global and good governance which portrays corporations as 
responsible and resourceful “partners” or “citizens” while at the same time 
highlighting their essential contribution to economic growth.124 The “good-
corporation” belief is as prevalent as it is essentially contested. This section argues 
that is serves two important functions: Firstly, it affirms the privileged status of 
companies at the international level, and secondly, it opens up scope for political 
manoeuvre and strategic interpretation of political responsibilities of corporations. In 
discussions on natural resource extraction, the narrative is mostly observable in the 
form of the “sustainable development equation”. 
 
The good corporation in discourses on global governance 
The introductory chapter already introduced the literature on global governance, with 
a specific focus on the emerging role of corporations as political actors on the 
international stage (see chapter one). This section illustrates more specifically how in 
the nexus between the global governance and the CSR-perspective, corporations 
are framed in positive terms as resourceful and constructive actors on the 
international stage. This is most visibly signalled by euphemisms such as 
‘responsible partners’ or ‘caring capitalism’ (Sklair 2002: 159).  
The global governance discourse which dominated the 1990s and early 2000s was 
underpinned by liberal connotations emphasising the prospect for international 
peace and security through democracy and trade, starting from the following problem 
assessment: The international level is characterised by the absence of an 
overarching global authority or power at the international level. In addition, global 
problems exist, which need to be addressed. These are problems which are not 
solvable by single state or state action in general. Against this background, the idea 
emerged that companies could help to fulfil central governance tasks, such as rule-
making and rule-implementation, at the international level. Firstly, from a rationalist 
perspective and often additionally deploying a functionalist logic, the inclusion of 
private actors as partners in international governance processes is described as a 
                                               
124 The term “good corporation” is borrowed from S. Prakesh Sethi (2003). 
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win-win-situation: Corporations are assumed to be interested in predictability and 
stability of their investments. Clear, transparent and consistent rules and standards 
at the international level can contribute to guarantee this. At the same time, 
companies have access to resources such as managerial or technological expertise 
or financial capital which could help to make international political processes more 
effective and efficient and thus close global governance gaps which public actors are 
no longer able to address (Mayer and Gereffi 2010). This line of argument has been 
most prominently advocated for through the UN-business partnerships under Kofi 
Annan’s administration (see chapter one).  
In discourses on global governance, the status of companies as legitimate partners 
is conceptualised as a form of “private authority”. Private authority is understood as 
derived from the co-regulative function business actors perform at the international 
level based on their superior resources and expertise, see this argument for 
instances presented in Hall and Biersteker (see also chapters two and seven): 
They perform the role of authorship over some important issues or domains. They 
claim to be, perform as, and are recognised as legitimate by some larger public (that 
often includes states themselves) as authors of policies, or practices, of rules and of 
norms. They set agendas, they establish boundaries or limits for action, they certify, 
they offer salvation, they guarantee contracts, and they provide order and security. In 
short, they do many of the things traditionally, and exclusively, associated with the 
state. (...) They appear to have been awarded a form of legitimate authority (2002: 4). 
 
An example from the EITI on how companies can ‘help to make the MSG work 
effectively’ (at the national level of the EITI process), following the same logic: 
Experienced companies can play a key role by providing leadership to help take the 
EITI agenda forward. Companies can improve the effectiveness of the MSG by using 
their expertise to build the capacity of less experienced MSG members and national 
Secretariat staff in the areas of strategic planning, workplan design and 
implementation, as well as the technical and managerial issues involved in the 
reporting process (EITI Business Guide 2013: 15). 
It is important to note that as this discourse emphasises support and collaboration as 
the norm, negative effects of corporate activities are downplayed as “misbehaviours” 
or “exceptions”. 
The second argument presented in the global governance literature comes from a 
constructivist perspective, and argues that companies are sensitive towards 
international norms and aim at following them. Therefore, they are attentive to the 
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wider impact of their operations on the social and environmental context at the 
national and international level.125 These arguments see corporations as norm 
followers but also potential agents of norm-establishment and enforcement, as for 
example Banfield et al. argue: ‘The basic thesis (...) is that conflict-sensitive business 
and its promotion of public policymaking institutions could become an important part 
of a collective and multi-actor effort to create a more peaceful world’ (2005: 133). 
This perspective on companies as agents for positive change is frequently 
expressed in business statements on the EITI, here exemplary by ICMM: 
ICMM sees the EITI as important in improving the governance of resource revenues, 
in reducing opportunities for corruption and for improving development outcomes in  
mineral-dependent economies. Our member companies see the benefits of 
involvement in EITI at a country level through increases in trust and a growth in 
dialogue between governments, civil society and business (EITI Business Guide 
2013: 11). 
This perception of corporations as sensitive and positive agents at the international 
level epitomised by the rise of the concept of global corporate citizenship, is 
promoted likewise by international organizations, academic scholars in IR and 
Business Ethics and policy experts (Sklair 2002: chapter six; Matten and Crane 
2005; Moon et al. 2005; Crane et al. 2008). The concept can be understood as an 
evolution of the broader model of CSR which encompasses four different types of 
responsibilities for corporations as members of a society, as outlined by Archie B. 
Caroll: (1) the economic responsibility to be profitable; (2) the legal responsibility to 
abide by the laws of society; (3) the ethical responsibility to do what is right, just, and 
fair; and (4) the philanthropic responsibility to contribute to various kinds of social, 
educational, recreational, or cultural purpose (Caroll 1979, cited in Matten and Crane 
2005: 167).126 
                                               
125 The line of argument presented here disagrees with Holzer who states that ‘corporations do not 
wield unfettered power in world society. Despite their economic wealth and their access to formal 
power, TNCs are bound by globally institutionalized scripts of legitimate social action that favour their 
critics’ (Holzer 2010: 4) by which he is referring to civil society. In contrast, it is suggested here that 
the global governance discourse legitimises both agents, while their constant engagement and debate 
with each other reflects on their dominance and re-perpetuates their status. This argument will be 
explored in greater detail in chapter seven. 
126 For a history of the evolution and the various approaches to CSR, refer to Caroll (1999). However, 
the most infamous critique of CSR came from economist Milton Friedman who opposed the idea 
strongly and elaborated his arguments in a New York Times Magazine article in September 1970 
titled ‘The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits. Available from: 
http://www.colorado.edu/studentgroups/libertarians/issues/friedman-soc-resp-business.html. 
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The argument underlying the concept of global corporate citizenship can be 
summarised in the following statement: 
With economic globalization and changing local conditions, business leaders are 
called upon to wrestle with complex issues that affect not only their shareholders, 
employees and customers but also the quality of life in local communities, our 
environment and people and countries throughout the world (Business for Social 
Responsibility (BSR) Conference Brochure 1996, cited in Sklair 2002: 156). 
Despite the empirical and conceptual variety of CSR and global corporate citizenship 
approaches (see Frynas 2009: chapter one; Crane et al. 2008), it can be stated that 
the numerous academic articles in journals, such as Business Ethics or Business 
Ethics Quarterly, have common ground as they generally assume that the objectives 
of being a socially responsible company and increasing shareholder-value are not 
mutually exclusive. An argument which is also increasingly illustrated with case 
studies from developing and resource-rich countries. This discourse essentially 
depicts corporations as sensitive towards the social and environmental impact of 
their activities: 
The popular myth of a good corporation is a financially successful and economically 
efficient company that would marry profit-making with social responsibility; provide 
stable and well-paid jobs with generous benefits; support culture and the arts; 
encourage employees to become involved in their communities; and, be a good 
corporate citizen. Others have offered parallel although somewhat different visions of 
this idyllic corporate welfare state where managers combine market-competitive 
efficiency with enlightened stakeholder management to achieve the best of all 
possible worlds. In a word, we seek a corporation that is paternalistic and benevolent 
(Prakesh Sethi 2003: 21). 
As indicated, the idea of CSR has received severe criticism in recent years.127 In 
particular, civil society has labelled most CSR-efforts as “green washing strategies”, 
targeted at improving a company’s international reputation through positive publicity 
while distracting from the still prevalent practices of environmental pollution and 
exploitation on the operational ground. In essence, this argument states that apart 
from “cosmetic” actions, including new logos or advertisement highlighting 
environment and safety measures, company’s CSR efforts have rarely materialised 
into fundamental measures improving working and environmental conditions. This 
argument has been elaborated in greater detail by Sklair, concluding that companies 
have not taken conscious steps to resolve the central dilemmas of our times, 
                                               
127 For critical assessment of the concept, see Vogel (2006) or Cutler (2008). 
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referring to poverty and equality, as well as more generally the ‘unsustainability of 
the system’ (2001: 5-6).  
Despite this controversy, the line of argumentation portraying companies as 
responsible agents for positive change is often found in EITI documents, as for 
example expressed in the foreword to the EITI Business Guide by Clare Short, 
Chairwoman of the EITI, and Sam Walch, Chief Executive Officer of Rio Tinto, which 
reads:  
Well-managed companies want to invest in countries governed by transparency and 
fair rules. They want to be part of a public discussion and to engage with their 
stakeholders and external audiences including local communities and governments 
(EITI Business Guide 2013: 7).  
The guide further lists fundamental CSR principles as motivational factors for 
companies to participate, such as a stronger social license to operate (see chapter 
five for the importance of this principle for the miners) or demonstrating international 
credibility, delivering on business principles and showing industry leadership (Ibid.: 
11-12).  
As the discussion has explored, the idea of companies as interested in broader 
social and environmental well-being is contested. Nevertheless, this section argues 
that in combination with the aforementioned rational arguments, the CSR-discourse 
provides the scope for a positive depiction of companies which is open enough for 
interpretation and thus can strategically filled with meaning by the private sector 
when necessary or convenient. In the academic literature, Sklair provides an 
excellent example illustrating how major MNCs have managed to strategically 
capture and transform the emerging international dialogue on sustainability and the 
environment for business serving purposes.128 In natural resource governance, this 
is exemplarily done by the sustainable development equation which emerged as a 
line of argumentation throughout the interview process. 
Legitimate business and the sustainable development equation 
Even if the extraction of natural resources is conducted in a socially and 
environmentally sensitive way and by companies in cooperation with the local 
                                               
128 Mainly by deflecting ‘from the idea of a singular ecological crisis’ towards an approach in which 
there are ‘a series of manageable environmental problems’ (Sklair 2011: 198). 
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government – both aiming to minimise the negative externalities usually associated 
with drilling or mining while maximising the potential benefits for the communities – 
the crucial point remains that it takes a few years or even decades to extract 
something that has taken billions of years to develop, and once extracted is gone 
forever. Oil, gas and minerals are a finite resource and this fact creates a unique 
momentum of huge responsibility for all economic and political parties involved with 
consequences, not only for the present, but also for future generations of resource-
rich countries. So how do extractive industries interpret and act on this 
responsibility?  
The first thing to notice is the fact that this responsibility is generally understood to 
belong to the local government, a view strongly expressed by all the corporate 
representatives but frequently also stated by other stakeholders, also suggested in 
the EITI documents and in statements by the international financial institutions. 
Following the liberal line of argument already elaborated in the previous sections, it 
is the government who is responsible for providing basic public goods and services 
such as infrastructure, education and healthcare through the redistribution of 
individual and corporate taxes. In addition, it is the government who has an interest 
in establishing a business-friendly climate which provides the secure and predictable 
realm for corporations to undertake their operations. Despite a widely-used CSR-
rhetoric as elaborated in the previous section, the discourse here, in accordance with 
conventional liberal economic theory states that corporations primarily contribute to 
society by generating wealth, both through paying taxes and providing employment. 
This function is vital for legitimizing the very existence of the corporation. But how to 
reconcile the paradox of extracting finite resources whilst assuming contributing to 
society in resource-rich countries? This is done via the sustainable developmemt 
equation: 
We, I hope, also have a positive agenda, as well as things that we think are 
dangerous and undesirable, so if I look at this strategy review and where we have 
come out we wanted to begin to get EITI more into the issue of how money is spent. 
That doesn’t mean that we think EITI should be saying: ‘You shouldn’t spend money 
on defence and you should spent money on education!’ That clearly has to be 
decided through proper democratic processes in the country. But actually making 
sure there is transparency about how that budget is divided, where the revenues are 
going so there can be a debate whether or not the uses are potentially sustainable. 
‘Cause if we think about sustainable development conceptually than of course 
digging stuff out that has taken half a billions of years to make that of course means 
you are not going to replace it the year after next, so you are exhausting a non-
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renewable resource. So in some senses that clearly isn’t sustainable, but if you take 
it as a sustainability equation, e.g. you are reducing your natural capital by x amount 
but during that period you can augment your manufactured capital through 
infrastructure improvements, your human capital through education and health 
expenditure and investment and social capital through strengthening your institutions 
through development than it becomes about sustainable development and we know 
from experience that a lot of the money that we generate, either people in these 
countries don’t know we generated or they assume that (and it some cases it does) 
get paid in and than nothing useful happens with it. 
    (Company constituency interview, 27 February 2013) 
As this quote illustrates the presence of natural resources literally holds a promise of 
wealth and prosperity for the people living in these regions, often the only imaginable 
route to better education, healthcare and infrastructure in the future (see for example 
Goucha and Crawley 2009). The inflow of revenues is understood as an exceptional 
opportunity that has to be utilized wisely, to provide what has been coined 
sustainable growth.129 Norway, Canada and Botswana are usually highlighted as 
prime instances of such an exemplary development and are thus frequently referred 
to as empirical cases whenever there is a positive story to tell about natural resource 
extraction. In consequence however, these exaggerated expectations have 
obviously an opposite side: that if the extraction of natural resources has for some 
reasons not turned out to be the promised road to prosperity then this must be due to 
some sort of political miscalculation at best and mismanagement and corruption at 
worst (refer back to previous sections for the role of governments). Please note also 
how the concept of sustainability is used for describing economic growth which 
appears compatible with the broader quest for environmental protection. In fact, as 
Dryzek has elaborated in greater detail, within the various discourses on sustainable 
development, the currently dominant approach is described as ‘environmentally 
benign growth’ explicitly including that environmental protection and economic 
growth are not mutually exclusive but go together. This line of argumentation is 
                                               
129 There is an interesting academic literature on the evolution and application of the concept of 
sustainability and the actors promoting it, such as Dryzek (2005) or Egelston (2013). Broadly defined, 
‘sustainable development can be viewed as a holistic approach to the relationship between man and 
the environment. Yet the sustainable development discourse does not have one unique set of 
meanings. Various actors emphasize differing facets of sustainable development depending on their 
needs’ (Egelston 2013: 2).  
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obviously present in the definition of sustainable development elaborated by 
Brundtland:130  
In essence, sustainable development is a process of change in which the exploitation 
of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of technological 
development, and institutional change are all in harmony and enhance both current 
and future potential to meet human needs and aspiration (Brundtland Report 1987: 
46, cited in Dryzek 2005: 146). 
This particular discourse takes, as Dryzek summarises after further examination, the 
capitalist economy as well as its players for granted. Evidently, this conflation of 
sustainable development and liberal economic development follows the same 
problematic logic as already discussed in the previous section on property rights, 
indigenous people and issues of ethics and justice. The liberal concept of capitalist 
property relations distinguishes between the use of and profiting from things (i.e. 
objects) and the respect of people (i.e. subjects). This leads to an understanding in 
which people’s well-being is separated from the well being of the environment and 
non-human nature.  
In his elaborations, Dryzek particularly highlights the role played by business 
association World Business Council on Sustainable Development (WBCSD) 
throughout the WSSD in Johannesburg and the signal sent by the participation of 
business actors (see also introduction), concluding that this ‘confirmed the status of 
business as a major participant in sustainable development, not a source of 
problems to be overcome. This role was solidified in partnerships involving business, 
governments, and NGOs, several hundred of which were established at the WSSD’ 
(Dryzek 2005: 15), and of which the EITI was one example as summarised in the 
following statement:  
EITI is founded on an assertion that exploitation of natural resources should 
contribute to sustainable development and the reduction of poverty. This assertion is 
universal and essentially moral (O’Sullivan 2013: 36). 
This underlying assumption of corporations as agents for economic growth and 
development is also transported into discourses on good governance, despite the 
fact that this premise seems to focus on accountability, effectiveness and the rule of 
                                               
130 Although the origins of this discourse can be traced elsewhere, commonly the concept of 
sustainable development is widely associated with the United Nations World Commission on 
Environment and Development which was headed by Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem 
Brundtland.  The resulting report titled Our Common Future is generally referred to as the Brundtland-
Report (for more detailed elaboration, see Dryzek 2005: chapter seven). 
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law as components. The concept of good governance rose to prominence in recent 
decades in international development discourses and focuses on what governance 
should look like to foster development and reduce poverty. According to the 
sustainable development equation, development and economic growth are supposed 
to go hand-in-hand, re-enforcing and complementing each other. This is particularly 
evident in the programs and policy recommendations of global financial institutions 
and programs of international donors but is also noticeable in civil society reports 
and academia.131  
This trend is well documented by the academic literature as illustrated by the 
following two examples: Catherine Waever (2008, 2010) elaborates in her work how 
discourses on development within the World Bank have changed over the last 
decades towards good governance. This is attributed not only as a result of external 
factors such as the evident failure of the Washington Consensus and neoliberal 
policies, but mainly due to internal forces and debates which pushed for what would 
later become recognizable as the Bank’s “good governance” agenda.132 The author 
further summarises how the concept of good governance is presented ‘as the 
essential precondition for the type of market-friendly environment needed to attract 
investment and ensure sustainable growth’ (Burnside and Dollar 2002; World Bank 
2007, both cited in Weaver 2010: 47). ‘Moreover’, Waever continues, ‘good 
governance is seen to be the institutional means by which the poor can achieve the 
most basic human security, become empowered to exercise their voice, and 
overcome the barriers to realizing the fundamental freedoms that constitute human 
development’ (Sen 1999, cited in Weaver 2010: 47). Essentially, Weaver’s work 
documents how a particular standard in governance links to economic growth. Her 
findings are supported in a recent article by Van Alstine and Barkemeyer, in which 
the authors analysed development agencies and extractive industries’ CEO 
                                               
131 A fact also illustrated by the economic sub-discipline called Development Economics or the Journal 
of Development Economics published by Elsevier (see also Moufida and Crawley 2009). 
132 The World Bank example was included as this point, as it illustrates that ‘international financial 
institutions play a central role in defining and enacting the ideas of practices that drive the world 
economy’. The World Bank and the EITI are linked through the World Bank’s management of EITI’s 
MDTF (see chapter three). In addition, there are various professional links between international civil 
society and donor or supporting governments. The economist Daniel Kaufmann, for example, who 
was appointed President of the Natural Resource Governance Institute in 2013 (a fusion which 
brought together the Revenue Watch Institute and the Natural Resource Charter), previously lead the 
World Bank Institute which ‘developed the Governance Indicators to provide a relative measure of 
governance and institutional quality in developing countries, aggregate scores that are now widely 
use by many aid organization in their allocation decisions’ (Weaver 2010: 62). 
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statements, interested in how the discourses on business and development relate to 
each other and influences each other. Thus, the authors suggest that particularly in 
the period from the late 1990s until 2006, both discourses were dominated by what 
the authors describe as the logic of a “partnership for economic growth”, in which 
‘private sector and market-based approaches’ (Van Alstine and Barkemeyer 2014: 
10) were presented as a potential solution for the growing problem of poverty and 
inequality, particularly highlighted by the United Nations Millennium Development 
Goals and the WSSD. However, from 2006, the authors attest the discourse on 
international development a stronger focus on good governance and state 
capacities, while the business discourse is still very much dominated by the 
partnership for economic growth logic.  
Two additionally problematic features of this discourse are the general assumption 
that markets are the most efficient way for allocation of scarce resource and ‘firms 
are more efficient than any other economic agents’ (Leander 2010b: 479). 
Combined, both premises fundamentally legitimise the status of private, 
internationally operating companies at the expense of nationally-owned companies 
which due to their closeness to politics are assumed to be less productive, less 
efficient and more prone to corruption. In natural resource governance this translates 
into the assumption that a country’s natural resources are more efficiently extracted, 
e.g. with better managerial skills and more advanced technological equipment, by 
foreign companies than by national, state-owned, partners. This status can be 
illustrated by the following quote from a representative of resource-rich countries:  
We live day-to-day with big multinationals, with the likes of Shell or ConocoPhillips, 
so we know them (...) and these are huge companies, they do everything, and it’s 
been a journey for us (...) understanding the companies. We know the importance of 
their existence, in terms of doing this very complex and risky business. (...) so there 
are serious interests to be defended and if a country is not prepared, yes you will be 
taken advantage of. 
    (Implementing countries interview, 27 February 2013) 
 
Although the already mentioned work of Ostrom (1990) has demonstrated that there 
is scope for a third way between privatization and strong regulation for avoiding 
Hardin’s “Tragedy of the commons”, it is obvious that in the field of natural resource 
governance where the alternative is between extracting resources with the help of 
private MNCs, or nationalising the industries, the latter is usually disfavoured by the 
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global financial institutions, MNCs and countries with liberal market democracies, 
while preferred by governments of resource-rich countries, usually pushing the 
establishment of joint ventures as preconditions for contracts and concessions.133 
Here, private corporations operating in a resource-rich country are depicted as 
atomised, a-political, profit-orientated actors. Their operations are understood as 
‘legitimate business’, justified through their contribution to potential economic growth 
and thus a future transformation of the country: ‘Ecological constraints should be 
respected, but once this is done economic growth can proceed indefinitely’ (Dryzek 
2005: 154). Consequently, it can be assumed that companies only get engaged in 
questions of social, political and fiscal responsibility if the government fails to 
appropriately manage the public realm itself and this leads to negative 
consequences for business operations, such as local protest or damaging of the 
facilities. It could also be argued that this lacking administrative, legal and political 
capacity in resource-rich countries is implicitly considered to be the natural limit of 
CSR efforts. This sense of positive overall societal contribution via economic activity 
is very important for understanding one of the fundamental paradoxes of natural 
resource extraction and governance: Despite numerous accounts of social and 
community damage and environmental degradation and pollution by various 
companies and in various regions, or put simply, the fact that the entire thesis of the 
natural resource curse or paradox of plenty indicates that natural resource extraction 
in the gross majority of countries on this planet correlates with an increase in the 
likelihood of corruption, poverty and even conflict. Despite these realities on the 
ground, resource extraction is legitimised via a potential and indirect contribution to 
the future.  
However, the sustainable development equation is problematic on an additional 
account: Conceptually, it separates economic and political activity. More precisely, it 
separates the revenues generated from the policy decisions taken in a country. 
Obviously, this approach downplays the significant political power of businesses’ or 
the manifold ways in which corporate activity and influence on the ground has 
                                               
133 It is interesting to observe that nationalisation and nationally-owned companies are generally 
understood as risk factors, as for example: ‘[T]he recent trends of re-nationalisation of energy policies 
and concomitant resource nationalism are not only threatening the future sustainability of global 
energy markets and the WTO order but also jeopardizing future global investments, energy efficiency 
and planned production levels’ (Leverett and Noel 2006, cited in Umbach 2009: 1232). 
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proven to be intertwined in local decision-making processes. This depiction also 
provides the background for the arguments presented in chapter five by the 
corporate constituency in which EITI efforts are depicted in apolitical terms as 
managerial or technical problems.  
In summary, the companies are depicted as legitimate actors as their activities 
contribute to the overall wealth and therefore development of a country. In addition, 
they are constructive and responsible political partners, not only capable of acting 
morally but their participation also increases the likelihood of more effective and 
efficient policy outcomes, which is considered supplementary rather than detrimental 
to pursuing profit. In addition, the neoliberal underpinnings introduce a tendency to 
regard private, internationally operating extractive industries as more effective and 
efficient and therefore more legitimate than state-owned companies based in 
resource-rich countries, thereby reinforcing the already existing bias in disfavour of 
resource-rich countries as elaborated on in the previous sections. Combined, these 
aspects provide a vital source of legitimacy for the status of companies as they 
portrait an image of the “good corporation”. 
4.3. Extractive industries as exceptional agents guaranteeing energy 
security 
The third shared belief on which the status of companies in natural resource 
governance is based is the discursive inclusion of concerns regarding energy supply 
into national security considerations, referred to as security of energy.134 In 
discourses on energy security, companies are portrayed as vital and exceptional 
agents guaranteeing access and timely delivery and thus contributing to national 
security. This argument particularly holds for the position of the oil industry and helps 
to understand their exceptional role within the EITI Standard and, as further argued, 
their inconsistent approach towards national sovereignty and legislation (see chapter 
five). 
The concept of energy security has become a buzzword of our time, much like 
globalization, used by ’lawyers, bankers, brokers, economists, geographers, 
geologists, engineers and journalists (...) with the same confidence as generals, 
                                               
134 The discursive process by which a particular topic or issue gets granted an exceptional status has 
been coined securitization by the Copenhagen School in IR and authors such as Wæver (1995). 
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development workers, defence analysts or environmental activists’ as Ciută (2010: 
124-5) notes.135 Although the academic literature soon engaged with the 
phenomenon elaborating the conceptual, theoretical and empirical flaws and 
problems attached136, it can be stated that in general the conventional line of 
argumentation states that a nation’s economic growth and prosperity, vital in liberal 
market democracies, is understood to depend on access to natural resources at 
affordable prices – which is also the simplest definition of the term. As Daniel Yergin 
the most prominent advocate argues: ‘Underlying everything else is the fundamental 
need for countries – and the world – for reliable energy with which to power 
economic growth’ (2012: 267).137 In addition, Carbonnier et al. note: ‘Energy security 
ranks among the top priorities of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and emerging economies alike, whose foreign relations 
agenda is often dictated by a permanent concern to secure oil and gas supplies’ 
(2011: 247).138 In the public debate the notion is mostly linked to the supply of oil. 
However, after the recent Ukrainian crisis, supply of gas, has increasingly become 
part of the discussion. 
Today, most of the world’s natural resources are not located in the countries that 
primarily consume them, the so-called resource-importing, or more accurately 
described as resource-dependent countries. In addition, historical incidents such as 
the 1973 oil price shock have proven that a high dependency on particular countries 
or regions for these importing countries can have dramatic consequences. As a 
result, industrialised countries do not only actively pursue a diversification strategy 
(diversification regarding the places the resources come from but also referring to a 
mix of energy sources), aiming at preventing overall dependence on particular oil-
                                               
135 Within the academic debate the topic of energy security is covered by Energy Security and the 
Journal of Energy Security. In addition, the Journal of Energy Policy deals with related issues (Ciută 
2010: 123, footnote 1).  
136 For a more critical introduction into the conceptual pitfalls of energy security, see Ciută (2010) or 
Chester (2009), for a line of argumentation in the tradition of critical security studies, illustrating the 
securitization of energy policy and its impact on the US-China relations, refer to Nymann (2014). 
137 The public prominence of the topic can be further illustrated by the fact that Yergin’s The Prize: the 
Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power (2008) was not only awarded the Pulitzer Prize and became a 
number one New York Times best seller, but has also been translated into 17 languages and made 
into documentaries and miniseries (see: http://danielyergin.com/the-author/). 
138 For an example of ‘how oil influences U.S. National Security’, see Glaser (2013). 
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exporting countries or regions, but also a risk-reducing strategy, framed in 
geopolitical and social terms.139  
At this point extractive industries become important, if not vital, agents helping to 
achieve this goal. At the national level this translates into extensive government 
subsidies for the extractive sector including such measures as depletion allowances; 
bonuses; tax reductions; production credits; public insurance; and research 
subsidies (Florini and Sovacool 2011: 65).140 Moreover, the authors argue, these 
energy subsidies have international consequences, taking ‘the form of trade barriers 
and protectionist tariffs’ with ‘self-replicating and distortionary’ policies and resulting 
in competitive disadvantages (ibid.) Additionally, this prioritization translates into 
active political support for access and advantage of, for instance “British” companies, 
by the government, nicely illustrated by the anecdotes mentioning Tony Blair’s 
involvement in a deal BP established with dictator Gaddafi in Libya: ‘Without Tony 
Blair’s intervention, I doubt BP would ever have been as significant a player as it 
turned out to be in the re-opening of the oil and gas industry of Libya’ (Browne 2011: 
129). 
As a result, extractive industries become strategic agents in the global geopolitical 
energy security scramble, exceptional private economic players, illustrated by the 
following quote: 
The interlinkage between globally designed traditional energy security concepts – 
that rely just on economic factors and “market-strategies” – and domestic as well as 
regional political stability demands new thinking with regard to both energy supply 
security and foreign and security policies. As a new study of energy policy scenarios 
to 2050 of the World Energy Council concludes, the best strategy for achieving the 
three criteria of accessible, available and acceptable (“3 A's”) energy in all regions in 
the developed and developing world is no longer a pure market-driven approach with 
minimal government involvement. Instead it is favouring a strategy that demands a 
careful planning in a highly cooperative effort of the government side and private 
industry as well as exercising great control and discipline with a strong government 
involvement. The latter needs to seek close cooperation and deep integration of the 
public and private sectors, both domestically and internationally (Umbach 2009: 
1239, quotation marks and brackets in the original). 
This understanding of extractive companies as partners in a high-politics, strategic 
game has the tendency to misrecognise companies’ importance as independent 
                                               
139 For an interesting overview of strategies and perspectives pursued by the EU, see Umbach 2010 
or Constantinia et al. 2007. 
140 The topic’s recent prominence can also by exemplified by numerous handbooks (for instance 
Sovacool 2011; Dyer and Trombetta 2013, or Kalicki and Godlwyn 2013). 
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agents pursuing their own agenda which might neither take into account nor be 
congruent with their home (or host) country’s national energy strategy after all.141 
Nevertheless, presenting themselves as resourceful and reliable partners in the 
“scramble” for energy security is a key source of authority for the extractives, as 
demonstrated for instance in a speech by BP’s former CEO Tony Hayward on ‘The 
Challenge of Energy Security’, delivered at the London Business School in February 
2010: 
Advanced technology is essential to producing these resources efficiently. The 
revolution in shale gas in the United States in the past three years, unlocked by new 
application of drilling and fracturing technology, is a great example that has 
transformed the US’s energy future. So too is the series of discoveries we and others 
have made with the help of advanced seismic imaging techniques in the deep waters 
of the Gulf of Mexico (BP 2010).142 
The Chevron Homepage, for instance, emphasises in the ‘Energy Supply and 
Demand’ section:  
At Chevron, we recognize the world needs all the energy we can develop, in many 
potential forms. That's why we're investing in a broad portfolio of energy resources, 
with $40 billion budgeted in 2014 for capital and exploratory projects.143  
A similar line of argumentation can be found in most of the oil company’s 
homepages. Estimations of the world’s future energy supply indicate a sharp rise in 
demand, particularly due to rising new economies such as China, and the oil 
companies are agents “committed” to guarantee that this does not jeopardise the 
energy supply in Western countries. 
This sense of exceptionality is further strengthened by the way in which the operative 
conditions of the extractive sector are portrayed: This includes firstly, the fact that 
they have to operate where the resources are and thus have only limited choice of 
location, and secondly, the exceptionally high investment costs of extractive 
operations resulting in this industries’ need to operate in politically stable 
environments (see also chapters three and five). This argument can be illustrated by 
a quote from Rex Tillerson, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of ExxonMobil, 
                                               
141 After BP recently closed down a refinery in Australia, following similar decisions by other oil 
companies as reaction to increased Asian competition, BP’s Australia President Andy Holmes found 
himself in the position to publically assure that this decision ‘will not endanger the nation’s energy 
security’. Article available from: http://www.heraldsun.com.au/business/oil-giant-bp-says-nations-
energy-security-not-at-risk/story-fni0dcne-1226872789754.  
142 Available from: http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/press/speeches/challenge-energy-
security.html. 
143 Available from: http://www.chevron.com/globalissues/energysupplydemand/. 
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during a speech at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in January 
2009: 
The energy industry is a long-term enterprise, and decisions made today can have 
consequences for years to come. While elected officials understandably tend to think 
in terms of two, four or six years, based on election cycles, energy companies must 
necessarily think in terms of two, four and six decades, consistent with the lifecycle of 
our resource-development projects. Even in the midst of our current economic 
downturn, which includes a return to more historic levels of crude oil prices, my 
company remains committed to investing in projects and technologies to meet 
tomorrow’s needs. Our business model is based on rigorous and realistic long-term 
planning. We try to look through near-term events. As part of this planning, we work 
to recognize risk factors that we know about today and can manage with the 
acknowledgement that there will be unforeseen risk factors that we will also have to 
manage in the future. Our approach enables us to manage the risks inherent in the 
energy business and in the broader business cycle. As a result, for more than 125 
years we have helped fuel the American economy – during good times and during 
bad times (ExxonMobil 2009, emphasis added). 
The EITI Homepage states under the FAQs/ What are the benefits of EITI: 
Governments benefit from following an internationally recognised transparency 
standard that demonstrates commitment to reform and anti-corruption, and leads to 
improvements to the tax collection process and enhanced trust and stability in a 
volatile sector. Companies benefit from a level playing field in which all companies 
are required to disclose the same information. They also benefit from an improved 
and more stable investment climate in which they can better engage with citizens and 
civil society. Citizens and civil society benefit from receiving reliable information 
about the sector and a multi-stakeholder platform where they can better hold the 
government and companies to account. Energy security is enhanced by a more 
transparent and level playing field. This increased stability encourages long-term 
investment in production – and thus improves the reliability of supply (emphasis 
added).144 
And the PWYP Guide specifically highlights how concerns about energy security 
were an important initial factor in the UK government’s support for the EITI:  
Blair’s personal support for the issue of revenue transparency – motivated primarily 
by concerns about the UK’s energy security – was a critical factor in getting revenue 
transparency on the international agenda – and in the establishment of the EITI 
(PWYP 2009: 56) 
However, the sense of exceptionality stemming from the discourse on energy 
security seems particularly true for the oil companies, as the following statement 
suggests: 
Energy security is another phenomenon than gold security or copper security. If you 
don’t deliver then the gold price might go up a bit and you’ll lose some money, but 
                                               
144 EITI Frequently Asked Questions, available from: https://eiti.org/eiti/faq-countries-considering-
eiti#USEU.  
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with oil or gas this is directly connected to energy security which cannot be 
jeopardized. If you don’t deliver oil or gas than you risk big law cases against you. 
     (Civil society constituency interview, 23 July 2012) 
Obviously, this argument culminates in the underlying assumption that private 
extractive industries find themselves in such difficult circumstances that they are in 
need of their home country government’s support rather than to be a target of 
stronger regulation. It is against this background, that the contestation of legislation 
such as the Dodd-Frank Act which can be understood as detrimental to business 
activities, is legitimised (see following chapter five). And in fact Carbonnier 
summarises that: ‘The global governance of extractive resources has largely been 
shaped by the energy-security agenda of industrialized countries’ (2011: 135).  
This depiction, however, has the tendency to strongly downplay the often existing 
power-hierarchies between extractive companies and governments of resource-rich 
countries (which to be fair can run both ways). There are indeed examples of 
companies having been forced out of countries due to internal political turmoil and 
subsequent processes of nationalisation, with the Venezuelanian case after the 
election of Hugo Chavez being arguably the most prominent case in recent years. 
However, there are also and more frequent empirical examples where the power 
hierarchies work in favour of the extractives. The companies understand very well 
how to make use of a country’s weak political structure, for instance by generally 
making use of their superior resources, such as bargaining power through legal and 
managerial expertise, or by bribing for contracts and concessions. A statistical 
regression analysis by McMillan and Waxman (2007) on the profit sharing between 
governments and multinationals in natural resource extraction provided evidence for 
the fact that the industry tends to gain more in less democratic countries. In addition, 
the anecdotal evidence in business leaders’ biographies points towards the 
necessity to investigate the role of individual corporate leaders in the politics of 
natural resource countries.145  
                                               
145 A study Nownes and Aitalieva, investigated the political activities of American corporate leaders, 
concludes: ‘Far from being marginal participants in politics, business leaders engage in a great deal of 
political activity. Theories of business power and influence must begin to consider these players if 
they are fully to comprehend the mechanisms by which corporate America tries to get its way 
politically. Individual corporations are active politically through their lobbying and public affairs offices. 
But corporate leaders are part of the picture, especially for highly politically active firms. Indeed, the 
137 
4.4.  Conclusion: Portraying companies as positive, responsible and 
exceptional agents 
This chapter approached the question of how corporate power is legitimised in 
natural resource governance by using Bourdieu’s concept of doxa. It depicts a 
category of supporting cognitive structures which can be classified as taken-for-
granted, tacit or implicit. Doxa is referred to as shared beliefs in this project. These 
beliefs fulfil the role of an underlying, unconscious grip which structures the mental 
categories by which actors approach, assess and interpret the world and which, 
embodied as dispositions, enable their action. As argued in the introductory 
paragraph of the chapter, it is what one would need to know in order to understand 
the role of companies but which is often not explicitly stated.  
In summary, the chapter elaborated on three such beliefs which reinforce a depiction 
of business as positive, responsible and exceptional agent in natural resource 
governance while at the same time placing the burden for corruption and 
mismanagement firmly on the shoulders of governments.  
The first of these beliefs is described as the “natural resources belong to the people” 
assumption which presupposes certain normative liberal political and economic 
concepts as natural, universal and incontestable “facts”. Such assumptions result in 
a limited understanding of the problems associated with natural resource extraction 
and governance, focusing on corruption and mismanagement as governance 
capacity problems while downplaying the role of world markets and corporations. 
Moreover, it became evident that this assessment and the proposed solutions are 
only comprehensible with the presupposition of liberal markets and democratic 
governments, mainly ignoring the empirical realities in the majority of resource-rich 
countries. Importantly, down-playing the strategic role played by companies for 
accessing markets on the one hand and the assumed “positive” role they perform by 
contributing towards turning natural resource wealth into development. At the same 
time, this restricted normative perspective which is assumed to be universal, limits 
the scope for debates on broader, arguably more critical and more constructive 
issues of ethics and justice. 
                                                                                                                                                  
typical corporate leader in our study spends approximately 1 hour every day on national politics. 
Given all the responsibilities associated with being the boss, this is not trivial’ (2013: 156). 
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The second set of beliefs can be found at the intersection between discourses on 
global governance, development and CSR, promoting what was described as the 
“good corporation” belief. The “good corporation” belief is linked to and reinforces the 
emphasis on business “positive” contribution by portraying corporations as legitimate 
and responsible actors. It rests on the liberal assumption that companies contribute 
to the overall wealth and prosperity of societies, but in addition suggests that they 
can use their superior resources to help solve complex issues as partners in 
governance. At the same time, they are receptive and thus responsible towards 
societal and environmental concerns, constantly reaffirmed in discourses on CSR. 
Arguably, the “good corporation” belief is much more openly and controversially 
discussed than the previous shared belief. However, the belief was shown to be 
strongly present in EITI documents and most evidently in what has been described 
as the “sustainable development equation”. According to this line of argumentation, 
extracting finite resources can contribute to sustainable development as long as the 
resulting revenues are invested in enhancing a nation’s other “forms of capital”, such 
as human capital, or infrastructure. As was further argued, this example not only 
illustrates how in the intersections of international discourses on global and good 
governance and CSR, companies are provided with the opportunity to strategically 
impose their meanings in discussions, here particularly on what sustainable 
development in natural resource governance should encompass and what the 
companies’ role should be. But also, however, it became evident how the “good 
corporation” belief rests on the same problematic normative liberal concepts as the 
previously discussed “natural resources belong to the people” assumption. 
Finally, the nexus between resource extraction, energy supply and security, 
encapsulated by the notion of energy security is explored. The argument presented 
here states that by linking energy and security, the extractive sectors has been 
prioritized and put in a position of exceptionality. Companies involved in this sector 
are depicted as of strategic geopolitical and economic importance for resource-
dependent or consumer countries. They become agents in need of government 
support instead of objects of stronger regulation. Obviously, such a discourse 
downplays corporate agency, independence as well as their power and individual 
strategic interests.  
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Combined, these underlying beliefs portray the picture of the positive, e.g. 
contributing and resourceful, responsible and exceptional agent which legitimises the 
companies’ status in the EITI, and, as will be demonstrated in the following chapters, 
results in a privileged position in contrast to other stakeholders. 
On closer examination it becomes evident that the identified beliefs reflect the 
power-structure of the broader field of natural resource governance. In fact, Bourdieu 
would assume their mere existence as a manifestation of power, as it is only the 
dominant agents who have the resources to maintain such a structure. At the same 
time, it would also be misleading to assume that these beliefs have been 
strategically injected by the companies, as they affect the business agents’ 
dispositions just as much as the dispositions of the other players (see chapter two). 
However, as shared beliefs are also an inherent part of agents’ dispositions, 
structuring and enabling social action (see chapter two), it can be assumed that they 
automatically induce behaviour and thoughts without conscious decision by the 
agents – a mechanism which makes them difficult to challenge, although on close 
examination there should be sufficient incentives to explore and discuss them. As 
will become evident through the course of our argumentation in the following 
chapters, these shared beliefs lead to a situation in which the influential status of the 
companies is neither fully recognised nor challenged but taken for granted (see 
chapter seven). In addition, and as elaborated through the course of this chapter, 
shared beliefs, through their universalistic and a-historical status, have a tendency to 
serve the interests of the dominant players in a social arena, in our elaborations the 
corporations, through the establishment of a particular hierarchical order. It is 
therefore argued that these beliefs ultimately reflect the already described 
dominance of large corporations in the global political and economic structures, 
particularly the global economy, as described in chapter one. 
In conclusion, shared beliefs provide an essential source of legitimacy for companies 
in natural resource governance. The following two chapters further enhance our 
knowledge on the political role played by companies by focusing on their collective 
and individual representation at the international level of the EITI, using Bourdieu’s 
concepts of capital and practice. 
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5. Corporate political practice in action I: Collective representation 
Chapter three established EITI as an international multi-stakeholder standard which 
grants companies from the extractive sectors and institutional investors decision-
making rights at the Board table. Building on these insights, chapters five and six of 
this study present and examine how exactly the political representation of MNCs at 
EITI’s international level works. This chapter focuses on businesses’ collective 
representation, e.g. how the company constituency operates, whereas the following 
chapter six analyses the political practice of individual corporate representatives as 
Directors of EITI’s Board.  
Based on the conceptual framework elaborate in chapter two, the following 
expectations can be deduced: a) it is assumed that business representation from a 
collective perspective displays a degree of organisation and institutionalisation as 
inherent in the concept of corporate political practice and corresponding to the 
delegational component in the concept of political capital (see chapter two); b) it can 
be expected that forms of capital which correspond to the problem/arena are used to 
secure not only the influential status of individual companies within the business 
community but also the status of the constituency vis-à-vis the other stakeholders; 
and c) that the privileged status of the company constituency translates into room for 
manoeuvre and interpretation on their role and the Standard itself. This chapter 
relies mainly on insights generated through the interview process and participant 
observations which were, however, combined with findings from the text analysis 
(see chapter two, part two). In the overall structure of the thesis, this chapter serves 
two functions:  
Firstly, it provides a detailed portrayal of the collective representation of the 
extractive sector in the EITI Standard. It starts by outlining the business case(s) for 
the sectors in greater detail as well as the different modes of participation and 
engagement available to corporations at EITI’s international level. Reflecting on the 
concept of political practice as institutionalised behaviour, the focus lies on the 
procedural aspects of the representational practice. The chapter thus depicts how 
the constituency works internally, and identifies the forms of capital used by the 
business community for representation. Therefore, the findings complement and 
extent our knowledge of participants in the EITI already established in chapter three.  
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Secondly, it is assessed when and how the privileged status of the companies, which 
can reasonably be assumed to exist based on the shared assumptions elaborated in 
chapter four, impacts the overall performance of the company constituency. 
Therefore, three inconsistencies are examined in greater detail. 
5.1. The business case, the participants and forms of engagement 
There are key benefits for participating in the EITI Standard which are assumed to 
be shared by the members of the company constituency despite the fact that the 
umbrella term extractive industries encompasses quite diverse economic sectors 
with companies of all sizes, namely, the establishment of a level playing field; an 
improved investment climate with increased political stability and predictability; 
improved relations with governments, civil society and the general public; and finally 
reputational advantages (see also chapter three).146 
From the perspective of the companies the most important factor for participating in 
an international reporting standard is firstly, the potential for establishing a level 
playing field inside resource-rich countries but also at the international level with 
‘clear and consistent reporting requirements’ (EITI How Companies Can Support the 
EITI 2013: 1). If transparency and reporting requirements are in place then, so the 
argument goes, they have to be mandatory for everybody in order not to favour 
some players and to prevent free-riding: 
For us the biggest advantage is the level-playing field. Everybody is treated the 
same, if you are in a country everybody is showing the same data, and that’s 
important. We would not like to be in a situation, like there could be in the Dodd-
Frank Bill or in the EU Transparency Directive, where we would have to show some 
data and the competitors coming from China or from India would not have to. So for 
us it’s important. It secures our investment.  
(Company constituency interview, 14 February 2012) 
The second important factor often mentioned in the EITI publications and frequently 
highlighted by the interview partners is the anticipated improvement in investment 
climate and the benefits that are assumed to come with it. According to the good 
governance paradigm that dominates the international development agenda these 
days (see chapter three), this principle is supposed to encompass improvements 
                                               
146 Obviously, this only accounts for members of the extractives which do not intentionally aim at 
taking advantage of weak governance structures in resource-rich countries. At the same time, 
improving investment climate and lowering political risk through better governance is assumed to 
benefit all companies in the country not only the extractive sector. 
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such as efficient, transparent and accountable administration or public spending into 
the health and education sectors. These factors are further anticipated to enhance 
the overall political situation in a country and thus decrease the risks of political 
unrest while at the same time increasing predictability for economic planning.  
As the interview partner elaborated further: 
Why is it important for us? (...) We need to ensure that our investments in countries 
are there for good and cannot be re-negotiated or dismissed from one day to the 
other because there has been a revolution. So we need security in our investments, 
(...) this industry is an industry which works for 50 years, 40-50 years. We invest for 
ten, we produce for 40, and we cannot accept to have our investment re-negotiated 
or cancelled. So it’s better to have an accountable government, it’s better to have a 
responsible government which is accountable to its population, because if they show 
what they do with the money, it’s more likely to be better governance. 
(Company constituency interview, 14 February 2012) 
The importance of a stable and predictable political situation in operating countries 
might at first glance seem as a feature desirable to all sorts of legal economic 
ventures. However, the extractive industries share two characteristics which make 
this factors much more important to them in comparison to other economic actors. 
Firstly, it is clear that the choice of location for the extractives industries is primarily 
determined by the geological presence of the resources, or, put simply, you have to 
extract where the resources are located and extraction is technically possible. In 
addition and as already highlighted in the quote, the production process of 
extractives industries requires large up-front investment calculated on the basis of a 
long-term operational horizon. Despite recent ground-breaking technological 
innovations in the oil and gas industry which make extraction in certain areas more 
efficient or even possible in the first place, such as the possibility to extract oil out of 
oil sands or the ongoing venture of off-shore drilling, the majority of the Earth’s finite 
reserves are estimated to be found in what is considered politically unstable regions 
at risk of corruption and social or military conflict. As most of resource-rich countries’ 
economies are heavily reliant on the revenues generated by the extractive sectors, 
newly elected governments, some of which feel empowered by the transparency 
movement, have expressed their intentions to review and potentially re-negotiate 
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established contracts or contemplate changes in the taxes rates.147 In extreme 
cases, companies can face expropriation (see also chapter three). 
Thirdly, an important motivation driving corporate participation in the EITI more 
generally is an improved relationship with host governments and civil society as well 
as the opportunity to use EITI participation for reputational benefits. Here is an 
interesting anecdote by a former representative of civil society:  
If you are a company, there is no reason not to sign up as a supporting company, it 
costs almost nothing, it requires almost nothing of you and it is a really useful thing to 
refer to when defending your commitment to transparency and other good things, 
right? Like I was at this conference of commodity traders in Switzerland in April and 
the Head of Oil for Glencore was there and I asked a question about oil trade and 
transparency to this panel of top executives from the biggest oil trading companies 
and of them Glencore is the only one who is a member of EITI and they were the 
only ones who gave anywhere near a decent answer because they could refer to 
their participation in EITI. You know, it gives them a way to answer that question. 
    (Civil society constituency interview, 31 May 2012) 
This quote also illustrates, how reputational concerns did not only play an important 
motivational factor for companies’ involvement at EITI’s establishment (see chapter 
three), but continues to play an important factor for business participation. This 
indicates that the international CSR-discourse portraying companies as responsible 
citizens remains, despite its controversial academic debate, a major point of 
reference at the international level (see chapter four). 
To summarise, the factors considered to drive corporate participation in the EITI are 
the establishment of a level playing field, an improved investment climate and 
enhanced relationships to local stakeholders as well as the urge for a better 
reputation. As the quote further above highlighted, there are limited down-sides for 
companies supporting the EITI (although, as will become evident through the course 
of this chapter, active participation at the international level does require a degree of 
investment). As outlined in chapter three, there are different forms by which 
members of the extractive industries can nationally and internationally become 
involved with the EITI process: as “supporting company”, as a member of the EITI’s 
                                               
147 For a recent example, see the announcement of the newly elected government of Mali in 
September 2013. Article available from: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/10/mali-mining-
idUSL5N0H64AR20130910. 
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Board or/and as a contributor to the national multi-stakeholder processes in 
implementing countries.  
The simplest way to engage with the Standard is to become a “supporting company”. 
This requires a company to publicly announce their support for the initiative (usually 
done via your company’s website) and to submit what is called an “international level 
self-assessment form” to the Secretariat within a year of public endorsement. In 
addition, supporters are expected to financially contribute to the MDTF and actively 
engage and cooperate with the local EITI multi-stakeholder group (MSG) of countries 
the company is operating in.148 As frequently highlighted by interview partners from 
civil society, public endorsement of the EITI seems to be widespread and regarded 
as quite “cheap” for the companies without necessarily indicating the depth of 
commitment to the process. Apparently, as indicated by the variety in the country 
reports and indicated in the EITI Scanteam Report (2011), the levels of engagement 
and cooperation in the implementing countries vary quite drastically from company to 
company as well as from country to country. Empirically, there has never been a 
case in which a company has been rejected in an attempt to become EITI member, 
nor was an active corporate member of the EITI excluded.149  
International-level engagement for the EITI requires participation in the EITI 
governance structure. This can in a first step result in sending company 
representatives to attend and participate in EITIs global meetings, such as Board 
Member Meetings or the bi-annual EITI Global Conference (both events are regularly 
attended by a variety of delegates from the business sector as indicated by the list of 
participants). In an additional step, these representatives can become a more 
permanent member of EITI’s international governance structure by becoming one of 
the Directors of the Board representing the corporate constituency. As a 
representative of the corporate constituency at the International Board of the EITI, 
the individual acquires voting powers at the EITI International Board table as well as 
the additional opportunity to engage or chair the committees which support the 
Board. As a committee member, the representatives can draft recommendations, 
influence the agenda or revise the initiatives rules and guidelines. Due to the fact 
                                               
148 See EITI Supporting the EITI for Extractive Companies (2013). 
149 In email communication a member of the Secretariat indicated that the EITI Board has been 
considering minimum requirements for supporting companies. However, it was noted that ‘it is tough 
to establish anything that falls within Anti-Trust law’ (29 August 2014). 
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that the EITI International Board is elected during the Members Meeting, which 
usually takes place at the bi-annual Global Conference, the election period for Board 
Members until recently has been two years (see chapter three for EITI’s international 
level governance structure).  
At the country level, however, there are different ways by which companies can 
contribute to the process. As every resource-rich country wanting to implement the 
Standard needs to set up their own national multi-stakeholder process, participating 
in the EITI process at the national level usually means for companies engaging in the 
local EITI multi-stakeholder group, which includes attending meetings, drafting the 
national guidelines and procedures, engaging in a dialogue with the local 
stakeholders and ultimately facilitating the implementation by providing the required 
data for the validation process. Apparently, there are examples of companies which 
have approached their local government suggesting EITI implementation (see EITI 
Supporting the EITI for Extractive Companies 2013). However, the role of companies 
in national EITI implementation processes has not been systematically assessed. 
Participating companies  
The official list of EITI supporting companies includes extractive and non-extractive 
companies150 and consists of ‘over 80 of the world’s largest oil, gas and mining 
companies’ raging from A African Oil to W Woodside.151 The institutional investors 
are listed separately and again ‘over 80 global investment institutions, that 
collectively managed over US $19 trillion’, have signed the "Investors' Statement on 
Transparency in the Extractives Sector" and support the EITI.152 There are no 
estimations available regarding the percentage of extractive companies participating 
in the EITI.153 
When it comes to representation at the Board level, however, the picture becomes 
much clearer, with only the major oil/gas and mining companies actively 
participating. Amongst the initial supporters of the process are: BP, AngloAmerican, 
Chevron and PetroBras, with F&C Asset Management participating for the investors. 
                                               
150 Interestingly, this includes German automotive manufacturer Volkswagen AG 
151  Available from: http://eiti.org/supporters/companies. 
152 Available from: http://eiti.org/supporters/institutionalinvestors. 
153 This figure would be difficult to calculate due to the numbers and varieties of companies subsumed 
under the category of extractives, which also includes their sub-contractors. 
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The first EITI Board established in 2007 saw AngloAmerican and the International 
Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM)154 for the miners; BP, Chevron and Petrobras 
for the oil and gas companies (with ExxonMobil, Shell and Pemex as alternates); and 
F&C Management for the investors on the Board, representing the company 
constituency (EITI Minutes 1st Board Meeting 2006). At the time of writing, the 2013-
2015/2016 Board is composed of representatives from Total, Chevron, Freeport- 
McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc, Rio Tinto, Royal Dutch Shell and Allianz Global 
Investors (with Statoil, ExxonMobil, BHP Billiton, Arcelor Mittal, BP and SNS Asset 
Management as alternates).  
Out of six of the world’s biggest oil companies, only ConocoPhilips has been absent 
from the EITI Board (although officially supporting the EITI). There are no Asian or 
African-based companies represented at the Board. As a result, changes in the 
industry over the last decade, such as the increased importance of national 
competitors from Russia or China are not reflected at EITI’s Board table.155 Neither 
are companies from the developing countries taking on seats as Board members. 
And although Petrobras and Pemex came on the Board in an attempt to reflect a 
broader geographical coverage, it was indicated that they were not much engaged 
partners. Interviews suggest that in general, ExxonMobil and Chevron came to be 
perceived as the most conservative companies, BP is supposed to be the more 
progressive one which is probably due to its role in EITI’s inception while Shell and 
Total occupy a middle ground.  
The corporate constituency at the international level of the EITI process broadly 
consists of three sub-groups: the oil and gas companies, the mining companies, as 
well as the institutional investors. Understanding some of the considerations and 
realities of the different sectors is not only important for the functioning of the 
constituency but allows also for a more nuanced picture of the visions and 
challenges of extractive industries participating. 
 
 
                                               
154 See following section on miners for more detailed information. 
155 The consequences of China’s economic development for the state-owned oil companies and their 
increased activities and public engagement in Africa are explored in Yergin (2012: chapter nine). 
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Oil and gas companies 
It is the oil and gas sector which is usually more prominently featured in academic 
articles, civil society reports and media coverage on the resource curse and 
environmental degradation. A few conversations with EITI stakeholders made it also 
apparent that this sector plays a different role to the miners at EITI’s international 
level. Oil and gas companies are widely regarded as the most conservative and risk-
averse partners in the company constituency. In general terms, oil and gas 
extraction can be characterised as highly-industrialised operations which require 
large up-front investments, cutting-edge technology as well as high-profile personal 
expertise. Complex operational dimensions, for example in cases where drilling 
basins cross national borders, can result on average in larger initial investments 
compared to the miners. This makes the business extremely sensitive to political 
instability, epitomised in a quote by Lucio Noto, CEO of Mobil: ‘Once you sink a 
couple of billion dollars into the ground you can’t move it’ (cited in Yergin 2012: 34). 
In addition, it can be argued that this sector is very prone to reputational damage and 
thus extremely sensitive to reputational concerns. In contrast to miners and 
investors, these MNCs are publically well-established and thus easily recognised 
brands with more direct contact to individual consumers. Both factors make them 
extremely vulnerable to public shaming campaigns. Due to a number of disastrous 
incidents over the course of the last three decades, such as the ExxonValdez oil spill 
or Shell’s involvement in the prosecution of the Ogani movement leaders, or latest, 
the BP Deep Water Horizon Oil Spill, the potential for environmentally disastrous 
catastrophes attached to this industry was brought to public awareness by wide-
spread global media coverage. The resulting negative image of the “greedy 
environmental polluters” has since been tackled by the oil companies through 
enhanced CSR activities (see, for instance, the re-branding strategy of BP 
conducted in 2000 in order to symbolise BP’s commitment to sustainability and 
environmental protection).156 If, as Stephen Wilks summarises, ‘(...) the public image 
of the corporation is as shadowy, self-interested, manipulative and not to be trusted’ 
(2013: 195) then the oil and gas companies can easily be identified as the most 
demonised in the public sphere.  
                                               
156 See the article in The Guardian (2000), available from: 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2000/jul/25/bp.  
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However, in the past 25 years, the oil and gas sector experienced a number of new 
developments, such as the spread into new territories after the end of the Cold War; 
technological innovations which enabled extraction of “unconventionals” (see chapter 
four); the rise of new, predominantly state-owned competitors from China and India 
as well as the process described by Yergin as “financialization” and 
“commodification” of oil (see chapter four or Yergin 2012). Partly as a reflection of 
these new challenges and trends, the internationally operating oil and gas industry 
saw an unprecedented concentration in market power, known as the establishment 
of the “supermajors” (see Yergin 2012: chapter four). These companies are BP, 
Chevron, Royal Dutch Shell, ExxonMobil, and Total (occasionally, ConocoPhillips is 
added). Also known as ”big oil”, they are well represented at the EITI’s Board table, 
as previously stated (again, except ConocoPhillips).  
The already described negative public image, or “reputational concerns”, widely 
serve as an explanatory variable for understanding the vital role played by members 
of the sector, particularly BP, at EITI’s inception and therefore for the emergence of 
the ‘oil sector transparency as international norm’ (Gillies 2010). Additionally, Shell is 
credited with helping ‘to get EITI up and running by giving quiet encouragement to 
the UK Government. Shell became the first major extractive company to openly 
support the call for individual company disclosure at company level in 2004’ (PWYP 
2009: 58). However, an additional explanatory factor for understanding the more 
prominent position of the oil and gas sector can be found in this sector’s direct 
relationship to the concept of energy security, and their corresponding status as 
guarantor of national security. 
To summarise, the businesses cases stated for the extractive industries apply 
strongly for the oil and gas sector. These companies are arguably more present in 
the public eye due to their brand status and therefore more vulnerable to public 
shaming campaigns and consumer boycott. In addition, they are a key strategic 
agent in the quest for energy security. At the same time, oil and gas companies’ 
operational realities make them also extremely vulnerable for political instability and 
conflict. As a result, the sector is generally portrayed as conservative and risk-averse 
which corresponds to the role attributed to them in the EITI. Therefore, it is important 
to note that all of the five major players in the industry participate in the EITI and 
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have been active members at the Board table since EITI’s establishment, while BP 
played also a vital role in the Standard’s establishment. 
Mining companies 
The negative economic effects subsumed under the umbrella term resource curse 
which are most prominently associated with oil and gas extraction, also affect 
countries with a strong mining sector. Therefore, it is often argued that the sector 
needs to play an important part in resource revenue regulation and management. 
For example, statistical data provided by the IMF and analysed by Paul Mitchell, 
former president of ICMM, illustrates how fiscal revenues from the mining sector in 
mineral-rich countries are on average much smaller than revenues from the oil and 
gas sector (12.8% in comparison to 55%). This might prompt the conclusion that 
mining is not as important to a country’s risk of developing the resource curse. 
However, the data also shows how both hydrocarbon and mineral-rich countries are 
strongly fiscally dependent on the resource sector, with natural resources accounting 
in most cases for more than 50% of total national exports (Mitchell 2009: 11).157 It 
can therefore be concluded that although the fiscal revenues from minerals are on 
average smaller, a country’s dependence on resource revenues might in fact be just 
as strong as in the case of extracting oil or gas.  
However, it has been pointed out by a representative from the mining constituency, 
that the link between mining and conflict or organised crime, as articulated in the 
literature on the resource curse,158 generally applies to ‘informal, artisanal’ mining 
which makes ‘it difficult to find many countries where mining is at the root of 
governance and macro-economic problems in the way that applies to oil and gas in 
countries like Nigeria and Angola.’159 It was further highlighted that in a number of 
countries, such as Canada, Australia, the US and South Africa, mining has proven to 
be a ‘basis for economic advance’, while other countries with a strong mining sector, 
such as Chile, Peru or Ghana have ‘progressed reasonably well’ (ibid.). 
                                               
157 For the tables on which these calculations are based, see IMF (2007: 55-56). 
158 In civil wars, natural resources are assumed two perform to functions: Firstly, they provide militia 
with a constant source of income required to pay for the costs of keeping the conflict going. Secondly, 
the control over resource extraction sites is assumed to be a primary motive for outbreak of violent 
conflict (the empirical evidence for the latter assumption has proven weak). As a result, however, the 
term “conflict resources” has been coined by civil society (see also chapters one and three). 
159 This was a comment on the initial draft of this chapter made on 08 September 2014. 
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In terms of composition, the mining sector includes global giant companies with 
diversified focus as well as small exploration juniors and producers.160 In addition, 
the sector has experienced an increase in concentration between 1975-2006 (EITI 
Advancing the EITI in the Mining Sector 2009: 23).161 In general terms, the sector is 
described by insiders as fairly complex due to various factors such as the diversity 
and quality of minerals extracted, the diversity of geological conditions, and the 
already mentioned involvement of different companies of varying size. In contrast to 
some of the oil and gas companies which are very public brands, miners on average 
are less often involved in the production process of the final product and thus are 
assumed to have less direct contact with the average high street consumer.162 As a 
consequence, miners are understood to be less vulnerable to international public 
shaming campaigns than oil and gas companies, although recent examples included 
in Dashwood (2012) suggest that this assumption should be reconsidered.163 
In addition, a few key points are highlighted as important for understanding the 
economic and political challenges faced by mining companies in their operations: 
Firstly, the industry describes itself as fairly inflexible, both regarding the operational 
grounds as well as with reference to the operation itself, and thus vulnerable for 
changes of external circumstances. The decision of where to invest is ‘largely 
dictated by the geology and the identification of economically viable mineral deposits’ 
(Bickham 2009: 7). Thereby, the author, who represented the miners at EITI’s Board 
table, elaborates that ‘such deposits are decreasingly likely to be found in stable 
OECD and other developed economies’ (ibid.). Moreover, the two initial phases of 
the minerals cycle, which is the name of the mining production cycle, i.e. the 
                                               
160 For more detailed information regarding the mineral production cycle and empirical examples in 
different mineral-rich countries please refer to the EITI Guide for Advancing the EITI in the Mining 
Sector (2009).  
161 For a more comprehensive summary of major developments in the mining sector, see Dashwood 
(2012: chapter 3). 
162 The literature on the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme considers the diamond industry to be 
an exception. The diamond sector is highly concentrated, with DeBeers as the most prominent actor, 
while the products fall under the category of “luxury goods”. As a result, a public campaign against so-
called “blood diamonds” became very successful and allowed for the establishment of a certification 
scheme against the illegal trade of diamonds in zones of conflict (see Grant and Taylor 2004 or 
Haufler 2010a). As the Kimberley Process had difficulties in delivering its goals in recent years, it is 
interesting to observe that DeBeers is an EITI supporting company and opted for becoming a Board 
Member in 2013. 
163 A recent study by Davis and Franks (2014), for example, calculates the potentially high costs of 
such company-community conflict for the extractive industries.  
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exploration and mine site development phase, require large up-front, long-term 
investment before the actual production starts and profits can be made.164  
Secondly, mineral extraction sites are often very visible with direct and large-scale 
environmental and socio-economic impact on the communities and regions where 
operations starts. They are therefore much more likely to raise social and 
environmental issues than for example off-shore exploration of oil. Dashwood 
illustrates in great detail the significant environmental footprint of miners: 
Hard-rock mining involved the displacement of large amounts of earth in order to 
extract the desired metal ore. The discarded earth, or waste rock, is then stored in 
huge piles, which can leach toxic metals or acid produces when previously 
unexposed rock is exposed to the air and water. Acid produced by mine arsenic, 
mercury, cadmium, and lead. Acid-rock drainage can seep into groundwater, 
streams, and rivers, endangering potable water supplies, aquatic and human life. (...) 
Toxic chemicals used to extract ore, such as cyanide in the case of gold, must be 
stored in tailings ponds, which if not properly maintained can spill (...). Tailings dam 
failures are the most common major accident associated with mining (Dashwood 
2012: 77-8). 
Interestingly, environmental issues do not feature prominently as factors in EITI 
implementation or country evaluation. However, there have been cases in which 
countries had to defend themselves at the Board table for issues which can broadly 
be subsumed as “social”, although mainly related to the treatment of civil society 
representatives. However, as a reflection on the broad impact of their operations, the 
academic literature argues that miners require a “social license to operate”, much in 
accordance with the CSR perspective described in chapter four. Summarising the 
literature, Prno and Salcombe define the concept as: 
A social license exists when a mining project is seen as having the broad, ongoing 
approval and acceptance of society to conduct its activities (citing Joyce and 
Thomson 2000; Thomson and Boutilier 2011). Gunningham et al. (2004: 307) add 
that it “governs the extent to which a corporation is constrained to meet societal 
expectations and avoid activities that societies (or influential elements within them) 
deem unacceptable, whether or not those expectations are embodied in law” (Prno 
and Salcombe 2012: 346-347, quotation marks in the original). 
As this perspective is frequently acknowledged by representatives from the miners, it 
can be assumed that this further increases their incentives to participate in the EITI. 
                                               
164 ‘Typically, a mining major will explore on the basis that less than 1% of exploration targets 
generates a viable mine. Exploration and appraisal may well take 3-7 years (or longer if the 
commodity price cycle is unfavourable) and permitting and project development a further 3-5 years. 
Thus it may be 10 years of cash outflow before there is any production, let alone a payback of the 
upfront (now captive) investment’ (Comment on initial chapter draft, made on 08 September 2014). 
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Thirdly, the view of minerals as a country’s non-renewable ‘natural capital’ (Mitchell 
2009: 24) is very prevalent (see chapter four for a discussion on commodification of 
natural resources) and the expectations for generating resource-based economic 
growth are consequently high. This understanding evidently also relates back to the 
previously described sustainable development equation which ascribes a vital role to 
resource extractive companies for a country’s economic development (see chapter 
four). This is expressed in the following statement: 
Transparency is not by itself a sufficient condition to guarantee success, but it is an 
important contributor to better governance. Indeed, this is partly a matter of self-
interest. It is more likely that we will gain access to resources in the future if our 
industry is seen to make the lives of ordinary people better and to contribute to the 
realisation of the Millennium Development Goals (Bickham 2009: 8).  
At EITI’s international level, part of the miners have been consistently represented by 
the ICMM, a CEO-led industry association representing the sector up until 2013.165 
As one of the initial consultation partners for the process, the London-based ICMM 
has participated in the EITI Board and the corporate constituency since the early 
days of the IAG (see chapter three).166 This consistency in representation allowed 
the miners to speak with a common front and is perceived to have translated into a 
more advantageous position of the sector compared to the participation by the oil 
and gas sector (on the point of consistency, see chapter six). 
It is further interesting to observe, that the participation of the mining sector has 
shifted towards a more pro-active role during the course of their contribution at the 
international level of the EITI. However, in contrast to the oil and gas industry, the 
miners are not credited with playing a pro-active role at EITI’s establishment by civil 
society:  
Mining companies were not as closely engaged early on in discussions about the 
formation of EITI. Many viewed the NGO campaign and the push to develop EITI as 
focused more on the oil industry and so there was less at stake for the mining 
industry. Mining company representatives even stated that EITI was yet another in a 
                                               
165 ‘ICMM brings together 21 of the world's leading mining and metals companies as well as 33 
national and regional mining associations and global commodity associations (...). Together, our 
member companies employ some 800,000 of the estimated 2.5 million people working in the mining 
and metals sector, with over 800 sites in 62 countries across the globe. (...) Our companies are 
responsible for a significant percentage of global minerals production: about 50 per cent of the world’s 
copper and platinum group metals; 40 per cent of the world’s iron ore, nickel, and gold; and 25 per 
cent of the world’s zinc’. Available from: http://www.icmm.com/members. 
166 For a comprehensive historical introduction to the self-regulatory initiatives of the miners, including 
the establishment of the International Council on Mining and the Environment and the Global Mining 
Initiative, as well as the launch of ICMM, see Dashwood (2012: chapter seven). 
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long list of initiatives that companies were increasingly being called upon to 
participate in (PWYP 2009: 59).  
Assessments of the contribution of miners by interview partners suggest, however, 
that the sector is keen in being recognised as progressive in recent years, 
particularly observed throughout the strategy review process and in contrast to 
members from the oil and gas companies. Miners are consciously adopting what has 
been described by a representative from the industry as “a co-ownership strategy”, 
which proposes the view:  
that it is incumbent on the industry, as an EITI partner, that we have a responsibility 
to be pro-active in proposing changes rather than responding to the agendas of 
others. Hence, in the 2011 Standard it was the miners which (with the World Banks 
support) pushed for the inclusion in EITI of opaque infrastructure for minerals barter 
deals and first proposed the creation of an MSG annual report (not to be confused 
with the annual reconciliation report). In the 2013 Standard, the miners would claim 
lead responsibility for the inclusion of material on budgeting and transparency around 
expenditure choices, and were co-authors of the provisions on beneficial ownership 
and license transparency. In both cases, the miners were also the leading and most 
consistent advocates of transparency around payments to sub-national levels of 
government.167 
In summary, it can be stated that mining companies are interested in mitigating the 
economic and political risks of their operations for which the EITI can prove a helpful 
tool. They place a strong emphasis on improving local community relations and 
make the benefits of mineral extraction tangible and visible. In recent years, the 
adaptation of a strategy of co-ownership signals that the miners are keen for their 
participation to be understood as pro-active and progressive. 
Institutional Investors 
Over the years, the EITI Board has seen representatives from Standard Life 
Investments, Allianz Global Investors, F&C Asset Management, and others. The 
institutional investors’ case supporting the EITI slightly different from miners and oil 
companies. As economic agents, investors need to calculate the social, financial and 
political risks which the companies in which they share equity might encounter 
operating in particular regions or political systems. To perform their vital function of 
safeguarding investments, described by Gourevitch and Shinn in Political Power and 
Corporate Control (2005) as “minority shareholder protection”, investors share the 
                                               
167 Comment on a previous draft of this chapter, made on 8 September 2014. 
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preference for stable and predictable political conditions with the extractive industries 
and regard EITI as a tool contributing towards improved governance performance. 
Their vital role within the EITI and particularly throughout the Standard’s 
establishment has been summarised as follows: 
As they have significant holdings in publicly listed extractive companies, investment 
management funds can exert influence over corporate policies through their 
investment decisions. Thus the backing of investment and pension fund managers 
was crucial in getting EITI underway and continues to be crucial in pressuring for 
change of company policies and practices (PWYP 2009: 59). 
However, as their investments are usually spread more broadly and into more 
aggregated units, their interests can be described as less direct and more general. 
As summarised by an interview partner: ‘What may be bad for one company and 
possibly cause the Shell price to fall, is worth it if the aggregate benefits across the 
economy outbid’ (Company constituency interview, 31 October 2012). In other 
words, investors prioritize the overall investment climate over the temporary well-
being of individual companies. In general, this has been mentioned as the main 
reason why investors support mandatory disclosure legislation, such as Dodd Frank 
or the EU Transparency Directive. This prioritizing made, for instance, an impact at 
EITI’s inception as the option of disclosure of disaggregated data was discussed and 
opposed by some of the oil companies (particularly ExxonMobil, Total and Chevron). 
Some oil and gas companies subsequently called on the investors to support their 
protest against making disaggregated data a requirement within the Standard but 
were refused (ibid.).168  
Another dimension of investors’ interests regarding EITI is the assumption that fiscal 
transparency is essential for good governance and therefore a precondition for 
repaying the sovereign debts in which they invest (see also chapter four). This 
argument is additionally endorsed by the World Bank and the IMF (see World Bank 
                                               
168 Aggregation is defined as ‘a method of reporting by which the payments made by individual 
companies are consolidated, so that individual company payments cannot be identified in a published 
EITI report. It can also refer to the consolidation of different types of payments made by a company so 
that individual payment types cannot be identified’ (EITI Business Guide 2013: 36). In contrast, 
disaggregation refers to ‘a method of reporting by which individual companies’ payments made to a 
government are disclosed and can be identified separately. It can also refer further to reporting 
individual types of payments, so that each payment type (royalty, tax, etc.) can be identified’ (ibid.: 
37). 
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2012).169 Fiscal transparency as an indicator for turning resource revenues into 
sustainable economic development and ultimately of a country’s ability to repay its 
loans, also plays an important role in the assessment of countries via credit rating 
agencies.  
In summary, institutional investors share an interest in stability and predictability of 
their investment with the extractives, albeit from a broader perspective. In general, 
they are regarded as positive and supportive partners in the EITI who played an 
important part in EITI’s establishment (see also chapter three). Despite some 
differences in contrast to the extractives, the standing of the investors can be 
assumed to rest on the same two underlying beliefs described in the previous 
chapter which portray their engagement as positive and responsible contribution to 
resource-rich countries’ overall economic development. However, they do not 
operate under an equally strong linkage to national security which would give them a 
sense of exceptionality. Investors regard EITI primarily as a tool for improving 
governance performance, and particularly fiscal transparency. 
5.2.  The company constituency as influential stakeholder 
The company constituency represents the business perspective within the process. It 
encompasses the three different sectors and, reflecting on the variety of supporters, 
consists of companies of all sizes and origins. This section establishes how the 
representation of the business perspective at EITI’s international level can be 
described as institutionalised and organised. In addition, it describes how the 
collective representation functions.  
Generally, business representation is guaranteed by EITI’s multi-stakeholder design 
which insists that the stakeholders need to be represented at the international level 
(see chapter three). The EITI gives each constituency (countries, civil society and 
companies) ‘the right to determine their own internal processes’ (EITI Constituency 
Guidelines 2011: 1). The companies agreed to apply an internal rule for the 
allocation of Board seats, in an attempt to reflect the most important divisions within 
the business community. This rule allocates two seats at the Board table to the oil 
and gas companies (again informally divided between one seat for a North-American 
                                               
169 Available from: http://wbi.worldbank.org/boost/tools-resources/topics/promoting-open-
budgets/fiscal-transparency. 
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and the other for a European company): two seats for the mining sector: one seat for 
state-owned or national oil and gas company: and the final seat is supposed to 
represent the investors’ community (ibid.). 
Representing at the Board level as a company is usually a matter of stepping 
forward within your sub-constituency, for instance oil and gas (sometimes the 
selection process is overseen by the previous Board Director for this seat). The 
miners, for instance, explicitly state that they are looking for a company or 
association who has ‘relevant experience and prior involvement (in the process)’ and 
‘a good regional coverage’ as well as someone who might count as representative 
for the entire sector (EITI Constituency Guidelines 2011: 2). Once the sub-
constituencies have put a list of potential candidates together, the names are shared 
amongst all members of the constituency and agreed upon by consensus. The 
announced candidates are then later elected at the EITI Members Meeting prior to 
the Global Conferences. Thus, the representational process consists of an element 
of delegation in which the business community grants individual companies the right 
to represent them at EITI’s international level and sent individual employees to the 
Board. Following a Bourdieusian line of argumentation as elaborated in chapter two, 
this practice is an example of the delegational component of political capital, a 
community granting authority to represent to individual players which then becomes 
institutionalised in the position of the corporate Board director. As indicated by the 
big names sitting at the Board table, the likes of ExxonMobil, BP or Shell usually lead 
the way. In general, active engagement at EITI’s international level is regarded as 
opportunity to demonstrate ‘international credibility’ and ‘leadership’ within the 
industry (EITI Business Guide 2008: 9).170 In addition, it is supposed to serve as 
mechanism for ‘reputational assurance’ (EITI Business Guide 2013: 12). 
When it comes to the functioning of the constituency, the most important factor 
facilitating effective representation is the establishment and maintenance of a good 
communication process. This process needs to enable the flow of information from 
the national to the international level of the process and from the EITI Board table 
back to the individual members of the constituency. A very important role for 
                                               
170 The already mentioned article by Elbra concludes that this leadership role within the industry is an 
important explanatory factor for miners contributing to regulatory arrangements in the sub-Saharan 
African countries (2014). 
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maintaining effective communication is played by regularly held teleconferences for 
the separate sectors, to which all members of the sector (e.g. oil and gas 
companies) are usually invited. Interestingly though, there are no calls on behalf of 
the combined extractive sector – miners, oil/gas and investors debate separately. 
The perspectives thus only come together once individual Board members share 
them at the international Board level. And, as one interview partner highlighted, even 
though the representation at the international level is dominated by the big 
companies, smaller or middle-sized corporations participate in these teleconferences 
as a way of keeping up with newest trends and developments at the international 
level and for providing input from their perspectives (Company constituency 
interview, 27 February 2013). 
Active international involvement usually means that a company is willing to put 
personal and financial resources or capital into the process, a point further illustrated 
by the following description of procedures within the constituency: Whenever there is 
an upcoming issue to be discussed or a decision to be made, one of the companies 
would take on a lead role and ask for instance their legal department to assess the 
issue, if it were to be a legalistic problem, as well as the risks related to it, and draft a 
position paper. Such a leadership role is usually taken on by a company who has a 
special interest in the particular topic. This means that one company allows for their 
resources (people, money, time, etc.) to be used on behalf of the constituency. In a 
second step, the position paper is circulated amongst the members for consultation 
and re-drafted until it becomes the constituency’s position on a topic. In a third step, 
one representative is chosen to put the position forward at the EITI Board. In-
between Board meetings the constituency usually operates via conference and bi-
lateral calls as well as circulations of position papers. In addition, the constituency 
gets together before every Board meeting in order to prepare the meeting and 
discuss the interests.171 Occasionally, there is an additional session after the Board 
meeting to discuss the outcomes. 
As the practice demonstrates, it is the big MNCs who have the resources and the 
interests to perform an active role. Depending on the issues discussed, different and 
                                               
171 At the 22nd Board Member Meeting in Oslo Norway, for example, the members of the company 
constituency were invited to meet at the headquarters of Statoil (the Norwegian oil company). The 
individuals attended a meeting organised by the EITI Secretariat in Oslo’s City Centre in the morning 
and were picked-up by taxis after lunch (the coordination and costs appeared to be Statoil’s). 
159 
multiple departments of the company can be involved, e.g. legal and public affairs. 
However, the effort is usually coordinated by the Board Director and the respective 
department. This Board practice also displays the substantial advantages in terms of 
access to resources that these companies have readily available in contrast to, for 
example, civil society representatives at EITI’s international level (see chapter 
seven). 
Reviewing the company homepages, it can be stated that EITI engagement is 
usually highlighted at the sustainability sections, here exemplified by BP’s 
international homepage:  
As a founding member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and 
an alternate member of the initiative’s Board, BP works with governments, non-
governmental organizations and international agencies to improve transparency and 
disclosure of payments to governments. We have supported governments’ efforts 
towards EITI certification in countries where we operate. We have worked with many 
countries on implementation of their EITI commitments, including most recently with 
the US and UK administrations following their decision to join the initiative (BP 
Homepage, Financial Transparency).172 
The fact that EITI participation features in companies’s external representation 
indicates that the initiative has become an important, albeit not necessarily central 
part of their CSR activities. 
In summary, it can be stated that the functioning of the corporate constituency is 
based on the establishment of an effective communication process operating along 
sectoral lines. In addition, the functioning is maintained by individual representatives 
and substantially supported by the willingness of individual companies to use their 
resources. The previous Board practice shows that the big players in the industry 
have the resources and the motivations to act as members of the Board. Operating 
from an already outstanding position within the industry, their EITI engagement 
grants them access to political capital and thus the legitimate authority to represent 
the business community which can be assumed to re-affirm and re-produce their 
privileged status further (for the effects of political capital, see chapter seven). 
 
 
                                               
172 Available from: http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/sustainability/society/managing-our-impact-
on-society/financial-transparency.html. 
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5.3.  Assessing inconsistencies in companies’ participation 
Elaborations in the previous section illustrated how corporate collective 
representation at the international level is institutionalised and organised while 
already powerful players within the sector also take on the role as Board Directors. 
Through this delegation, they are granted an additional source of power which is 
political authority. This section examines three inconsistencies regarding the 
contribution of the constituency which stem from direct observations as well as 
remarks by the interview partners and allow for additional insights into the 
constituency’s performance over time. 
It is argued that these observations demonstrate two points: Firstly, the existing room 
for strategic manoeuvre and interpretation available to the corporations, and 
secondly, their taken-for-granted status as positive, responsible and exceptional 
agents within the Standard which translates into low expectations towards their 
actual contribution, and, as the following chapters six and seven will demonstrate, 
also into significant influence. 
5.3.1. “Staying the same while moving forward” 
The first inconsistency in corporate engagement with the EITI is the ambiguity 
displayed regarding supporting EITI’s existence in general while opposing changes 
in EITI’s regulatory framework over the course of EITI’s evolution. The inconsistency 
of wanting EITI to exist but not wanting it to change is most obviously displayed by 
the oil and gas companies and became particularly evident throughout the course of 
EITI’s strategy review process from 2011-2013. As already elaborated in chapter 
three, an external evaluation conducted by Scanteam concluded amongst other 
things that there was little evidence for societal change, e.g. actual governance 
reforms, induced by EITI implementation (EITI Scanteam 2011). The EITI decided to 
address this problem over the course of a two-year strategy review (see chapter 
three for greater details). This was recognised by civil society as an excellent 
opportunity to push for more rigid and more comprehensive compliance 
requirements and reporting standards. It was argued that by including the additional 
requirements of contract transparency, reporting of in-kind payments, beneficial 
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ownership173 of companies and project-level reporting, the effectiveness of the 
Standard in implementing countries could be improved significantly. Obviously, these 
suggestions had already been discussed in international and national discourses on 
revenue transparency over the last years, particularly with reference to changes in 
legislation in the US and EU (see chapters three, seven and eight). However, in the 
strategy review discussions it became evident that the oil and gas companies had a 
very conservative vision for EITI’s evolution and rejected the inclusion of new 
requirements:  
We feel we stick to the original principle of EITI, this good compromise which is in 
favour with every important point for everyone. Now, I can understand that some 
parties, NGOs particularly, consider it as a first step to get more, but that’s not the 
original plan. 
(Company constituency interview, 14 February 2012) 
The oil and gas representatives argued that the stakeholders should focus on 
strengthening the already existing implementation framework which was established 
in 2007 by paying closer attention to the implementing practice in participating 
countries. The 2007 Standard was the idea and the framework they signed-up for, it 
has been discussed and agreed upon and therefore should be preserved. In 
contrast, it appeared that miners and investors put greater priority towards 
procedural aspects and the achievement of EITI’s aims which means they appeared 
more flexible towards changes and extensions of the existing standard and had a 
more pro-active role in the debates. 
To achieve their goal, the oil and gas representatives deployed two strategies: 
argumentation and blockage of decisions. They argued that these changes a) could 
be perceived as imposition on national jurisdiction and thus a challenge on resource-
rich countries’ national sovereignty (an argument particularly stated in the context of 
contract transparency as national legislation in China or Angola effectively prohibits 
such disclosure, see also chapter three); b) that such requirements could 
compromise competition law, particularly when it comes to the disclosure of pricing 
information174 or reveal commercially sensitive information;175 c) it was argued that 
                                               
173 Defined as ‘the “natural” person(s) who, directly or indirectly, ultimately own(s) or control(s) a 
corporate entity, a license or other property’ (EITI Glossary, quotation marks in the original). Available 
from: https://eiti.org/glossary. 
174 This is a valid argument. However, in practice, most of the EITI reports are retrospective, e.g. the 
data disclosed refers to fiscal periods which date back several years.  
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ultimately that they were simply costly and difficult to implement. Alternatively, the 
companies would refuse to participate in discussions on these topics, thus stopping 
the Board effectively from making decisions (which are adopted by consensus, see 
chapters three and eight on the rules and practicalities respectively). 
At the same time, however, the strong business case(s) already discussed in the 
previous sections of this chapter made the potential benefits of a voluntary standard 
that actually works quite clear from the beginning. Therefore, the oil and gas 
corporations also had a strong interest in EITI’s existence and flourishing, e.g. an 
imperfect but functioning EITI was always understood to be better than no standard 
at all. A perspective which put the sector into a difficult position: 
They (the oil and gas companies) have got themselves into an impossible position: 
on the one hand side they clearly don’t want the EITI to change (...) but on the other 
side they want it to be a success. And the two are not consistent (...) the EITI has to 
move or it will die. 
(Secretariat interview, 14 November 2012, content in brackets added for clarification) 
From the observer perspective it is interesting to note the constructive contributions 
made by the other members of the company constituency – the miners, for example, 
did not oppose contract transparency and are credited with playing a more 
constructive role throughout the strategy review process by civil society 
representatives and members of the Secretariat – the conservative stance of the oil 
and gas companies naturally reflects on the constituency performance as a whole. 
This is illustrated by the following statement: 
I mean (...) they occasionally did helpful things here and there that helped the 
process a lot...but they have basically two positions: One is to be against something, 
e.g. to say we can’t do this, we need to be flexible we must not past judgement, this 
is too far, this is confidential, for one or the other reason to say something can’t be 
done; the other position they have is two keep quiet. They very rarely come and say: 
Come on guys this isn’t good enough we need to fix xyz, you will almost never hear 
that from one of the company people. They are not mandated to do it. 
    (Civil society constituency interview, 9 August 2012) 
                                                                                                                                                  
175 This argument has been assessed by the Natural Governance Institute with reference to the Dodd-
Frank legislation. They argue that ‘information on basic concession terms (such as bonus payments 
and royalty rates) is widely known within industry circles, while leases and their bid terms are made 
publicly available by many governments, including the United States. Nothing in the new U.S. law 
requires the publication of the sort of information (for instance on geological data or proprietary 
technology) that might qualify as commercially sensitive.’ Available from: 
http://www.resourcegovernance.org/publications/fact_sheets/costs-criticisms-facts-about-disclosure-
rules . 
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As a result of this strategy, the company constituency’s performance in the process 
is generally understood to be rather re-active and conservative, to a point where the 
entire constituency is viewed as the biggest obstacle for EITI’s evolution into a 
stronger and more coherent standard by civil society.  
If miners and investors have not been in accordance with the oil and gas sector on 
particular issues then they neither voiced their disagreement openly nor have been 
able to influence oil and gas into adapting the more progressive stance of the others. 
This indicates a dominance of the oil and gas sector over the other partners from the 
business community which, following Bourdieu’s logic, likely stems from the 
exceptional status granted to them through their role as provider and guarantor of 
energy security as described in the previous chapter. Against this background, it is 
also interesting that the company constituency never made use of their voting power 
to block certain decisions, trusting that the consensus principle would not make such 
a move necessary (see also chapter seven). 
5.3.2. “Respecting and contesting legislation at the same time” 
The second interesting observation revealed what appears to be an ambiguous, if 
not instrumental, attitude towards legislation:  
On the one hand, as “good citizens” and “partners”, as the CSR-rhetoric evokes, 
representatives from the company constituency have frequently stressed that 
adhering to sovereign law is understood as a vital underlying principle of economic 
activity. This argument is particularly emphasised with reference to resource-rich or 
host countries as this interview partner argues: ‘We think the first respect we owe is 
to the state that welcomes us’ (Company constituency interview, 14 February 
2012).176 It was already elaborated how representatives from the oil and gas 
companies frequently stated the argument that a particular point, for instance 
transparency of contracts, should not be included in the EITI regulatory framework 
as this could easily be understood as imposing Western or imperialist standards 
(remember that EITI requirements need to be implemented at the national level. In 
some countries, particular requirements have been incorporated into national 
legislation, see chapter three). This public display of respect for national law and 
                                               
176 This stands in contrast to discourses on energy security which portray Western-based MNCs as 
agents of their countries. 
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thus national sovereignty is certainly due to the fact that the extractive industries, in 
particular the miners, require a “license to operate” a concept which indicates that 
governments perform the function of a gate-keeper for extractive companies. At the 
same time, it might well have something to do with the fact that from a historical point 
of view extractive industries have always been quite close to power (in industrialised 
as well as resource-rich countries) with their influence and proximity generally been 
regarded by the public as opaque and non-beneficial for citizens.177 Therefore, it can 
also be interpreted as a strategy to downplay existing power asymmetries in these 
countries by publically subordinating themselves to political authority. 
On the other hand, this standpoint becomes an entirely different dimension if 
contrasted with the oil and gas companies’ approach towards the Dodd-Frank Act in 
the US. As already mentioned in chapter three, Congress passed the Dodd Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, in July 2010, a bill aiming to 
improve accountability and transparency by imposing stronger regulations on the 
financial system. Part of this legislative package is the so-called Cardin-Lugar 
Amendment or Section 1504, a provision with significant consequences for the 
extractive industries, as the following statement by the Natural Resource 
Governance Institute summarises: 
In July 2010, the U.S. Congress passed Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act, a 
measure requiring companies registered with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to publicly report how much they pay governments for access to 
oil, gas and minerals. Revenue Watch and a wide range of development, anti-
corruption and anti-poverty organizations worked hard to support the passage of this 
landmark requirement. It is a powerful tool that allows investors to properly assess 
risk and citizens to see the value placed on their natural resources.178  
In greater detail, this bill effectively requires extractive industries listed in the US to 
publically and unilaterally disclose their payments to the governments of the 
countries in which they are operating on a project-by-project basis. The major oil and 
gas companies, amongst which were ExxonMobil and Chevron, reacted through the 
American Petroleum Institute (API), a US-based industry association, and filed a 
lawsuit against the SEC. They presented the argument that Dodd Frank would 
effectively force these companies to reveal commercially sensitive data and thus 
                                               
177 A number of illuminating examples regarding this proximity are included in Lord Browne’s memoir 
in which he describes meetings with UK’s Prime Minister Tony Blair, Libyan’ s dictator Muammar  
Gadaffi or Russia’s President Vladimir Putin amongst others (Browne 2011). 
178 Available from: http://www.resourcegovernance.org/issues/dodd-frank. 
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undermine their ability to compete on the international stage. In addition, 
implementing the law would impose high compliance cost due to the details required. 
This lawsuit brought a major controversy into the EITI process with civil society 
publically calling the companies out on the discrepancy of being Board Members of 
an international transparency standard while at the same time legally fighting 
mandatory transparency legislation in the US (see this described in greater detail in 
chapter seven). 
As the lawsuit was still pending during EITI’s 22nd Board meeting which was 
attended for the fieldwork and took place in Oslo, Norway, 26-27 February 2013, it 
was observable that particularly the representatives from American oil companies 
found themselves in an extremely difficult position: in the beginning of the meeting 
they announced that they have been legally advised not to participate in discussions 
that would touch on issues which might be linked to the litigation case in the US 
(particularly project-level-reporting and contract transparency). Strategically, oil and 
gas entered the meeting by stating their red line. At the same time the EITI Board 
was having its last session prior to the Global Conference which was to take place a 
few months later in Sydney, Australia, and which was meant as a platform to 
publically introduce an improved standard resulting from the strategy review process. 
It was evident that these issues were going to be discussed. 
This strategy demonstrated the confidence displayed by the business 
representatives in their status and their resources. It could be argued that at this 
point the bill passed, meaning the legislation was in place and thus should be 
considered as basis for orientation and action of everyday business conduct. The 
company’s stance suggested, however, that the existing regulation in the US was 
regarded as provisional or temporary, something that has to be, and through the 
lawsuit would be, corrected.179 The oil and gas company’s standpoint on mandatory 
legislation was interpreted by civil society and other representatives at the 
international stage to be inconsistent with the aim of transparency. Importantly, 
however, the companies effectively made the national legislation in the US a 
decisive factor for EITI’s evaluation, thereby confirming the importance of Western-
based MNCs in a Standard which targets resource-rich countries mostly located in 
                                               
179 For information, the lawsuit has been dismissed on April 26 by the Court of Appeals due to lack of 
jurisdiction.  
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the South (see chapters seven and eight). In addition, this approach confirms the 
international perspective of these players which stems from their role and 
engagement in the global political economy (see chapter one) and explains their 
aforementioned emphasis of a level playing field (see chapter three and further 
above). 
In summary, it was observed how, on the one hand, respect for national legislation 
was strongly voiced with reference to economic activities in resource-rich countries 
while on the other hand, certain aspects of the Dodd-Frank Act in the US were 
opposed and legally contested. Again, this observation displays a confidence by the 
constituency which re-affirms their status quo as privileged agent in the arena. 
5.3.3. The blurred lines between politics and “managerial” or “technical” 
problems 
It was described earlier in this chapter how the political representation of the 
constituency works at the international level of the EITI process. Additionally, chapter 
three illustrated the rules and guidelines for the implementation of the Standard while 
highlighting the highly political nature of the validation process. Considering this, it is 
evident why the nature of the companies’ involvement automatically provokes 
questions of political power and legitimacy. Interestingly, however, from the 
perspective of some members of the company constituency, the picture is more 
complicated. On the one hand, it is quite easily acknowledged that the EITI Standard 
is an international governance mechanism: 
Yes it is a political process. Before meetings and during meetings you would see a lot 
of lobbying going on, a lot of side discussions (...) a little bit akin to (...) what you see 
in a EU context or multi-government context, where you do see lobbying and 
discussions going on and between constituencies and within constituencies that’s 
certainly (...) yes. I think it is a political process and I think also that for all of the 
representatives although you are there to be a director of EITI it is also difficult to 
leave behind your wider political context. 
   (Company constituency interview, 31 October 2012) 
On the other hand, there have been various occasions in which company 
constituency representatives, explicitly and repeatedly stated that they would not 
want to engage in politics or political decisions (examples include the topic of 
violation of human rights in particular implementing countries usually introduced by 
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members of civil society and resulting discussion on whether or not this should make 
a difference for accepting a country as candidate or compliant country or even de-
listed it from the standard). From a historical perspective, it can be reasonable 
assumed that a number of high profile corruption cases in the past and present might 
have contributed to this aversion of being seen publically as mingling in politics.180 
Such incidents build the basis for the overall very negative public image of the oil 
and gas companies.181  
It was directly observable, that the corporate constituency is very careful to avoid 
‘moral judgements’, and argues instead in favour of what is called a ‘rules-based-
approach’: 
If for example we were debating a particular country and the debate was usually 
around whether that particular country qualified or not, I think, that’s a very legitimate 
debate, (as) sometimes outside factors could come in. So we had examples were a 
particular country might have satisfied some of the requirements for becoming a 
candidate country but because of some of its human rights record that the civil 
society groups admitted to be problematic, so it could be an area not directly linked to 
revenue transparency, but equally it was one that civil society felt this country just 
because of its record should not be admitted and I think that’s a very legitimate 
debate to have. The companies generally speaking try to follow a rules-based 
approach, (They) try not to make judgements by the ethics of otherwise individual 
countries but rather take a view that if the countries have satisfied the rules (referring 
to the EITI requirements) than we are not there to make moral judgements of 
whether or not that country should be admitted. And the NGOs find that distinction 
more difficult to make and that’s understandable given the different background.  
(Company constituency interview, 31 October 2012, insert in brackets added for 
clarification) 
Another illustrative example of this distinction is highlighted the following statement: 
It’s better to have a responsible government, which is accountable to its population, 
because if they show what they do with the money, it’s more likely to be better 
                                               
180 See, for instance, the corruption case against former chairman of French state-owned company 
Elf, now part of Total. Available from: 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2003/nov/13/france.oilandpetrol. A more recent example 
involves miners BSGR and Vale who are accused of obtaining a concession for a mine located in 
Guinea by bribing public officials in 2008. Available from: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/10/guinea-mining-simandou-idUSL6N0M70T920140310. The 
case became even more interesting as a former adviser to BSGR, on trial for facilitating corruption 
deals, changed his plea to guilty in March 2014. Available from: 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/mar/11/former-adviser-to-beny-steinmetz-mining-firm-
frederic-cilins.  
181 In an informal conversation the following statement was made by a company representative who 
did not want to be cited on this: ’We do not interfere politically (...) but, there is legitimate interference 
taking into account our own interests as a company and the economic interests of the country which 
hosts our activities’. 
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governance. I would not use the term democratic because this is then becoming 
political, just better governance, economic governance. 
    (Company constituency interview, 14 February 2012) 
Therefore, it is legitimate to hold decision-making power in an international standard 
which makes explicit demands on resource-rich countries about the ways by which 
the administrative and economic sector should be run and also assess or “validate” 
their performance and at the same time not acknowledging this as political practice. 
This line of argumentation only works if the problems addressed by the EITI process 
– lack of transparency about the generated revenues and the ways in which these 
incoming revenues are spent – are considered to be of managerial or technical 
nature. These inconsistencies are an attempt at strategic interpretation serving the 
already dominant agent, the companies, effectively aiming to mask their actual 
influence: 
Firstly, if the problem is identified as a lack of managerial and technical capacities, it 
makes perfect sense to help fill this void with the contribution of actors who are 
supposed to be experts in these areas – the helping to fill “governance gaps” 
argument prevalent in the literature on global governance (see chapter one).  
Secondly, it can be interpreted as a strategy to prevent forms of disclosure which are 
considered sensitive by the companies, such as contract transparency, as the 
following anecdote on the discussions at the 21st EITI Board Member meeting on 25-
26 October 2012 which took place in Lusaka, Zambia, suggests:  
I would also say that there is a little bit of a tactic going on here, I mean, if you don’t 
want something to happen you say we cannot go there because that’s politics, we 
don’t get involved in politics, that’s their (the companies) way of saying, I am drawing 
a line here. Now what happened at the last Board meeting (Lusaka) is when it came 
to project by project transparency discussions, the companies said: ‘This is an area 
of national sovereignty we don’t think that the EITI should require this.’ When it came 
to the discussion on contract transparency they said: ‘This is an area of national 
sovereignty we don’t think that the EITI should require this.’ When it came to scoring 
they said: ‘This is an area of national sovereignty we don’t think that the EITI should 
require it.’ And the representative from the Republic of Congo, which is hardly the 
most enlightened country system in the world, turned around and (...) he banged the 
table and he said: ‘Don’t tell me what is my national sovereignty! I am sick of being 
told what we can or can’t rule on because you have my best interests at heart! 
Common! I am telling you, I want this!’ And that, oh my god, that was an amazing 
moment, that was one of the most amazing moments I witnessed in all EITI Board 
meetings that I have attended, the dynamic changed immediately, they could not use 
that card anymore. (...) I mean the investors, they talk about politics and that’s 
because they are terrified, that’s not their territory at all, and there I think its naivety, 
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at least with the present representative, because when this person says: ‘We don’t 
touch political issues, this is all a technical process’, sure, in an ideal world it would 
be a pure technical process, but it’s not. There is an enormous amount of judgement 
involved whether Iraq is compliant; because you cannot write the rules so clearly to 
be easily interpreted objectively in 37 different political environments. The rules are 
not, they can’t be that developed, so there is gonna be some political judgement and 
Equatorial Guinea is gonna get treated harder than Mozambique. 
     (Secretariat interview, 14.November 2012) 
Thirdly, these blurred lines between political and technical issues also indicate the 
presence of an economistic mode of interpreting the complex issues around natural 
resource extraction and management which corresponds to the arguments 
presented on the prevalence of a liberal economic approach and the 
commodification of natural resources stated in the previous chapter.  
In summary, it seems as if some members of the corporate constituency have 
difficulties in openly acknowledging the fundamentally political nature of EITI as an 
international governance process and consequently their part in it. At the same time, 
the drawing of a line between politics and technical or managerial issues appears to 
be a strategic instrument in the battle over what effective and legitimate international 
natural resource governance should look like.  
Interpreting these observations in combination, it is argued that these findings largely 
confirm our understanding of the companies as privileged agents in the EITI arena 
and the picture of them inherent in the shared beliefs on natural resource 
management (see previous chapter). Hence, the rather passive or conservative 
stance of the oil and gas sector regarding more detailed disclosure requirements is 
in fact consistent against a discourse on natural resource extraction which identifies 
a lack of governance capacity as the main problem, as explored in chapter four. 
From the companies’ perspective, therefore, more detailed disclosure, such as 
project-level-reporting, will only increase the costs for them but from a regulatory 
perspective does nothing to address the “real problem” which lies with the 
governments.  
Moreover, it was observed how a sense of exceptionality evident in the energy 
security discourse, in combination with the positive depiction in the global 
governance/CSR discourse, provides the companies with self-confidence derived 
from an awareness of their strategic position – as displayed in the public statements 
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on the API lawsuit and the legislative contestation. At the same time, their portraying 
as resourceful and ethnical partners is consistent with their public affirmation of a 
high esteem for sovereignty and the rule of law in resource-rich countries. Moreover, 
the discrepancy between their political practices in the EITI and their interpretation of 
addressing managerial or technical problems reflects on the ambiguity inherent 
between the global governance/CSR discourse and the more conventional 
appreciation of companies as contributing to society by generating wealth. In 
summary, this section concludes that the inconsistencies displayed in the 
performance of the company constituency can be explained as resulting from the 
role attributed to the companies and the governments in natural resource extraction 
relying on the shared beliefs elaborated in the previous chapter. 
5.4.  Conclusion: The ambiguous partners 
Having established the companies’ legitimate and privileged status in discourses on 
natural resource governance, this chapter paid closer attention to the question of 
how corporate power actually operates in practice in a multi-stakeholder governance 
process. It became evident that corporate political practice at the international level 
is institutionalised, formalised and requires a substantial amount of various forms of 
capital. In addition, further insights into EITI’s inner workings were generated, 
enhancing our understanding of this social arena. Therefore, the chapter relied on 
the concept of corporate political practices which was defined as an institutionalised 
performance, recognised as competent by others and adapted through socialization 
(see chapter two). In greater detail, the following findings were made: 
It became evident that the effective functioning of the constituency depends on two 
factors: Firstly, the provision of resources that individual companies made available; 
and secondly, the leadership of individual Board Directors representing the 
companies who take on the task of coordinating the decision-making process and/or 
argue the case at the Board level (for a further exploration of the role of individuals 
see following chapter). More broadly, and as Bourdieu would expect, a substantial 
amount of various forms of capital is required. These findings confirm that the 
representational practice of the EITI not only favours the dominant major players in 
the extractive sectors, but also already indicate that the companies have resources 
at their disposal which are likely to be superior to those of the other stakeholders at 
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EITI’s international level, particularly the members from resource-rich countries (see 
this aspect further explored in the following chapters six and seven). 
As we recall from chapter two, the concept of political practice emphasises repetition 
and reiteration. Reflecting on the findings, this would suggest that the already 
existing power asymmetries within the extractive sectors as well as in the broader 
field of natural resource governance more generally (see chapters three and four), 
are not only constantly reflected in the companies’ political practice at EITI’s Board 
level but, perhaps more importantly, re-enforced and thus potentially perpetuated 
(see chapter seven). On this reading, EITI participation and contribution is an 
excellent instrument to maintain leadership and power by individual companies 
since, following Bourdieu, social practices play an important part in preservation and 
enhancement of hierarchies in social arenas. This conclusion is further affirmed by 
the interesting findings that there is a surprising consistency in the companies 
actively participating on the international stage which does not reflect the changes 
this industry has been undergoing in the recent decade (as state-owned companies 
and companies from resource-rich countries are generally underrepresented at 
EITI’s international level). 
At the same time, the findings in this chapter illustrated that social arenas are 
dynamic places of change and contestation. As became observable, the EITI is 
embedded in broader fields of power at the international level which affect the game, 
here exemplified by the impact of mandatory disclosure requirements in the US and 
EU on EITI’s discourses. In addition, differences and varieties in the engagement 
and contribution were explored not only of the extractive sectors over time but also 
between individual companies from the same sector. In addition, changes in single 
company’s performance over the years could be observed (particularly BP’s 
performance, which changed from a pro-active model stakeholder to today’s more 
consolidated status). Moreover, the prominent role of the oil companies at the time of 
EITI’s inception, for example, was followed by a more consolidative stance in the 
following years. At the same time, the miners seem to have decided on a hands-on 
and proactive strategy since the early days of EITI’s launch, probably reflecting an 
increased international awareness of the consequences of their operations and the 
call for a “license to operate”. Moreover, it became evident that over the course of 
EITI’s evolution a number of requirements affecting business have been included 
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into the Standard which the companies’ initially opposed. This can be interpreted as 
confirming companies’ still vital interest for making this governance endeavour work, 
as indicating for the progress of discourse on disclosure and governance, and as an 
indicator for the influence of civil society at EITI’s international level. 
Observing corporate political practice unfolding over time, as summarised in the 
section on the company constituency’s performance, it was further found that the 
shared beliefs elaborated in the previous chapter provided the companies with a 
strong confidence regarding their standing. As their contribution and status is 
institutionally enshrined and essentially uncontested, they are granted a tremendous 
amount of space for manoeuvre and interpretations which in itself is a strategic 
advantage. This is exemplified by the discussions on the political nature of the EITI 
which in summary attempt to disguise political influence by framing the process in 
more “neutral” terms, by using managerial or technical language. The taken-for-
granted status of their participation is further illustrated by the fact that the 
companies frequently stressed how important it was that their collaboration through 
the EITI does not collide with existing competition law. However, there was no 
evidence found that any of the other stakeholders is exploring the companies 
potential to use EITI cooperation for enhancing their position in international markets, 
which indicates a lack of critical engagement. 
In conclusion, this closer examination of companies’ collective representation has 
not only enhanced the understanding of EITI’s inner workings, but also revealed 
corporate contribution to the EITI as institutionalised, formalized and resource-based 
practice which has a representational and delegational component, thereby further 
confirming the emerging academic consensus of companies as political agents at the 
international level. In addition, it became evident that corporate power operates in 
practice and through practices which reflect and enhance existing power 
asymmetries in favour of the companies (for the problematic effects see chapter 
seven). The following chapter explores the second component of corporate political 
practice, the individual representation and the effects of political capital granted to 
them through EITI participation. 
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6. Corporate political practice in action II: Leadership by individual corporate 
representatives 
This chapter focuses on the individuals serving on the EITI Board as company 
representatives on behalf of the big multinationals, industry associations and 
institutional investors. It begins by introducing and interpreting the insights on 
recruitment and mandate of the company representatives. Furthermore, it elaborates 
on the personal qualities regarded as helpful for being an effective EITI Board 
Director and introduces examples of leadership by corporate representatives.182 The 
final section summarises and evaluates how corporate representatives reflect on 
their experiences as members of the EITI Board. The insights presented have been 
generated through the interview process and are complemented by findings from the 
text-analysis and participant observation (see chapter two, part two on methods). 
These findings supplement the insights from the previous chapter on the 
performance of the constituency and thus corporate political practice in the EITI. 
This chapter makes use of Bourdieu’s concepts of capital and disposition (see 
chapter two). It follows Bourdieu’s assumption that power usually has a pre-reflexive, 
embodied dimension, as encompassed in his concept of disposition. Therefore it can 
be expected that a) the practices of corporate representatives strongly rely on the 
knowledge structure and shared beliefs elaborated in chapter four, as these would 
be the thinking tools which enable interpretation and action, and b) that the 
representation and practice rests on particular forms of capital and whose 
identification will help to assess the corporate representative’s standing in relation to 
other stakeholders in greater detail.  
It is argued that, complementary to the ways by which corporate power operates 
through the company constituency as a collective body, it also operates through the 
actions of individual representatives. Firstly, this chapter identifies how corporate 
political practice is based on cultural and social forms of capital, culminating in the 
possession of a form of expertise which is very specific to the EITI Standard. It is this 
form of expertise which is identified as the most valued form of capital at the EITI’s 
international level. Secondly, the argument is presented that corporate power as 
                                               
182 This research understands leadership as defined by Haslam et al. who elaborate an identity-based 
approach to leadership from a psychological perspective as a ‘process of influencing others in a 
manner that enhances their contribution to the realization of group goals’ (2010: 247). 
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symbolic authority can be seen operating in such a way that achievements and 
status are attributed to personal qualities rather than understood as the effect of an 
exercise of power by a privileged agent. 
6.1. Recruitment and mandate 
The following sections introduce the company representatives, examine how they 
were recruited as EITI Board Directors, and elaborate on the mandate they have 
been given.  
Educational background and the practice of recruitment  
In Bourdieu’s terminology, education is understood as an institutionalised form of 
cultural capital which requires the previous investment of economic capital. In the 
case at hand, the complexity of issues with which the EITI process deals (see 
chapter three) makes it reasonable to assume that company representatives come 
from quite diverse educational backgrounds as there are financial, environmental, 
social, legal and administrative details to deal with as well as technical and practical 
issues related to the operational process to take into account. Unfortunately, there 
was no publically accessible information available for every corporate member 
serving the EITI Board from 2007-2013. The following section thus exemplarily 
concentrates on the twelve Board Directors representing the corporate constituency 
from 2009-2012, out of which three members had a degree in law; five in the broader 
category of business administration and economics; two hold a degree in social 
science; an additional member in geological engineering.183 Two of the 
representatives had also previously been members of the UK Diplomatic Service.  
Seven out of the twelve were heading what in broader categories could be described 
as their company’s CSR department (alternately called public or environmental 
affairs; international relations; business ethics; upstream international; or, in the case 
of the investors, socially responsible investment). They represented Chevron, 
ExxonMobil, AREVA, Freeport-McMoRan Copper&Gold Inc, Statoil as well as 
Standard Life and Allianz Global Investors. In addition, two Directors were 
representing the ICMM, amongst which one was the President of the Council. 
Statoil’s representative was Senior Vice President of Corporate Communication, and 
                                               
183 For one individual there was no public information on educational background available. 
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finally PEMEX representative was Chief of Staff. As this detailed listing of the 2009-
2011 Board further illustrates, the individuals representing the corporate constituency 
can be described as well educated and quite senior, with the majority of them 
coming from or heading CSR-related divisions within their organization and an 
educational background in business administration and economics. This leads to the 
conclusion that they interpret and evaluate their role and contribution to natural 
resource governance from a perspective which is likely to have a CSR-sympathetic 
outlook but is nevertheless based on profound knowledge on business operation. In 
Bourdieu’s language, educational background and expertise are understood as a 
form of cultural capital. Interesting to note also, only two out of the twelve Board 
Members, representing the investors and Statoil, were female while all corporate 
representatives were white and from what can broadly be described as of “Western” 
background and education. It can be concluded that the representational bias from 
“Western”-based companies discussed in the previous chapter is further perpetuated 
in individual representation. 
Having approached the subject of recruitment in the interview process as well as in 
more casual conversations during the meetings, it appeared as if the choice of 
becoming a representative depends on two factors: One is obviously the strategic 
decision within a company to be more visible at the international stage, whereas the 
second one is the degree of willingness and personal engagement of the individual. 
Apparently also, there has never been a formal election within the corporation 
constituency regarding their representatives: 
Within the constituency there is no election as such, I don’t think there has ever been 
an election. It’s really a question of either being asked: would you prepared to take 
this on? Or indicating that you are happy to be involved and a lot of it comes down to 
a mixture of the readiness of the company to make you available, because it is quite 
a commitment of time, but also the individuals commitment to be involved and the 
level of energy and interest that you have in the topic. 
(Company constituency interview, 31 October 2012) 
A few representatives mentioned how they pro-actively suggested a more profound 
engagement via Board membership within their company, after learning about this 
option by regularly attending EITI meetings. Other individuals seemed to have been 
brought in because of their expertise. Here are two examples of specific expertise: 
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the first is experience with doing business in politically highly sensitive situations and 
the second professional knowledge regarding economic and legal issues: 
When (...) we realised that the company was becoming very big, one of the number 
four, number five companies in the world (...) and among the twenty-five strongest 
companies in the world, we thought that reputational issues were certainly more of 
importance (...) because we would be under the scrutiny of stakeholders. And so it 
was decided to have a person in charge of all the reputational issues. At that time I 
was general manager for country x184 which was a potentially hot issue, and the CEO 
decided that he would give me all the potentially hot issues (the person names other 
countries in similar situations) but also such as transparency, finance transparency in 
our operations, and so I became it without having chosen it really. But I do enjoy it. 
    (Company constituency interview, 14 February 2012) 
 
And one of the reasons that I was asked to become involved was that it was 
becoming clear that the debate within the EITI was moving on and the whole debate 
on transparency was changing with the civil groups looking for more transparency. 
And it was felt within my company that my company’s argument in that context might 
be better made by somebody who was closer to business and who understand some 
of the issues perhaps better. But also that having a lawyer in that role could be 
helpful because some of the issues started to become quite legalistic in nature. So I 
was asked if I would take on that role and that’s really why it worked that way (...) and 
in the case of the EITI it’s a fairly easy transition because you have the initial period 
as an alternate before you become a full director and you get two years to see how 
the Board works and how you get on with it. 
(Company constituency interview, 31 October 2012) 
The last statement suggests that EITI participation comes with a gradual process of 
inclusion which is supposed to facilitate the individual’s adaption towards EITI’s 
internal procedures and which includes an element of socialization into EITI’s norms. 
This fits nicely with the definition of practices as competent performance which 
requires and reflects the actor’s socialization into the arena (see chapter two). In 
consequence, as the following observation from an EITI Members Meeting will 
illustrated, not understanding EITI’s functioning marks participants as outsiders: 
It should be noted that several of the members who attended the meeting where not 
very familiar with the EITI’s International internal procedures and are not within the 
inner core of the EITI family (EITI Scanteam 2011: 56). 
Moreover, this comment illustrates why some interview partners described 
throughout the interview process the merits of extending the Board’s period of office 
as a method to speed-up the decision-making process (the assumption being that 
                                               
184 This country is a war-torn African country with tremendous natural resources, ranking amongst the 
bottom few regarding development indicators. It has been for decades struggling with conflict and for 
political stability.  
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the greater the number of Board Directors familiar with the EITI process, the faster 
consensus can be reached since representatives better understand the process, the 
challenges and their role at the Board table). 
Consistency in participation and acquisition of capital 
A further interesting finding is the remarkable consistency in staff of the company 
constituency compared to the other constituencies. The company constituency 
consists of some individuals which have been serving the Board as representatives 
and alternates or generally participating in the process since the early discussions on 
EITI’s establishment and thus approximately for over a decade (see chapter four):  
There were four people who have been around more or less from the beginning. Four 
of them I remember from the meetings back in 2003. A couple of them dropped out of 
the Board now but they still come occasionally to the meetings, you know, it’s a 
matter of public record: It’s Stuart Brooks from Chevron, Jean-Francois Lasalle from 
Total, Oliver Loubiere from Areva and Edward Bickham who was with AngloAmerican 
when he started and then he went to ICMM. So those guys have been associated 
with EITI for a long time now. 
    (Civil society constituency interview, 9 August 2012) 
I think within the EITI certain individuals who have been in their roles for a long 
period of time, naturally generate a great deal of respect. 
(Company constituency interview, 31 October 2012) 
Interpreted in a positive light, this consistency in engagement indicates an honest 
personal commitment by individual corporate representatives to the cause of 
transparency in natural resource governance. This assumption is further 
strengthened by the examples of outstanding individual contributions which will be 
outlined in the following sections of this chapter. In addition, a more cynical reason 
has come up in an informal conversation, namely the lack of interested candidates. 
One representative explained their long personal participation with this person’s 
growing expertise on the subject but added frankly that within the corporation there 
were no other candidates willing to take on this role. Being a, EITI Board director 
obviously includes being visible within the transparency debate at the international 
level and thereby becoming approachable by members of civil society – apparently a 
prospect not everyone in the business community is keen to experience. 
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However, it is argued that this consistency of engagement strategically serves the 
accumulation of cultural and social capital, in the forms of expertise and social 
relationships, which requires the investment of economic capital in form of financial 
resources and time. Here it is suggested that cultural capital in the form of expertise, 
understood as specialized knowledge on and about the EITI Standard, enhances the 
already existing knowledge and status of representatives which they have acquired 
through formal academic education in addition to their status stemming from being 
delegate of a powerful company (see also previous chapter). This form of expertise 
is extremely helpful in the highly complex and partly rather technical discussions at 
the international stage of the EITI, for instance, when it comes to validation 
procedures or to the run-up for the strategy revision. It can therefore be concluded 
that these members, having served the Board for a long period of time thereby 
acquired a degree of expertise regarding the finer details of the process which is not 
likely to be met by new, incoming participants. In addition, a prolonged period of 
participation provides a great opportunity for establishing and maintaining social 
relationships with other members of the EITI family. Thereby company 
representatives established themselves as constructive and trustable partners – 
Bourdieu has described this as the accumulation of social capital which is regarded 
as strategic asset: 
The reproduction of social capital presupposes an unceasing effort of sociability, a 
continuous series of exchanges in which recognition is endlessly affirmed and 
reaffirmed. This work, which implies expenditure of time and energy and so, directly 
or indirectly, of economic capital, is not profitable or even conceivable unless one 
invests in it a specific competence (knowledge of genealogical relationships and of 
real connections and skill at using them, etc.) and an acquired disposition to acquire 
and maintain this competence, which are themselves integral parts of this capital.185 
Equipped with social and cultural capital, it was directly observed how these 
members of the company constituency provided more frequent and confident 
contributions at the Board table and in subsequent discussions. In addition, they are 
more frequently consulted by other stakeholders and members of the Secretariat as 
well as in a better position to analyse existing problems and present an informed 
position. This tendency is further fostered by the fact that neither has there been a 
large turnover regarding the companies represented at the Board, particularly with 
                                               
185 This quote stems from an online version of Bourdieu’s (1986) article on forms of capital. Available 
from: https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/bourdieu-forms-capital.htm, see 
list of references for printed versions. 
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regard to the representation of “big oil” which is very influential, as the previous 
chapter has demonstrated. It can therefore be concluded that the personal and 
organisational coherence of the company constituency builds the basis for a 
strategic advantage in comparison to the other stakeholders. 
Mandates for representation 
An important component of political representation is the mandate given to the 
individual by the organisation or institutions which are supposed to be represented 
(corresponding to the delegative component in the concept of political capital, see 
chapter two). In the EITI, the individual representative has the obligation not only to 
represent their own company but the broader constituency at the Board. In addition, 
it is assumed that every Board Member has the responsibility to act in a way that 
supports the overall development of the Standard, thereby mirroring the classical 
question of political representation between delegate and trustee famously 
discussed by Edmund Burke (1790). The EITI rules further stress that Board 
Members are expected to constructively participate in the process and have an 
obligation of loyalty to the Board (EITI Role and Responsibility of Board Members 
2014). This implies a potential for tension and raises questions about the explicit 
mandate under which the individuals operate, e.g. whether or not the company 
constrains or empowers the individual’s contribution. It was therefore specifically 
inquired after the company representatives’ mandates and what was found is a 
discrepancy in assessment: 
From a civil society perspective, corporate representatives are assumed to operate 
under constraint, inflexible mandates: ‘They have been given an incredibly narrow 
mandate by their employer which makes it very difficult for them to respond to the 
civil society people’ (Civil society constituency interview, 9 August 2012). In 
particular, this seems to be the case for individuals representing US-based oil 
companies, described as ‘run by legal and risk management experts’ (Civil society 
constituency interview, 23 July 2012). It was suggested that this is the reason why 
their representative might have been ‘kept under tighter constraint’ (Company 
constituency interview, 31 October 2012).  
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The following quote illustrates the problem in greater detail: 
I said to one of them: ‘You know, you guys come with some ideas, what are we 
supposed to do? You are just pacing yourself into a corner by just saying no to 
everything’ and the response was: ‘Well, but if we could get an official position, it has 
to been signed by all the companies and all their lawyers and once it’s written down 
that’s it, you can’t change it.’ Particularly the American companies are preoccupied 
by legal considerations. If they sign a piece of paper that then commits them legally 
to do something. For the American companies are all very legalistic, in spite of how 
they work and where they work and who they work with, the mentality is very 
legalistic and that’s been the theme: ‘We can’t do this because the lawyers won’t let 
us. We don’t have a budget line for that. We can’t.’ So in a way I think they are quite 
constrained. 
     (Civil society constituency interview, 9 August 2012) 
Legal considerations as constrains on corporate political practice have been widely 
affirmed, as exemplified by the following statement: 
The Oil companies tend to be much more legally driven (...) so the US attorneys 
tend to dictate how Exxon (Mobil) and Chevron can port themselves. (...) They 
tend to find their red lines and stand behind them (...), it’s in part because their 
mandate tends to be reviewed by lawyers and for lawyers everything is about 
lines. 
  
(Company constituency interview, 27 February 2013, insert in brackets added) 
These findings tie to the previous discussion on applying a rather formal, rules-based 
approach in a dynamic political process which made the corporate constituency as a 
collective appear rather defensive and conservative, despite the more progressive 
stance of investors and miners. 
Contrasting this impression, company representatives, particularly from European oil 
companies and miners, acknowledged this tendency within the US companies, but 
also highlighted that their operating mandate has been ‘reasonably expansive with 
not a lot of argument about how we should proceed’ (Company constituency 
interview 27 February 2013) and thus with much more opportunities for individual or 
more nuanced contributions: 
I did really feel I was there to represent the interest of my company and my 
constituency, but I did not feel constrained in terms of how I did that. 
     (Company constituency interview, 31 October 2012) 
I can’t remember having to sit on the Board and argue a case that I don’t agree with. 
    (Company constituency interview, 27 February 2013) 
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Several factors have been stated in attempts to explain this discrepancy in 
perception and assessment of the company representative’s mandate by a former 
member of the EITI Board. The interview partner suggested that there might be three 
sets of explanatory variables for the differences in the contribution of individuals: a) 
the decision-making process inside the corporate constituency, b) the role of CEOs, 
and c) the internal decision-making process of individual companies. With reference 
to the first point, the person argued that ‘the enormous rigidity of the decision-making 
process in the company constituency’ made it difficult in cases in which an issue was 
brought to the table during the meeting that the constituency had not prepared for 
(refer back to chapter five for a more detailed description). Then the representatives 
could only state that they were not in a position to comment and would have to come 
back the issue. For a Board that meets only three times a year, such a practice 
slows down the communication as well as decision-making processes at the Board 
table significantly. 
As second point, the interview partners mentioned the progressive and public stance 
in support of transparency taken by BP’s former CEO Lord Browne (see also chapter 
three) which resulted in sending senior people to the Board. In these conditions, the 
individual representative was much more visible: ‘Graham Baxter (representing BP 
at the EITI International Board), even though he couched everything in a formal 
language, he pushed very hard’ (Company constituency interview, 31 October 2012). 
This interpretation is further confirmed by civil society observations: 
So I think the first problem that they face is that their corporate bosses are not that 
interested in the details, they are not at all interested in the details of the EITI. They 
are not that interested in the EITI anymore, cause it’s kind of, you know, being 
around for a while and their mandate pushes them to a position where they always 
have to defend and sometimes that can get a little bit tense, I mean it’s all very 
courteous but you know because they are basically sitting there saying no to stuff.  
(Civil society constituency interview 9 August 2012) 
With reference to the third point, a representative from the company constituency 
described differences in the internal governance structure of companies which 
limited or extended the operating space for individual representatives. For example, 
ExxonMobil’s internal structure appears to be relatively authoritarian with the 
company frequently presented as “military hierarchical machine”. In contrast, Shell 
seemed to allow their representatives a much bigger space for manoeuvre: 
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Apparently, previous CEO’s have been generally supportive of the EITI and the 
transparency cause, 
(...) than Peter Voser came in, and Peter Voser has been really difficult, and has led 
the charge against Dodd-Frank; so what’s interesting is that (...) even though Peter 
Voser was saying shocking things that were embarrassing to everybody, Keith 
Ruddock (Shell’s representative at the EITI Board table) was actively participating in 
Workshops and Conferences taking a much more conciliatory line on Dodd-Frank. 
(...) Shell has been quite productive. 
(Company Constituency interview, 31 October 2012, content in brackets added) 
The evaluation of the mandates of corporate representatives revealed differences 
between US- and EU-based companies based on the degree by which they are 
preoccupied with prospective legal consequences of their EITI participation which 
have a direct impact on the flexibility and scope of mandate. In addition, however, it 
exposed how the internal decision-making process of the company constituency, 
described in the previous chapter, proves problematic for EITI’s ability for effective 
and decisive communication at the international Board table.  
This section on mandate and recruitment established that the companies do take 
developments in the EITI as well as in the broader field of natural resources 
governance, into account and react towards anticipated challenges for and changes 
in the underlying power structure of the arena. This is for example indicated in the 
fact that the representatives are strategically selected. Moreover, this strategic 
perspective is further confirmed through the acknowledgement and deployment of 
expertise and knowledge as important forms of capital in the EITI, as illustrated in 
the understanding that legally complex issues are best addressed by a 
representative with a background in law. In addition, it was found that for what is 
considered effective participation, representatives apparently require a degree of 
familiarity and socialisation into the EITI which corresponds to the concept of 
corporate political practice as competent performance (see chapters two and also 
five).  
6.2. Leadership and personal qualities  
Reflecting on the trend towards greater inclusion of business (refer to the 
introductory chapter), it is obvious that the individual’s political practice raises a 
number of critical questions about their performance, actual contribution and the 
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legitimacy of their status. Is their participation to be characterised as competent, 
resourceful and overall positive to the endeavour, or is there reason to be more 
critically suspicious, as Stephen Wilks suggests: 
What levels of competence and judgement do corporate executives bring to social 
and environmental programmes? They have not engaged in public debate like 
politicians, nor accepted principles of integrity and public service like civil servants. At 
best, they are likely to be technically competent; at worst they may be careless, 
paternalistic, even neo-colonialist (2013: 297). 
The interview process engaged in conversations about what it takes to be regarded 
as a good representative at the Board. In addition, conversation partners were 
invited to name important individual contributions made by corporate 
representatives. Overall, these discussions illustrate the political dimension of the 
process as well as the scope for political practice, thus adding to and complementing 
previous findings. 
Expertise as cultural capital 
For representatives of the oil companies and miners, a profound knowledge of the 
business of resource extraction was obviously considered essential. In addition, a 
sense of “contextual knowledge” about the broader political, social and 
environmental discussions and developments was regarded as vital for 
understanding the framework under which EITI is operating, in addition to the issues 
the initiative is trying to address. This quality corresponds to the field-specific form of 
expertise described in the previous section. Also, legal expertise or practical 
experience in the “field”, and thus with the particular problems and challenges in 
specific countries, are considered assets. 
An additional factor frequently acknowledged as helpful for effective representation is 
the seniority of the representatives, e.g. the ability to act and make decisions ‘without 
having to constantly refer back to somebody in the head office’ (Company 
constituency interview, 31 October 2012). This is essentially a question of status and 
can be attributed to the degree of cultural capital the individual holds. The seniority of 
the corporate representatives on the Board is thus understood as directly affecting 
the space for manoeuvre that an individual has to speak on behalf of their company. 
In addition, interview partners from all constituencies indicated that they took the 
rank of a corporate representative as indicator for the value placed by the company 
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in the EITI Standard.186 It can therefore be concluded that the representative’s 
seniority has a direct effect on the credibility of the individual representative as a 
partner at the Board table. This observation confirms Swartz’ description on the 
delegated component of symbolic power as political capital, which is an ‘authority 
granted by an (...) institution’ (Swartz 2013: 66, see also chapter two).  
Furthermore, it needs to be considered that EITI engagement can take a significant 
amount of time and effort depending on the personal engagement of the individual. It 
requires constant keeping up with current developments at the international and 
many of the national levels which is usually provided for through information 
prepared by the EITI’s Secretariat.187 One representative estimated that an ordinary 
Board member spends around 12 working days of the year on EITI related issues. 
However, the amount of time changes drastically, if the individual becomes further 
engaged in the committees (see chapter three for greater details on the committees): 
‘On average, I would say, I spent 25-30 days per year on the EITI, with the strategy 
review last year probably 35, so 5-6 weeks per year’ (Company constituency 
interview, 27 February 2013). The notorious Validation Committee is understood to 
be the most demanding which was estimated to require at least 50% of the 
committees chair’s time. These observations further confirm the necessity of a 
significant investment of economic capital and the prerequisite of cultural capital in 
form of education as basis for effective corporate political practice. 
However, it is argued, that while a significant amount of cultural capital is required for 
effectively participating at EITI’s international level, at the same time this participation 
naturally fosters the individual’s accumulation of more expertise which translates into 
a better standing within the EITI. In addition, this is also likely to affect the 
individual’s standing within the company. 
Inviting interview partners to reflect on their experiences as representatives, it 
became evident that participation had enhanced understanding and knowledge on 
                                               
186 So when for instance Lord Browne, who was regarded as strong champion of BP’s CSR-efforts, 
stepped down, the contact person for the EITI also changed (although BP still remained on the 
Board). However, as the representative was not substituted by someone with quite the equal level of 
seniority this decision was regarded as a shift in priorities (see chapter three for the role played by 
Lord Browne and BP in EITI’s inception). 
187The Board papers for the 22nd Meeting, for example, included over 200 pages, ranging from 
proposed changes to rules and guidelines, to recommendations for the validation of specific countries. 
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the position and situation of the other stakeholders, particularly civil society, as 
exemplified by the following statement: 
And also if you can try and understand some of the challenges being faced by some 
of the others parties at the table and you can help them understand some of the 
challenges that you are facing then actually I think that is very valuable, and to me 
that was one of the best parts of the EITI because it was fascinating sometimes 
working with let’s say an NGO to realise that the NGO might have its own political 
internal issues that it has to deal with and its own challenges internally, which, as a 
company, you rather assume that every NGO has everybody aligned within the 
organisation, they all agree. But they are actually as diverse as many companies. 
That to me was a fascinating part of being part of the EITI. 
    (Company constituency interview, 31 October 2012) 
As this statement indicates, particularly the direct personal encounter with civil 
society representatives seems to have provided companies with the opportunity to 
learn about motivations, strategies and ambitions of these stakeholders. Further 
highlighted was the understanding that civil society’s advocacy function can 
occasionally result in vocal and controversial contributions as the Board table. The 
same applies to some of the government representatives whose first intention is 
assumed to be that they want their country’s voice on natural resource management 
to be heard at the at the international level without necessary paying too much 
attention to the finer details of the Standard. In contrast, it was noted that the 
corporate approach might appear more pragmatic and result orientated (ibid.). 
Interestingly, a member of the Secretariat speculated that it might be the case that 
individual corporate representatives who are perceived as quite conservative within 
the EITI setting might actually be understood as -liberal or CSR-friendly inside their 
corporate environment.188 
Social capital and socialisation 
However, as one would expect for political practice, the importance of so-called 
social or “diplomatic skills” was strongly emphasised. Corresponding to Bourdieu’s 
concept of social capital, the speakers subsumed under this category the ability to 
listen to and empathize with the position of others, to address issues in a 
constructive and non-confrontational way as well as the ability to effectively 
communicate and cooperate with a variety of individuals.  
                                               
188 Unfortunately, this assumption could not be assessed systematically in this study..  
186 
Diplomatic skills are actually very important because you are trying to engage with 
the other constituencies, some of whom have very different positions. But you are 
also trying to do it in a way that still advances the fundamental principle of 
transparency because yes you sit on the Board to represent your constituency but 
you also sit on the Board as a Board director of the EITI and so you have a 
responsibility to try and make sure that EITI itself is moving forward and try to get to 
the bottom of that so... it’s an interesting combination. I think that somebody who 
went on to the Board with a real focus of making sure that they where only 
representing their company (...), I don’t think actually that would be very productive. 
    (Company constituency interview, 31 October 2012) 
Again, it can be argued that this form of capital is also accumulated through 
participation in the EITI: Reflecting on the endeavour and value of EITI’s 
participation, the first thing that becomes apparent is that former and current 
representatives of all constituencies appear to be quite fascinated by the process, 
calling it “unique”, “unusual”, “exceptional”: ‘The only one that works under this 
format (e.g. multistakeholder-based) is EITI’ (Company constituency interview, 14 
February 2012). As a broad observation, it can be stated, that participating in an 
international standard like the EITI is very appealing not only because of the variety 
of people with different backgrounds and purposes one gets to meet, but also 
because of the sheer fact that the meetings take place on various, sometimes quite 
exotic locations which require frequent travelling. 
You know, you get to these conferences and meetings and they are always in 
different countries, and you get to meet interesting people, and you get a weird 
camaraderie, even if you got very different objectives. I mean, it’s funny when we 
were going down to Wiston Park, and there were just a lot of us in the bus together 
and we were making jokes about the bus being late and the Secretariat handing us 
sandwiches. And it was utterly surreal that these were representatives from these 
enormously powerful corporations with very cruel records in some cases, very cruel, 
indeed, very cynical, and yet there is a bunch of us in a bus going down to Sussex 
together. It’s one of the things that particularly people from the civil society side find 
very, very strange, (...) but some people like it, you know, it’s a very interesting 
setting in that way. 
    (Civil society constituency, interview 9 August 2012) 
In addition, it is observable that the participants seem to have been able to establish 
remarkably positive personal relationships across constituency barriers.  
A body like the EITI is a very unusual organisation, it’s very rare to have an 
organization where you are sitting at the same table as civil society, as governments 
and ultimately you are trying to further the same objective but you are coming at it 
from different perspectives. So it’s a little bit like having a coalition government, you 
have different parties at the table, but you are all trying to govern for the interest of 
the country but you are looking at it from your perspective and you are not always 
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going to agree, but if you can function in a way that helps build trust and respect then 
I think that actually becomes very valuable. 
(Company constituency interview, 31 October 2012) 
As this quote illustrates, it is highly valued by stakeholders to be able to engage in a 
communication process which facilitates mutual understanding. It allows for the 
establishment of personal ties and maintains a positive underlying atmosphere which 
in consequence provides the basis for trust and respect. Furthermore, it can be 
argued that EITI’s communication process provided the companies with the 
opportunity to explain their position to critiques from civil society. A company 
representative highlighted, that it is not well understood by civil society that not only 
aligning different companies with various backgrounds can prove to be a challenge, 
but that in every company different prioritisations and understandings regarding 
transparency exist. These internal political dimension needs to be taken into account 
by the individual corporate representatives. 
Symbolic power through political capital 
Interestingly, the decision to become involved in committee work is usually attributed 
to a combination of the individual’s personal commitment and special expertise, as 
some of the empirical examples further above illustrated and as again exemplified 
here by the following statement: 
Some of the corporate representatives have made useful contributions to the process 
(...) I mean as individuals they have put quite a lot in over the years. I don’t think the 
decision to sit on a committee or become chair comes from headquarters (...). I mean 
the chair of the Validation Committee was actually an institutional investor, not an 
extractive industries person, and she did that because she was very good at chairing 
committees, she was the person with the most experience and she was very good at 
it. So she stepped forward on her own behalf to do it. The other chairs (...), I mean 
the Finance and the Audit Commitee I think had corporate chairs, because they have 
more background in that kind of thing. (...) Well, some of them don’t do a whole lot, 
but some of them do actually actively make the process work. And being on a 
committee or chairing a committee is part of it. It’s not necessarily a political 
calculation on part of the company. It’s just part of being in the process and wanting 
to be involved. 
    (Civil society constituency interview, 9 August 2012) 
Obviously, not every corporate representative at the international level is credited 
with leadership qualities. In fact, some agents might simply attend the EITI meetings 
and report back, as was observable during the meetings. However, as the previous 
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example from the Validation Committee and the following examples illustrate, it 
appears as if over the years several of the corporate representatives have made 
substantial contributions to the EITI Standard. Interview partners elaborated on the 
role that members of the company constituency have played during EITI’s 
establishment through approaching stakeholders, facilitating contacts and 
introducing ideas (see also chapter three, part one). Others would engage in 
advocating the transparency argument within the industry, push for EITI 
implementation in particular countries, and chair and contribute to committees. This 
is another interesting example: 
I suppose the initial in-depth discussion would have been a dinner in 2012 in London 
to which I was invited and at which Georg Soros was the speaker (...). That was an 
interesting discussion. I remember thinking that it was a bit broad-brush and it wasn’t 
entirely clear how such process would work but anyway, as often happens when you 
get invited for dinners to discuss an issue, you didn’t think and hear about it for a 
while and this was probably in April. (...) Then I went to the Rio Plus 10 Summit, the 
Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable Development (...) and on this occasion I was 
approached by the Foreign Office on instructions that the Prime Minister was going to 
launch the concept of the EITI, and (my company) would express their support, 
wouldn’t we? I said that the objective is fine but obviously we would need to see 
more of the details; ‘Well there isn’t any detail’ was broadly the answer. And it just 
happened that our Executive Committee was meeting in Johannesburg that week; 
cause this was only a week or so before the speech was due to be made, so there 
wasn’t a lot of preparation, and I was able to talk colleagues through what I 
understood to be proposed, the benefits I saw and the potential risks,... and got them 
to agree that, in principle, we would express support. 
   (Company constituency interview, 27 February 2013) 
In interviews and texts, an influential role played by company representatives as 
described in the example above is not only openly acknowledged but is usually 
attributed to the individual and their personal qualities: 
So someone like Stuart Brooks from Chevron is someone who is well respected by 
all constituencies and tries to be a very positive player (...) I think he was always very 
good. 
    (Company constituency interview, 31 October 2012) 
Another example:  
The efforts of Katrina Litvack, representing the investment company F&C Asset 
Management, to bring together investment firms collectively under one umbrella to 
support the calls for greater transparency gave a huge credibility boost to the 
revenue transparency movement in business circles. The signatories to the Investors 
Statement on Transparency in the Extractive Sector now collectively represent some 
US$13 trillion in funds, making this one of the most significant public declarations 
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from the investment community. The statement highlights the business case for 
revenue transparency: mitigating country risks and enhancing long-term investment 
benefits in risky or unstable resource-rich countries. Litvack is widely credited for the 
leadership role she played to get revenue transparency on the agenda with the 
investment community (PWYP 2009: 59). 
It is argued that these examples, as well as the emphasis on interpreting them as 
singular examples of individual leadership, are based on personal qualities, and 
should be interpreted as an indicator of the presence of symbolic corporate power. In 
his concept of political capital Bourdieu described a personal component of symbolic 
power which centres on charismatic leadership and extraordinary skills without 
necessarily acknowledging the structural and materialist foundations of which these 
qualities are indicators. This section argues that for playing an effective leadership 
role within the EITI Standard, corporate representatives make use of their 
accumulated cultural and social capital which is substantially based on economic 
capital and easily accessible for representatives of some of the biggest players in the 
industry. Therefore, discussions on the leadership of individual corporate 
representatives are ultimately examples of corporate power which in a Bourdieusian 
language, is misrecognised for what it is: Instead of being recognised as an exercise 
of power by a privileged agent, stakeholders prefer discussing it in terms of individual 
effort and personal qualities, exemplified by the concept of leadership. 
Further indicators for the argument that access to the resources required for 
participation directly affects contribution can be found by closer examination of the 
period of 2011-2013, in which EITI undertook the strategy review process. During 
this period, the Governance, the Validation and the Finance committee, three out of 
seven and arguably the most important and most work-intense committees, were 
chaired by company representatives. In addition, the EITI working group on the 
strategy review was composed of seven members from the company constituency; 
four member of civil society; four members of supporting or donor countries and only 
three members from the implementing countries, in addition to two participants from 
the World Bank (for more detailed elaboration on the role of the companies on this 
strategic period, see chapter seven). 
This section illustrated how, although corporate representatives are assumed to 
have been operating under quite constrained mandates and despite the generally 
critical assessment of the overall contribution of the company’s constituency, it is 
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evident that a handful of individual representatives have accompanied the EITI 
process for years and are widely acknowledged for their contributions to the 
Standard. This consistency in engagement resulted in exceptional knowledge and 
expertise about the fine details of the process on the one hand, but also with great 
personal relationships with other participants on the other hand. Consequently, they 
are generally singled-out as exceptions or mentioned as individuals to approach 
whenever there is progress to be made. It can therefore be concluded, that they 
have establish themselves as trusted and respected members of the EITI family and 
have managed to substantially accumulate and increase their cultural and social 
capital. Thus, it was demonstrated in the discussions on corporate representative’s 
performance and contribution and in applying Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic 
authority how the effects of corporate power on EITI’s decision- and policy-making 
process are obscured by an emphasis on the competences and charisma of 
individuals – which is precisely how Bourdieu suggests that symbolic power operates 
when it is most effective. 
6.3. Conclusions: Symbolic authority as misrecognised corporate power 
This chapter deployed Bourdieu’s concepts of capital and symbolic authority for 
understanding how corporate power operates through political practices of individual 
corporate representatives. Bourdieu’s conceptual framework has proven very helpful 
for approaching actions and experiences of the individuals representing MNCs as 
Board Directors, a perspective which is rarely taking into account in studies on 
corporate power (see chapter one).  
Through this chapter additional insights into the resourced-based advantages of the 
companies were gained. In addition, the understanding of the amounts of economic, 
cultural and social capital which are required for effective participation in the EITI 
process (and which complement our findings from the previous chapter on collective 
representation of the companies) was refined. Hence, knowledge on the most valued 
form of capital in this social arena was also enhanced, which is, as already 
suggested in chapter three, a context-specific form of expertise, or cultural capital, 
combining knowledge about operational aspects of resource extraction and a wider 
understanding of the political, legal, environmental and social circumstances with 
practical experience and information on the functioning of the EITI process.  
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Moreover, the potential effects of granting decision-making rights, and thus political 
capital, to companies in multi-stakeholder processes were explored: namely, a 
further enhancement of an already powerful position through the accumulation of 
symbolic authority and thus the effective concealment of power. As examined, 
symbolic corporate power is extremely effective as it has a tendency to operate in 
the background. In the EITI process, this translates into the fact that the influence of 
companies becomes associated with exceptional personal qualities and charisma of 
individual representatives. It was argued, that this is extremely problematic, not only 
because such an interpretation misrecognises, as Bourdieu would call it, the 
substantial resource-based nature of their contribution which is fundamentally linked 
to whom they represent and the kind of resources they have, but also, more 
importantly, it effectively undermines EITI’s emphasis on transparency as an 
instrument against poverty and for empowering the citizen. 
Relating these findings to the previous chapters it can be concluded that the relative 
privilege of business in the EITI is not only legitimised through shared beliefs as 
elaborated in chapter four but also, and as Bourdieu would suggest, substantially 
based on the availability and strategic deployment of various forms of capital. 
Following Bourdieu it can be deduces that these forms of capital are more likely to 
be further accumulated through continuous EITI participation – a conclusion which is 
further supported by the findings of a remarkable degree of consistency with 
personal and company representation. Importantly, however, the granting of 
decision-making rights has provided the business community with political capital 
and thus symbolic authority which further enhances their powerful position, all of 
which can be expected to have significant impact on the Standard as will be critically 
explored in the following chapter. 
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7. EITI’s privileged partners 
The previous chapters explored that the status of companies as positive, responsible 
and exceptional agents is legitimised through shared beliefs in broader international 
discourses on natural resource governance. At the same time, these beliefs attribute 
responsibility for the problems linked to and consequences of natural resource 
extraction almost exclusively to national governments, a perspective on the problems 
which has a tendency to downplay the existing power hierarchies between big MNCs 
and governments of resource-rich countries and in consequence to overstate the 
existing scope for action of governments. Examining corporate political practice by 
the company constituency as well as individual corporate representative it became 
evident that corporate power rests on social and cultural capital, which are ultimately 
based on economic capital. These forms of capital can therefore be reasonably 
assumed to be held in greater quantities by the companies in comparison to the 
other stakeholders. Moreover, it was elaborated how corporate political practice at 
EITI’s international level is based on political capital, a form of symbolic authority 
which produces the effect that company’s influence is not recognised and is instead 
attributed to exceptional leadership qualities of individual corporate representatives. 
In combination, these findings indicated that companies are in a privileged position at 
EITI’s international level. 
Building on and extending these findings, this chapter examines the consequences 
which the inclusion of companies into EITI and the granting of decision-making rights 
at EITI’s Board level have had for the Standard up until May 2013. As stated, 
Bourdieu’s conceptual framework is ultimately a theory of domination (see chapter 
two). Following his line of thought, an agent’s power is most effective, when it is not 
exercised directly through coercion or consent, but operates through symbolic 
authority and shared beliefs which establish an advantageous social and institutional 
structure. Therefore, Bourdieu argues that social arenas like EITI not only reflect and 
but also reproduce the underlying power structure between the agents involved.  
Against this background it can be expected that EITI’s core principles reflect and 
consolidate the privileged status of the companies in contrast to other stakeholders, 
while EITI’s formal and informal procedures reproduce and reinforce it (this 
corresponds to an establishment of material and cognitive structures which Bourdieu 
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describes as “hierarchies of discrimination”, refer back to chapter two). Following 
Bourdieu, a player’s dominance is confirmed by a general recognition of this agent’s 
status and a non-contestation of the resulting structure. It can therefore be assumed 
that even where the company’s influence is directly observable it is very likely that 
the other stakeholders will rather acknowledge than challenge it. To investigate 
these assumptions, the strategy review process and the resulting outcomes are 
examined. In addition, findings are presented which demonstrate the advantages 
enjoyed by companies and other resourceful stakeholders in informal processes in 
contrast to partners from implementing countries.  
7.1. A privilege reflected in principles 
Building on the analysis in earlier chapters, this research proceeds by exploring less 
directly observable consequences of the companies’ powerful presence in the EITI, 
which come in the form of a consolidation of their status, particularly observable in 
EITI’s approach to transparency. 
Unpacking EITI’s transparency notion 
These days transparency seems to have been granted the status of a ‘quasi-
religious authority as a contemporary doctrine of governance’ (Hood and Heald 
2006: 1). Particularly in discourses on natural resources, the principle is widely 
endorsed:189 
Revenue transparency is now regarded as the priority initiative to address 
governance in resource-rich countries by policy makers, the major oil companies and 
non-governmental organisations (Frynas 2009: 140).190 
Transparency is a concept in political thought with a long history.191 Similar to 
concepts such as power or security, there exist contesting perspectives on 
transparency which have a tendency to serve particular interests:  
                                               
189 There is academic evidence that transparency and transparency initiatives can make a positive 
contribution (summarised, for instance, in Frynas 2009: 145ff). Nevertheless, Frynas also highlights 
that ‘most oil-producing countries lack the necessary preconditions for the success of transparency’ 
(ibid.), including free media or an active civil-society. 
190 Interestingly, as elaborated by Hood, this understanding can be linked ‘to government accounting 
and associated issues of organization, which is linked to the corporate governance strain of thinking 
about ‘transparency’. (...) This is the doctrine that government should operate accounting regimes that 
separate out different kinds of activities specially to make it possible to identify who pays and who 
benefits from particular programmes and measures’ (Hood 2006: 15). This is reflected in the world of 
corporate governance as an obligation ‘to disclose and publish information about themselves’ (ibid: 
17) in an attempt to minimise information asymmetries and prevent insider trading or more generally 
market and corporate failures (ibid.). 
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At some level, they all (perspectives on transparency) translate into some view of 
openness about rules and behaviour, but those to whom they apply – citizens, 
government, organizations – are different, and the underlying doctrines of 
governance that they reflect may be conflicting (Hood 2006: 19, information in 
brackets added for clarification).192  
In the EITI, transparency is the fundamental cornerstone on which the entire 
mechanism centres, as the following quote illustrates: 
A country’s natural resources belong to its people. For too long, (the narrator tells), 
citizens had no way to see how much money their government received from their oil, 
gas or minerals. Lacking this knowledge, they were unable to hold their government 
onto account on how these resource revenues were being used. (...) When these 
figures are being published, citizens can follow the money, they ask questions and 
they can demand improvements. (...) Transparency is a necessary first step and 
informs the public on how the natural resources should be governed and used (EITI 
Video. Information in brackets added for clarification).193 
The centrality of transparency is not only visible in EITI’s name, it is also deeply 
enshrined in the initiatives’ fundamental principles to the extent that the standard can 
be described as an example of ‘governance-by-disclosure initiatives’ (Gupta 2008: 
2). 
We underline the importance of transparency, defined as openness and disclosure of 
activities by governments and companies in the extractive industries and the need to 
enhance public financial management and accountability.194 
We are committed to encouraging high standards of transparency and accountability 
in public life, government operations and in business (EITI Principles, No. 5 and 9).195 
From an analytical point of view, the perspective on transparency invoked by the 
Standard can be described as instrumental/relational, taking a retrospective, events-
                                                                                                                                                  
191 Hood elaborates how from a historical perspective transparency as a concept has already 
accompanied various developments in political thought, ranging from classical theory by Aristotle to 
the writings of Adam Smith, Immanuel Kant, Spinoza and Jeremy Bentham amongst others (Hood 
2006). However, it was in the 1980s that transparency rose back to prominence as cornerstone of 
modern governance. Ann Florini notes, for example, in her introduction to The Right to Know that 
Webster’s (which is an English language dictionary) proclaimed transparency the “Word of the Year” 
for 2003’ (Florini 2007: 2). 
192 Hood notes further that transparency as a ‘pervasive cliché’ is usually invoked neither reflecting on 
the different theoretical approaches towards transparency nor the historical context in which they 
emerged and therefore it produces the effect that ‘much of the allure of transparency as a word and a 
doctrine may lie in its potential to appeal to those with very different, even contradictory, attitudes and 
worldview’s (2006: 19). 
193 Available from: http://eiti.org/eiti/video. 
194 Openness and disclosure are frequently used as synonyms for transparency. Thereby, open is 
assumed as ‘being included for the benefit of the non-specialized reader or listener’ (Heald 2006a: 26) 
while both terms in combination (transparency and openness) could be ‘a linguistic device to 
emphasize the point’ (ibid). Disclosure, on the other hand, appears to denote the same concept in 
what is referred to as ‘the (English) language of accounting’ (ibid.: 27). 
195 Available from: http://eiti.org/eiti/principles. 
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orientated approach. In greater detail, the EITI aims at empowering citizens of 
resource-rich countries and ultimately reducing poverty and inequality by facilitating 
transparent and accountable governance of natural resources (see chapter three). 
As a result, transparency in the EITI is a mean for achieving specific outcomes. This 
translates into an instrumental function as well as a relational aspiration. As Mason 
notes: ‘Transparency in governance is always relational: it is invoked to support 
other, more primary, social purposes and values’ (2008: 9), in this case mainly 
accountability and poverty reduction.  
In addition, this research argues that in the EITI transparency in governance reflects 
core normative liberal values (see Florini, 2007, introductory chapter; Mason 2008: 
9).196 Gupta summarises: ‘Transparency as a moral and political imperative is closely 
associated with goals such as accountable, inclusive, legitimate and democratic 
governance’ (Gupta 2008: 1). In consequence of this liberal perspective, 
transparency at the national level is understood as ‘a right of citizenship’ which is 
’necessary to protect the form of democracy that developed through the twentieth 
century’ (Birkinshaw 2006: 58). This understanding is clearly present in EITI’s 
attempts to improve governance capacities by imposing requirements which aim for 
downwards transparency, so that:  
(...) The ‘ruled’ can observe the conduct, behaviour, and/or ‘results’ of their ‘rulers’. 
The rights of the ruled in relationship to their rulers figure prominently in democratic 
theory and practice, often under the umbrella of ‘accountability’ (Heald 2006a: 27, 
quotation marks in the original).197 
Additionally, and consolidating a line of thought already introduced in chapter four, 
the liberal perspective in discourses on natural resources is predominantly based on 
the idea of sustainable development which advocates that ‘economic growth, 
environmental protection, distributive justice, and long-term sustainability go 
together’ (Dryzek 2005: 157). Essentially, this discourse accepts that Earth’s 
resources are limited while at the same time highlights the right to development and 
                                               
196Note that in the EITI transparency is not understood as core value in itself. Such an interpretation 
would, for example, be the understanding of transparency as basic human right, usually linked to 
Freedom of Information (FOI) as a means to protect ‘individuals against inefficient, oppressive, or 
even bullying government’ (Birkenshaw 2006: 55). This line of argumentation encompasses a 
normative dimension of intrinsic value which is not present in instrumentalist perspectives on 
transparency. 
197 Heald introduces four analytical categorises for the direction of transparency which are upwards, 
downwards, inwards and outwards (2006a: 27-8). 
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the central role economic growth plays in it (for a more detailed elaboration of this 
argument refer back to chapter four). 
Unpacking EITI’s transparency approach further it can be noted that the perspective 
evoked can in Heald’s analytical terms be described as ‘retrospective, event 
transparency’: The category of events, as opposed to processes, ‘represents 
points/states that are externally visible and – at least in principle – measureable’ 
(Heald 2006a: 30). To recall, EITI reports are designed to provide information in form 
of figures or data, they are not designed to shed light on the procedural aspects such 
as terms and conditions of contract negotiations or the internal decision-making 
processes of which these “events” are the result. A retrospective approach ‘allows an 
organization to conduct its business and then, at periodic intervals, to release 
information relevant to its performance, on which assessment will actually or 
potentially be based’ (Heald 2006a: 32).198  
Consequences of this understanding 
Information disclosure as required by EITI implementation does not happen in an a-
historical, neutral context: 
As scholars (...) have long argued, information (including scientific information) is 
neither value-neutral nor universally valid, and thus information alone is not likely to 
resolve normative and political conflicts (Gupta 2008: 5, citing Jasanoff 1990. In 
information in brackets in the original).  
The important follow-up questions therefore are: How much and what kind of 
information should be released, in addition to the critical: Who benefits? Answers to 
both questions reflect on existing power relation. Florini, arguably the most 
prominent voice in academic transparency debates, summarises:  
And because information is related to power, reason is only part of the debate over 
how far disclosure should go and when secrecy should reign. The battle over the 
right to know versus the right to withhold also reflects bitter struggles over existing 
patterns of political and economic privilege (2007: 4).  
This section argues that EITI’s transparency notion has two effects: Firstly, the focus 
on revenue transparency translates in practice into a strong emphasis on data. On 
the one hand, this emphasis re-affirms the value of expertise as capital and on the 
other hand attributes an important function to the validation process further re-
                                               
198 In contrast, a Real-Time approach would mean that ‘internal processes of the organisation are 
continuously liable to disclosure’ (Heald 2006a: 32) which is not the case in EITI implementation. 
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affirming the status of the companies as decisive players in the arena. Secondly, it is 
argued that transparency itself functions as a euphemism shifting the focus of 
attention from responsibilities and power-asymmetries to policies and solutions. 
Moreover, the instrumental approach on transparency in the EITI and natural 
resource governance has led to a focus on payments and cash flows. These, in turn, 
translate in accumulative form into “data” which needs to be collected, organised, 
decoded, interpreted and ultimately translated into useful information. As chapter 
three outlined, the observation that the provided data is difficult to understand and 
only used by a small audience is one of the central deficiencies of EITI 
implementation. The prominent argument is that these reports are too complex and 
technical to be easily accessible by a broad audience. In addition, the sheer volumes 
of some of the reports published might also be interpreted as a strategic move by the 
local EITI process to undermine the effort: the bigger and more complex the reports 
become, the less likely it is that they might be used as intended, as they require a 
vast amount of time and resources to be deciphered in the first place.  
EITI’s Chair Clare Short spoke in the context of the strategy review to an audience of 
EITI members of a ‘danger of proliferation of information’. Her observations 
correspond with findings in the academic literature which highlight a ‘danger of 
drowning in disclosure’ (Gupta 2008: 4).199 In analytical terms, this has been 
described by Heald as difference between nominal and effective transparency, in 
which the gap is called ‘transparency illusion’ (2006: 34). As he argues further: ‘Even 
when transparency appears to be increasing, as measured by some index, the 
reality may be quite different’ (ibid.). EITI’s case proves the point since the 
unprecedented amount of “new” information available does not necessarily makes 
results in the intended outcome, because ‘for transparency to be effective there must 
be receptors capable of processing, digesting, and using the information’ (Heald 
2006a: 35).  
                                               
199 Heald therefore cautions against the “sunlight metaphor”, the general assumption that the more 
transparency the better. He argues for a more considerate balance of the expected benefits of 
transparency against the limits of transparency and potential trade-offs (Heald 2006b: 59ff). However, 
he also elaborates that these trade-offs, such as lack of trust or decrease in efficiency, usually 
become important in organisational structures in which the level of transparency is already relatively 
high. 
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Furthermore, this debate also indicates the importance of EITI’s mechanism for 
assessment, the so-called validation, and the role played by the companies in it. The 
EITI homepage describes the process as follows: 
Validation is EITI's quality assurance mechanism and an essential feature of the EITI 
process. It serves to assess performance and promotes dialogue and learning at the 
country level. It also safeguards the integrity of the EITI by holding all EITI 
implementing countries to the same global standard.200 
In the EITI, candidate countries are required to implement requirements. The results 
need to be presented in a report on which basis the payments made by companies 
and received by governments can been reconciled by an external validator company 
(see chapter three). The validator is selected from an already existing list and 
chosen by EITI’s Secretariat. The company engages with the report and this 
country’s EITI-stakeholder group and examines whether or not a country has met 
EITI requirements (the result is the validation or EITI report). This report is examined 
in greater detail by the Validation Committee, a sub-committee of EITI’s international 
Board, which makes recommendations to the Board. In a second step, the Board 
confirms the recommendation and a country becomes EITI compliant or remains 
candidate. As this brief summary indicates, companies play a vital part in the 
validation process: The external validator is from the business community (although 
not a member of the extractives), e.g. the international stakeholders rely on and pay 
for business expertise in a vital stage of their process.201 In addition, it is important to 
recall that the Validation Committee is composed of and occasionally headed by 
representatives from the company constituency (see also chapter six). Finally, as 
frequently stated, the Board has company representatives as Directors.  
The Validator produces a Validation Report that assesses each of the EITI 
Requirements as requirement met, requirement unmet with meaningful progress, or 
requirement unmet with limited progress. The Validator's report is reviewed by the 
multi-stakeholder group and the EITI Board. The EITI Board will only designate a 
country as EITI Compliant where it concludes that all requirements are met.202 
It is argued that this and the following statements illustrate how the decision of the 
Board is ultimately an assessment of a countries performance, a judgement on 
                                               
200 EITI Validation, available from: https://eiti.org/validation. 
201 Previously, countries were paying for validation. As this practice proved difficult for financial and 
accountability reasons, following the new regulatory framework for 2013, validation is paid for from the 
money for EITI’s international management from the MDTF, out of which’s total budget was in 2014 
funded to 38% by business (see also chapter three).  
202 EITI Validation, available from: https://eiti.org/validation. 
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actions taken and aims achieved against the requirements stipulated by the 
Standard. As Moberg and Rich (Head and Deputy Head of EITI’s Secretariat, see 
chapter three) summarise the challenges associated with EITI implementation in 
their forthcoming book Beyond Governments: Lessons on multi-stakeholder 
governance from the EITI. 
(...) Assessing real political will is a perennial challenge for development initiatives, 
as is finding the balance between encouraging and keeping difficult countries inside 
the tent, and throwing them out (2015: 119).203 
This quote, clearly articulates the political nature of EITI as a governance 
mechanism. It is particularly interesting against the previously outlined discussion on 
how reluctant some of the companies are in acknowledging this dimension (see 
chapter five).  
At this point it is also important to note that company’s performance at the national 
level is only peripherally examined in validation. In fact, the EITI has no explicit 
mechanisms in place for assessing it. Furthermore, there are no consequences for 
companies if they chose not to participate or comply with EITI’s requirements at the 
international level (at the national level this depends on the political will of the 
governments). The fundamental problem is, as Frynas summarises, that ‘the 
initiative does not assign an active role to oil, gas and mining companies in 
improving governance’ (2009: 156). Against the background of the important part 
business plays at the international level of the standard and how enshrined their 
participatory rights are within the institutional design (see chapters five and six), it is 
interesting to observe that their overall contribution remains on a voluntary basis 
which provides them with an enormous amount of bargaining power, a fact that is 
tacitly acknowledged by the other stakeholders as will be illustrated in the next 
section. Instead of addressing responsibilities and making explicit demands for 
contribution, there is a much more general plea for a self-serving participation and 
advocacy on a voluntary basis, epitomised by the following quote: 
That’s why when we engage with companies in the EITI, we say to them: You know it’s 
not enough for you to say we comply with whatever the rule in x is... you have to go out 
there and proactively say: We value the EITI, we stand for the EITI, we have strong 
preference for operating in an environment that is transparent. Because by simply 
                                               
203 At the time of fieldwork, only one chapter has been made available by the authors at EITI’s 
Homepage. The book’s insights, although presumably very helpful for this project, could therefore not 
be included. At the time of writing, the title was forthcoming for summer 2015. 
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saying that under the umbrella of a multistakeholder-effort like the EITI, you are not 
taking a huge risk and you are sending an important message. 
     (Company constituency interview, 31 October 2012) 
In summary, this section argued that the decisive role played by companies and the 
low level of responsibilities attributed to them corresponds to the portrayal of 
companies as positive, responsible and exceptional agents elaborated in chapter 
four, and demonstrates their privileged status in the Standard. 
Moreover, it is widely acknowledged that corruption is a form of dishonest conduct by 
people in power for personal profit. As abuse of power, it is in the majority of 
countries morally condemned and at the same time prosecuted as violating the law. 
The term corruption transports strong negative connotations. At the same time in 
discussions on corruption identifying the perpetrators and addressing responsibilities 
feature prominently. Building on elaborations in chapter three, it can be recalled that 
the initial impetus behind the PWYP-campaign called for disclosure by companies 
based on empirical evidence stressing the complicity of companies in corruption and 
mismanagement. Inherent in this earlier debate was an acknowledgement of existing 
power asymmetries between countries and companies which open up opportunities 
for abuse, in addition to the recognition of the potential for fundamental clashes of 
interests. In contrast to the notion of corruption, the concept of transparency, linked 
to a liberal perspective, is associated with more positive outcomes, such as freedom 
and accountability. The opposite of transparency is opacity which, as it is argued 
here, is a mere description of a status or condition without necessarily including 
moral judgement. This corresponds with a general tendency to depict negative 
consequences associated with natural resource extraction in a-political terms as 
problems of administrative and managerial nature. In chapter four it was illustrated 
how underlying shared beliefs placed the burden of the problem on the shoulders of 
resource-rich countries, thereby reducing the problem assessment to a lack of 
capacity, what Mason (2008: 9) calls “functionalist concerns” of effectiveness and 
efficiency. This tendency can further be observed in the framing of the problem and 
the general debate, for example: ‘Extraction of these resources can lead to economic 
growth and social development. However, when poorly managed it has too often 
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lead to corruption and even conflict’ (EITI Homepage, emphasis added).204 Thus, 
transparency as a euphemism becomes a ‘synonym for absence of corruption’ also 
‘thought of as a solution or vaccine against corruption’ (Henriques 2007: 137, cited in 
Frynas 2009: 141).  
It is argued here that the instrumental and downwards looking perspective on 
transparency also signals that the initial focus on the complicity of companies in 
abuses of power has clearly been lost over the course of EITI’s development despite 
the fact that the potential for conflict between the “partners” still exists as the 
following quotes illustrates:  
If you say: Well, I believe that transparency can lead to better accountability and 
better management of this resources benefitting people, somewhere in there, of 
course, there is a clash of interests: Clearly the interest of the companies is to 
maximise their profits and clearly it’s in the interest of the countries to both gain a 
bigger slice of these profits and then of course the other issue is sharing this wealth 
within the country. (...) and although the clash of interests between countries and 
companies is rarely explicitly discussed, it’s clearly there.  
    (EITI Chair interview, 16 April 2013) 
The EITI video explicitly highlights company’s positive contribution to the process as 
well as the potential benefits for business to participate:  
(The narrator’s voice:) Working together, creates understanding and reduces 
accusations of wrong-doing. (John Deah, President of the Liberian Timber 
Association elaborates further): ‘At first, even if the companies are paying their taxes 
and governments are not doing what they are supposed to do in the communities, 
they jump on the companies. So we were at loggerheads. But since the presence of 
LEITI that has been put to rest’.205 
Clearly, the general focus of the debate which originally targeting the opaque 
business practices of extractive industries with the PWYP campaign has shifted from 
a focus on the industry to a much broader on resource-rich countries (see chapter 
three). In addition, it is interesting to note that despite mentioned problems regarding 
inclusion and legitimacy of the process, a substantial part of EITI’s Strategy review 
focused on solving problems regarding data, e.g. efficiency and effectiveness. These 
findings consolidate the observation that expertise is a fundamental form of capital 
for the EITI, and also strengthened previous observations about the disadvantages 
for less well resourced stakeholders from resource-rich.  
                                               
204 Available from: https://eiti.org/eiti. 
205 EITI Video, available from: http://eiti.org/eiti/video. 
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Formerly, the implicit disadvantage against public actors from resource-rich countries 
manifests in a variety of ways within the process: primarily in the fact that the 
Standard has been designed as an implementing task for governments: the 
government has to take the initiative and sign-up for the EITI and implementation 
costs are paid by them.206 Additional principles of the Standard, however, in 
tendency also favour the business partners. The standardisation of requirements 
which affects all resource-rich countries (and their national-companies) can be 
interpreted as contributing towards the establishment of the level playing field 
companies are constantly arguing for. Multi-stakeholderism, voluntariness and 
inclusiveness combined provide an ideal background in which the participatory 
status is not compulsory, responsibilities can be spread amongst various actors and 
actions and practices can be legitimised via reference to pluralist democratic 
arguments.207 As the BP Homepage states: 
We believe the comprehensive, multi-stakeholder approach of EITI is the best 
approach for the extractive industries. The EITI is an inclusive process, involving 
governments, civil society and companies, that is tailored to fit the local, fiscal and 
legal regimes. 
(BP Homepage, cited in EITI Business Guide 2013: 10) 
In fact, however, it is precisely the balance of the Board where the powerful status of 
the companies is reflected, as stated by EITI’s Chair (Interview, 16 April 2013), a 
Board in which the business community has been allocated six representatives (five 
for the extractive and one seat for investors), whereas the implementing countries 
and civil society both have five representatives. 
7.2. Privileges enshrined in procedures 
Next to the concrete principles on which the Standard rests, it is also the more 
informal rules and procedures under which the EITI operates at the international 
level which have a tendency to privilege business and disadvantage stakeholders 
from resource-rich countries. The following sections elaborate on the more directly 
observable consequences of corporate power with reference to the consensus 
decision-making principle and the role of informal procedures. 
 
                                               
206 However, they can apply for assistance at the international financial institutions or the MDTF 
207 See pluralist arguments on PPPs legitimacy discussed in Schäferhoff et al. (2009). 
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The role of informal politics and hands-on expertise 
This section focuses on the more informal politics and procedures of the EITI and is 
based on evidence gathered through participant observation and the interview 
process. Following up a line of thought already suggested in the previous chapter, it 
is argued that these informal processes require substantial investment of capital and 
in consequence have a tendency to reinforce and perpetuate the disadvantage of 
agents form resource-rich countries while favouring actors from “industrialised” or 
“Western” countries. With reference to this aspect it could be argue that the EITI 
does not seem to differ much from any other international organisation or institution. 
However, it is at these occasions – such as informal chats over the coffee table – 
were the resources or forms of capital of some of the individual corporate 
representative, as discussed in chapters five and six, play a vital role for making 
them not only influential actors, but additionally, for becoming members of EITI’s 
“inner-circle” at the international level.  
Akin to many other governance processes, a big part of the decision-making in the 
EITI takes place outside the actual Board meetings. This is primarily a matter of 
practicality for an international mechanism in which the Board only meet several 
times a year for a few days and which aims at reaching a decision by consensus. 
Important decisions are supposed to be decided at the Board table. Against this 
background it is helpful to know that within the EITI, a particular type of 
communication document, the Board Circulars can reach decision-making status if 
not objected after a communicated deadline has passed. These documents are 
circulated amongst Board Members prior to or in-between Board sessions.  
The building-up to a consensus takes place through informal communication 
channels such as conference calls, emails or in private conversations in corridors, 
meetings at other events and over lunch. A practice which is generally supported 
and actively promoted by the Secretariat against the background of the diversity of 
players involved: 
If you have the big row over the Board table than something went wrong. You need 
to work-out different positions with bi-lateral discussions, with committee phone calls 
either over telephone or bringing people together outside of the meetings, just to 
keep get on (...) where people can come to the Board without threatening to walk out. 
(...) It’s one of the lessons I learned: try to avoid a big buzz stop at the Board 
meetings at all costs. One of the key lessons is the importance (of) when meetings 
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have enough social events around them. Whether it be visiting a mine or receptions 
(...) where people are basically locked in the same room in a non-formal environment 
and you just bring people together and say: ‘Right, what are you gonna be saying 
tomorrow? How are we gonna work to bring this to a conclusion? 
     (Secretariat interview, 14 November 2012) 
This practice evidently gives the international Secretariat of the EITI an important 
role in facilitating a consensus which was particularly visible in the strategy review 
process as it was the Secretariat which in between meetings would interpret 
discussions and based on that re-draft proposals for the new edition of the rules (for 
the role of the Secretariat, see also chapter three). 
There is, however, additional evidence suggesting that an important part in these 
procedures is played by an elite or “inner circle” at the international level of the EITI 
which is composed of representatives from all constituencies and some members of 
the Secretariat.208 These individuals play a vital part in facilitating agreements and 
break-troughs, are members of the Board or Secretariat and share the characteristic 
that they have acquired a substantial amount of EITI-related expertise, e.g. cultural 
capital, on the process. This corresponds with Bourdieu’s expectation of the most 
dominant players in the field holding a specific context-related form of capital. Hence, 
this acquisitions of expertise is obviously build on the substantial investment of 
economic capital, required amongst other things for actual participation, in addition to 
cultural and social capital for interpreting and addressing the issues discussed. 
Corresponding to the findings in chapters five and six, a significant number of them 
are members of the corporate constituency. In comparison, fewer members are from 
the implementing countries. 
This argument can be illustrated by the following observations: Despite some 
controversy, the 22nd Oslo Meeting reached an informal consensus regarding the 
inclusion of project-level-reporting as an encouraged requirement at the very last 
minute of the last day of the meeting. Apparently, despite the initial blockage of the 
                                               
208 Against the background of this project’s focus on business actors and due to restricted resources, 
it was not possible to access and assess these informal networks and the ways by which they 
influence decision-making in a more systematic and comprehensive way as, for instance, a classical 
network-analysis might have offered (which, given his empirical work, would presumably have been 
Bourdieu’s choice of method in this case). However, these networks clearly play an important role and 
it can be assumed that in future research such an analysis might provide fascinating additional 
insights complementing the existing body of work on elite networks in international governance 
processes (see Useem 1984; Sklair 2001; and particularly in IR, studies on “epistemic communities” 
Haas 1992). 
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company constituency, the consensus has been agreed on over the lunch break. It 
was later communicated at the Board Table in a statement by the Secretariat, much 
to the surprise of some of the observers in the audience. What could not have been 
agreed upon in an open and transparent discussion at the Board table became 
possible through more informal procedures, obviously facilitated by individual 
endeavour. This is not to suggest that this network has been consciously established 
to dominate the EITI process, rather that its existence has important repercussions 
for EITI’s diversity and inclusiveness. 
I completely see this (the inner circle) as problematic. For example, (...) look at the 
composition of each constituency: because for the companies, it’s all white people 
from the “North”, there is actually no southern representative at the Board. 
    (Civil society constituency interview, 30 October 2012) 
As the following statement illustrates, ultimately, this circles’ existence further 
enhances the already existing disadvantages for representatives from resource-rich 
countries. 
The consensus principle 
The decision-making process at EITI’s international Board follows a consensus 
principle, despite the fact that the rules do include a voting-mechanism (see chapter 
3).209 In practice the preference for reaching decision by consensus goes to a point 
in which this vote has actually never been evoked. In general it can be stated, that 
members of the Board associated the principle with inclusiveness and collaboration, 
it is interpreted as far less confrontation than voting:  
The philosophy was: you want a Board that like a corporate Board is a mix of people 
who ultimately have the interest of the collective at heart. It’s not like the UN were 
everyone is fighting, it shouldn’t be anyway, where everyone is fighting for a very 
narrow interest and seeking alliances with people who may be able to support them 
on their specific thing (...) so if you had a vote system, you would have these 
alliances and it would be frankly quite dysfunctional. 
 
(Company constituency interview, 31 October 2012) 
                                               
209 This is interestingly from a Bourdieusian perspective, who presumably would interpret it as an 
evident case of a successful doxic battle, none of the interview partners remembered who actually 
proposed or promoted the consensus principles. The only thing that became evident is that is has 
been debated at the time of the IAG. Given the fact that the principle has been favoured in British 
committees and, as was pointed out the British Cabinet rarely votes, it can be speculated that the 
introduction of consensus might also be due to the involvement of the British government and in fact a 
number of other British-based agents at the time of EITI’s inception (see chapter three). 
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You see, everybody has got a reason to be at the table (...) if you get to the situation 
where you had to vote than trust has already been lost, its build on the idea that 
these guys have to trust each other. 
      (Secretariat interview, 14 November 2012) 
 
In the EITI, the acknowledgement of a tacit commitment to consensus allows the 
principle to perform the function of a safety net reflecting the inclusive and multi-
stakeholder-based nature of the Standard and thus providing legitimacy to the 
decisions taken. This shines through in some of the statements, for instance: 
Does it work? (the consensus principle), I think so. I think it avoids the kind of 
politicking that might happened, if there were more strict voting, were I think you 
would end up seeing companies and civil society fighting for the government votes, 
so the governments would often be stuck in the middle of these things which I don’t 
think would help anyone. 
 
(Civil society constituency interview, 31 Mai 2012, information in brackets added for 
clarification) 
 
As in similar committees, a very important role is thereby played by EITI’s Chair of 
the Board for facilitating the dialogue and in crafting the consensus. However, 
against the background of EITI’s unevenly equipped partners, the principle becomes 
a tool for re-establishing a privilege and disadvantages, as illustrated by this 
statement:  
They (the companies) have very bright, hard working people who attend all the 
details, read the papers, scrutinise all the proposals and only agree to something 
proposed that they have got right. (...) And because this thing has to be agreed upon 
by consensus, they are a powerful force.  
(EITI Chair interview, 16 April 2013, content in brackets added for clarification) 
Thus, the EITI can serve as illustrations for problems which arise in consensus-
based political processes: a) the potential for block by a fraction of the partners, b) 
the slow pace of the decision-making process, and c) the reaching of agreements on 
the least common denominator, with all three factors leading to a sense of frustration 
amongst the involved participants.  
This downside was directly observable in discussions on project-level-reporting and 
contract transparency at the 22nd EITI Board meeting which took place in Oslo, 
Norway, from 26-27 February 2013 (see chapter two for information on the 
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fieldwork). Already in the run-up it was evident that this meeting would be important, 
as a number of issues where on the table. Regular topics on the agenda include 
reports from the Secretariat and committees, the constituency meetings, and 
decisions that need to be made about the validation process in several implementing 
countries. However, this was the last Board meeting prior to the Global Conference 
in Sydney (which was due to take place in May, see chapter three for a timeline on 
EITI’s evolution). The Board needed to agree on a new version of the EITI rules for 
implementation and thus bring the strategy review process to a conclusion. As a 
consequence of the heated discussion at the previous Board meeting, in Lusaka, 
Zambia, however, the two most controversial issues, the inclusion of requirements 
for project-level reporting (proposal 9) and contract-transparency (proposal 18), were 
still to be discussed and agreed upon. At the same time it was evident for everyone 
attending the meeting that the initial positions – civil society calling for both principles 
to become mandatory requirements while companies arguing for leaving them out or 
at most make them “encouraged” requirements – remained unchanged.  
In discussions over the coffee table and in corridors people observed that at this 
point of the process it was clear that both principles would sooner or later have to be 
incorporated into the Standard as the issues were “on the table” and already legally 
required in the US following the Dodd-Frank legislation. It was also generally 
assumed that the Chair, Clare Short, would opt for a strategy which would prioritise 
the non-controversial issues on the agenda leaving the expected heated discussions 
for late afternoons or before-lunch-slots in an attempt to limit the time available for 
the controversy to come into full display again (a strategy which only partially played 
out). However, the cautious approach by corporate members, particularly from the oil 
and gas companies (see chapter six for further information) who argued that for 
“practicality and complexity” reasons these principles should not be made a 
mandatory requirement did not seem to evoke much sympathy from other 
participants. It was frequently argued that the Board should agree to include them as 
requirements and then discuss the details later. The corporate representatives made 
the statement that unless the requirements were elaborated in greater detail, and in 
explicit reference to Dodd-Frank and the EU Transparency Directives (which seemed 
to be of particular importance for these companies’ legal departments), they could 
not agree and therefore a “consensus was missing” as highlighted by one 
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representative from the sector. However, as already noted they later made the 
concession to “stand-aside” if the Board decided to make project-level reporting an 
encourage requirement. In result of this strategy, the Board agreed to include 
project-level-reporting as “encouraged” rather than “mandatory” requirement for the 
EITI Rules 2013. With regard to the topic of contract transparency the minutes state: 
‘The international oil and gas company representatives to not support suggestions to 
address contract transparency within the EITI’ (EITI Minutes 22nd Board meeting 
2013: 10). 
This example confirmes the already mentioned potentially problematic 
consequences of the consensus principle and illustrates what civil society 
participants generally described on several occasions as the “slow pace” of EITI’s 
decision-making process (calling it “frustrating” and thus implicitly posing questions 
of effectiveness and efficiency). On the positive-side, and in theory, the consensus 
principle can be of tremendous value for less-privileged groups or minorities as it 
guarantees that no other party can simply overrule them via majority vote. In the 
practice of the EITI Board during the strategy review the principle became an 
instrument for the already privileged to keep the evolution of the process confined. 
Disadvantages facing representatives from resource-rich countries 
This section elaborates on the disadvantages for representatives from resource-rich 
countries to illustrate more broadly how the informal rules and procedures listed 
above have a tendency to re-produce and thus re-establish different standings of the 
players involved. These findings stand in contrast to the principles of inclusiveness 
and transparency which are central to EITI’s self-image and severely undermine the 
impetus on empowerment for local communities and civil society. 
A significant number of representatives from resource-rich countries find it difficult to 
participate and contribute to the standard at the international level due to a lack of 
social, educational and financial resources, e.g. social, cultural and economic capital 
(for problems in participation at the national level, refer back to chapter three). The 
financial aspect of this problem is easily illustrated, starting with the money required 
to pay for the visa, flight and accommodation; for acquiring suitcases for travel and a 
wardrobe suited for an international conference in the winter months in Norway while 
for instance travelling from an African country which only has a rainy season; to the 
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pocket money required for placing international phone calls and accessing the 
internet; meeting up with other participants in bars and restaurants in an expensive 
city like Oslo or simply using public transport. Despite financial support from EITI’s 
international Secretariat, this aspect is not only problematic for representatives from 
civil society but accounts in general for representatives from resource-rich countries, 
as was indicated by various insiders, and could directly be observed in practice. A 
number of occasions were mentioned, such as dinner parties, in which participants 
were expected to pay individually and which brought representatives from resource-
rich countries in quite an uncomfortable situation, and the problem more strongly at 
the forefront. At the actual Board meetings, for example, individuals representing 
resource-rich countries civil society are easily recognisable due to their more casual 
outfits in contrast to the uniformity of the business suits worn by government and 
corporate representatives. 
The inclusion of local civil society representative at the international level is further 
problematic due to often existing language barriers. Although the EITI provides 
simultaneous interpretation in French and Spanish at the official discussions, this 
obviously becomes a problem on the corridors, during lunch and tea breaks. The 
language barrier makes entering a casual chat rather difficult while at the same time 
slowing the conversation down and making it less personal once an interpreter is 
involved: 
My personal experience with the process is not much (...) well on the one hand it’s 
interesting because you get to meet a lot of fascinating people, all the travels, etc., 
but on the other hand there is one aspect that I do not like which is the fact that as I 
don’t speak English (although I speak French). The main conversations are not 
taking place in a language I command fluently. This severely limits my options (...), I 
feel like I can only express half of the things I would like to say. This is my basic 
problem but it might also account for the fact my region doesn’t have a bigger 
representation and impact in the initiative in general. 
(Civil society constituency interview, 27 February 2013, translated by the interviewer)  
This factor is further deepened by the existing differences in expertise and 
knowledge regarding the extraction process and the finer details of the EITI 
Standard. Staying up-to-date on the discussion and developments not only at the 
international level (details which sometimes have quite a legalistic or technical 
nature), but also taking into account various country-level perspectives, requires a 
particular analytical skills and experience, e.g. expertise as cultural capital. In 
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addition, a supporting infrastructure such as simply a reliable and speedy internet 
and phone connection to participate in conference calls are essential. As noted by an 
interview partner, the technical and legal complexity of some of the issues discussed 
appear to be particularly problematic for government officials from implementing 
countries which simply ‘have other jobs’ and therefore ‘very rarely say anything in the 
discussions’ (Civil society constituency interview, 9 August 2012).  
In the fieldwork, these discrepancies in resources and the diversity of challenges 
faced by individual representatives could be directly observed at the 22nd Oslo Board 
meeting. For example, Hannah Owusu-Koranteng representing Wassa Association 
of Communities Affected by Mining (WACAM),210 a civil society organisation in 
Ghana, made an attempt to illustrate the everyday problems of local communities. 
She described that the region in which she lives, and which apparently has an 
operating mine in close proximity, was affected by a power breakdown which took 
almost two month to resolve after a heavy winter storm (this example also illustrated 
how the infrastructural improvements required for resource extraction, in this case 
energy supply for mining operations, have not been extended to benefit the local 
communities). The next conference day, however, in a different discussion, Statoil’s 
representative Baiba Rubesa indicated that she would be happy to support a 
particular issue by making ‘one of our lawyers available’ to implementing country’s 
representatives should legal expertise be required. 
A representative from international civil society described what the person had 
labelled the “two-speed problem” thereby referring to the fact that particular verbal 
and non-verbal processes, such as travels and communications, tend to require 
much more time in countries with less developed infrastructure than in highly 
industrialised ones where responding to an email after 24 hours is often already 
regarded as impolite. In an environment of informal decision-making as described 
further above which already is lead by a handful of insiders this factor further 
deepens existing mechanisms of exclusion and is very difficult to overcome: 
Inclusion is a huge issue. One dynamic which you see and which is very powerful 
and problematic is what I call the two-speed problem. People based in the West with 
good internet connections and a familiarity with this kind of discourse communicate 
                                               
210 At the time of fieldwork WACAM was not represented by an official homepage, which further 
illustrates the argument made. At the time of writing, the following homepage was available from: 
http://www.wacamgh.com/index.php?launch=page&name=about.  
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much more rapidly and much more fluently with each other than people from the 
developing world, whether it’s government, civil society or whatever. So the 
discussion will sometimes move very, very fast, because it’s going on, you know, 
informally amongst the people based in the “West”. And then for people based in the 
developing countries, it’s just much harder for them to catch up. And it’s not just 
communication, there are also some subtle linguistic barriers. And so there is a 
constant tension between the desire to be inclusive and the desire (...) or the idea to 
move ahead and take decisions. 
    (Civil society constituency interview, 9 August 2012) 
Another example for more subtle problems of inclusion linked to the availability of 
expertise as capital in the process is the acceptance and acknowledgement of the 
consensus principle: Not recognising the tacit rule of the consensus principle makes 
individuals from resource-rich countries automatically identifiable as not being part of 
EITI’s inner family and thus signals that they are generally less influential in the 
process. To illustrate this: At the second day of the already frequently mentioned 
22nd Oslo Board Member meeting, it became evident during the discussion that the 
majority of participants were in favour of an inclusion of contract transparency as 
mandatory requirement for EITI. This position was opposed by the company 
constituency and some members of implementing countries (a debate already 
mentioned in the previous section). In the midst of a heated discussion on the topic, 
a civil society Board member from a non-English speaking implementing country 
suggested a formal vote on the subject as it was clear that mainly the company 
constituency was blocking the requirement from adaption. As stated in chapter three, 
technically, there is a majority voting-mechanism in place. People at the Board table 
politely ignored the preposition with no intention to follow it up and the session was 
soon afterwards closed by the Chair. 
Actions taken by the Secretariat, such as the fact that civil society representatives do 
have the right to request that their mobile phones cost are covered or ask for a 
package of the distributed documents to be handed to them prior to the meeting by 
the Secretariat instead of having to print them out by themselves, are therefore only 
a small contribution towards greater inclusion: 
We give them considerable allowance (particularly for communication), but it hasn’t 
solve the problem obviously. I mean, these are bigger problems than just financial. 
It’s a fair point. Communication challenges, the language, the day time jobs some of 
these people have, the capacity that some of the Board members, some have teams 
working on positions and Board papers where other people are just coming by 
themselves (...) people are coming from a whole host of different backgrounds and 
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facing different challenges; there is different seniorities, different confidence, different 
languages, I mean (...) it’s not a level playing field. People don’t come to the table 
levelled, we try to level out, but (...) our interest is making sure that the representation 
is fair and making sure that people outside the Board meeting feel that they have a 
voice at the Board table either through submissions or through their Board 
representatives, making their constituency work, making sure that people are not just 
shooting from the hip or stating their own positions, it’s really important. 
     (Secretariat interview, 14 November 2012) 
While it is without a doubt a fascinating fact of the EITI that it brings representatives 
from small local communities at the same table as representatives from the largest 
internationally operating corporations, the practice comes with tremendous problems 
attached for a process which such unequal partners. While it promotes dialogue and 
enables the process in the first place, it brings at the same time the existing 
distinctions between participants to the forefront. Therefore, this section argues that 
the Board practice constantly re-produces the existing differences in capital and 
standard between the players. The dynamics of inclusion and exclusion become 
further problematic if it is recalled that countries from Asia and Latin America are 
generally underrepresented at the international stage of the EITI, as are state-owned 
companies from non-Western countries (see chapters three and five).  
A worthwhile game and a recognised status 
While the strategy review was on the way, two external events had a tremendous 
impact on the effort. In what some of my interview partners saw as an accumulation 
of several contributing factors the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
approved the Dodd-Frank Financial Reform and Consumer Protection Act in July 
2010, including section 1504, or the Cardin-Lugar Amendment.211 Section 1504 calls 
for detailed mandatory disclosure of resource revenues of companies at a project 
level basis. At the same time, the EU was undertaking similar steps by revising their 
Accounting and Transparency Directives (passed in April 2013).212 These mandatory 
                                               
211 Two explanatory facts that have come up in the interview process: Firstly, the financial crisis which 
demonstrated how much opaque business operations can damage the public even in industrialised 
countries and well-established democracies. Secondly, the devastating consequences of the BP oil 
spill in the Gulf of Mexico followed by public revelation on the ways by which extractive companies 
and industries associations had up until then successfully lobbied the US Environmental Protection 
Agency to prevent more rigorous environmental regulation. 
212 As the Guardian summarises: ‘Under the new EU laws, European companies are obliged to report 
payments of more than €100,000 (£85,000) made to the government in the country in which they 
operate, including taxes levied on their income, production or profits, royalties, and licence fees. 
Companies have to disclose the payments they make at project level as opposed to just government 
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disclosure legislation came as a big shock, particularly for the oil companies, and 
their strong opposition epitomised in a lawsuit filed by the American Petroleum 
Institute (API) the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, the 
Independent Petroleum Association of America and the National Foreign Trade 
Council against the SEC in October 2011 (this topic has already been discussed in 
chapters three and five). 
The oil companies at the EITI Board as members of the API and supporter of the 
lawsuit found themselves in the uncomfortable position of fighting mandatory 
legislation legally in the US while at the same time working on an improved voluntary 
international regulatory framework in the EITI. A position they understood as 
perfectly reasonable arguing that Dodd Frank undermines a global level playing field 
by making mandatory disclosure only a requirement for US-listed companies, and 
highlighting several implementation costs of the bill as detrimental for their 
competitiveness. At the same time, the companies publically affirmed their 
commitment to voluntary global disclosure rules agreed upon by consensus. In fact, 
their EITI contribution was highlighted as one of the reasons why stronger national 
legislation like Dodd Frank is actually unhelpful and unnecessary as this pioneering 
and global effort in form of the EITI Standard has already been established.213 In 
reaction, civil society, particularly the US-based members of the PWYP Campaign 
interpreted this parallel strategy as “hypocrisy”. For them it became quite obvious 
that part of the business community in fact strongly opposed attempts for more rigid 
national regulation and mandatory disclosure, thereby undermining the entire effort 
of the coalition while at the same time using their participation in the EITI process as 
a legitimising strategy against stronger regulation. 
In the run-up to the 21st international EITI Board Member Meeting, which was due to 
take place in Lusaka, Zambia, on the 25-26 October 2012, it became clear that a 
controversy between the civil society constituency and the oil companies seemed 
inevitable.  
                                                                                                                                                  
level, revealing the sources of taxable government income from the extraction or logging sectors. An 
oil company working in Nigeria, for example, will need to disclose the royalties paid to the Nigerian 
government relating to every project it operates in that country.’ (June 2013). 
213 See these arguments in greater detail in an article in The Oil and Gas Journal (2012). Available 
from:http://www.ogj.com/articles/2012/10/api-others-sue-sec-over-dodd-frank-payment-disclosure-
rule.html. 
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A week before the meeting PWYP-US called upon the companies in a statement to: 
1. Make public their position on the lawsuit to overturn United States transparency 
law and regulations, and make clear whether they are formally backing the 
lawsuit. PWYP US will consider the non-publication of a position to constitute 
support of the lawsuit. 
2. Make public their positions on the specific proposals for improvements to the EITI 
standard under negotiation within the EITI Strategy review Process. Oil 
companies involved in the EITI standard negotiations have yet to make public 
their proposals, analysis or positions on specific standard improvements, such as 
project-by-project reporting, or contract and licensing transparency (PWYP-US 
Press Release, 2012).214  
 
As the civil society deadline approached and no public statement on behalf of the 
companies was released215, the coalition at one point discussed if they should 
actively demand the oil companies to step down from the EITI Board at the 
upcoming Lusaka meeting. It was evident, that Lusaka would prove to be a very 
tense meeting, arguably the most controversial in the history of the EITI yet. 216 
After the meeting took place, a few points were interesting to observe. Firstly, the oil 
companies did not give in to the demands of civil society (no public statement of 
dissociation was issued, no strategy revealed), in addition they remained on the 
Board. Secondly, the EITI strategy review process was still ongoing. Oil companies 
had managed to stop the initiative from including requirements such as contract 
transparency and project-level-reporting into the new version of the rules. Civil 
society, on the other hand, regarded it already as a partial achievement that these 
issues were still on the table. Thirdly, the voices and public statements became 
much more conciliatory although still acknowledging the controversy. A Global 
Witness press release for instance from 30 October 2012 is titled: ‘EITI Makes 
Partial Progress Despite Big Oil’s Resistance to Contract and Project Level 
Disclosure’.217 The Board meeting minutes however, although mentioning Global 
Witness public plea to the oil companies to disassociate themselves from the lawsuit 
                                               
214 Available from:  http://www.pwypusa.org/node/162. 
215 After substantial pressure from civil society, and a few months following this controversy, Statoil, 
the Norwegian publically-owned oil company indeed distanced itself from the API lawsuit in a letter to 
Global Witness: ‘Statoil has not supported the lawsuit initiated by API; in fact, Statoil has explicitly 
withheld support for the litigation’ (see Global Witness Press Release 2013.) 
216 Ultimately this was considered too drastic by the European wing of the PWYP Coalition. From a 
strategic point of view it seemed to make more sense to directly confront them and demand changes 
at the Board table (Civil society constituency interview, 30 October 2012). 
217 Available from: http://www.globalwitness.org/library/eiti-makes-partial-progress-despite-big-oil-
resistance-contract-and-project-level-disclosure.  
216 
on p. 7, only states further that there was a debate, for instance on the issue of 
contract transparency but without explicitly mentioning the participants: ‘Some Board 
members noted the need to respect confidentiality clauses, in particular in production 
sharing agreements and preferred that EITI should avoid any reference to contract 
transparency. Others saw contract transparency as part and parcel of resource 
transparency: contract transparency was needed in order to value revenues’ (EITI 
Minutes of the 21st Board Meeting 2012: 11). 
This incident serves as a fascinating example for the extraordinary resilience of 
EITI’s institutional structure even in incidents of conflict which, as it is argued, 
indicates a tacit recognition by the stakeholder of EITI’s value. This interpretation 
was shared by interview partners suggesting that this situation could best be 
explained by the fact that apparently all partners still have enough to gain to keep 
engaging and participating in the EITI. Recalling our classroom example of the 
rebellious student presented in chapter two, an analogy can be made with the 
actions of civil society in this incident: Members from international civil society 
recognised the company’s influence at EITI’s Board and attempted to challenge it by 
speaking up at the Board table as well as through public shaming, as exemplified by 
the press releases. However, they did so clearly with the intension to influence the 
company constituency, not to jeopardise EITI.218 This highlights how non expandable 
the participation of the companies have become, even if they are slowing the 
process down or blocking evolution altogether. None of the actors involved contested 
the legitimacy of the process or the rules by which the game is played to a degree 
which would threaten the entire effort. Following Bourdieu, this engagement already 
confirms the effectiveness of the structure and the recognition of the company’s 
status as legitimate and privileged, in his language, this would be an example of 
“doxic subordination” (see chapter two). In contrast, note the extraordinary stance by 
the oil company Board members who insisted on their position without hesitation 
while at the same time taking into account that the tensions might seriously damage 
EITI’s international reputation. This makes sense against a background of symbolic 
authority based on political capital and a legitimised status based on shared beliefs 
                                               
218 In a comparable situation, and in contrast to the example further above, Global Witness publically 
withdrew from the Kimberley Process in 2011. Press release available from: 
http://www.globalwitness.org/library/why-we-are-leaving-kimberley-process-message-global-witness-
founding-director-charmian-gooch. 
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which established them as positive, responsible and extraordinary members in the 
first place (see chapters six and four respectivly). 
From this example can be further deduced that it is international civil society and 
MNCs which can be regarded as the major protagonists at EITI’s international level. 
A conclusion which was frequently confirmed throughout the interview process and 
here exemplified by the following statements:  
From my point of view it’s clearly civil society (which benefits the most from the EITI). 
If you compare the actions of the various stakeholders it is clear that it’s civil society 
which pushes for change and carries the torch whereas the corporations are 
engaged in making sure the process progresses as slowly as possible. The 
governments are caught in the middle. 
(Civil society constituency, interview, 27 February 2013, content in brackets added 
for clarification) 
This also confirms the findings which suggest that the most important form of capital 
in the EITI is cultural, e.g. context-specific expertise. In addition, it more generally 
illustrates how much an influential position is tight to the availability of various forms 
of capital: 
With such a combination of sources there is a danger that the most resourceful and 
organised become dominant. So you see in some of the Northern NGOs who have 
full-time very clever stuff, they can be sort of dominant and speak for the whole civil-
society (...). Similarly the companies employ former diplomats; (...) very competent 
people who are very methodical and busy. (...) And some of the representatives of 
governments they have got millions things to do and are less concerned with the 
details when there are different drafts or proposal and so it’s called multi-stakeholder 
but some of the partners are better resourced and then become too dominant and 
there is a risk of it becoming unbalanced. 
(EITI Chair interview, 16 April 2014) 
 
7.3. Companies’ influence in the strategy review process 
In 2010, following the initial 3-4 years of EITI’s operation, the necessity to agree on a 
strategic direction for the upcoming years became apparent in order for EITI to meet 
its objectives. Feedback from the experiences with EITI implementation process in 
candidate countries suggest the importance of a revision of the rules while the 
Scanteam Evolution Report (2011) pointed out existing weaknesses, most 
importantly the lack of impact at the societal level, and made suggestions regarding 
EITI’s future (see also chapter three). Against this background, the Board 
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commanded a strategy review process which was supposed to take place over the 
course of two years guided by EITI’s newly-appointed Chair Clare Short.  
This process led to the establishment of a Strategy Review Working Group (SWG) 
which was mandated to ‘supervise a process that will enable the Board of EITI to 
examine options and make recommendations regarding the strategic direction of the 
EITI (EITI Board Paper 2011: 21, Annex 1). Main tasks included the revision of EITI’s 
principles, criteria and scope; the system of assessment; EITI reports usage and 
communication, technical assistance provision, governance and organisation; and 
potential synergies with other governance reform programmes (ibid.). In addition, the 
Secretariat called out for an open consultation process amongst EITI members on 
the direction of the EITI and suggestions for improvement. 
The SWG consisted of 21 members including the Chair out of which three 
represented implementing or resource-rich countries; four supporting or donor 
countries; four civil society; two World Bank and seven companies and investors. 
The scope of SWG’s mandate as described above signals that participation in this 
group required a profound engagement with the Standard which includes: time for 
preparation and organization of resulting meetings; labour and knowledge in form of 
reading and interpreting proposals and drafting recommendations; communication 
and negotiation skills for active and effective participation; financial resources which 
supports engagement through technological devices or covering travel expenses, 
etc...; all of this, importantly, on top of the already existing engagement with the EITI 
(see previous chapter six for an estimation of how the effects of SWG participation 
on top of regular EITI participation). In a Bourdieusian language, this participation is 
based on economic, social and cultural capital which is, as elaborated in the 
previous chapter, at the disposal of corporate representative, and it is argued here 
that this explain the imbalance in the members of the SWG. In addition, this would 
lead to the reasonable expectation of corporate representative’s exercising a great 
deal of influence within the working group.219 Three broader topics dominated the 
discussions: The extension of EITI’s scope by inclusion of the entire value chain or 
other sectors, the revision and refinement of the existing criteria for implementation, 
and potential benefits of changing the assessment system (from binary 
                                               
219 This is difficult to assess from an external perspective as sessions of the SWG at EITI Board 
Meetings were closed for non-members of the Board. 
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compliant/non-compliant to a ranking and/or sliding scale). EITI’s minutes and 
papers from this period usually name diverse positions on topics without attributing 
the opinion to particular stakeholder groups or individual representatives. However, 
insights from the interview process as well as direct observation made it clear that 
most cautious and most conservative voices in this debate came from the company 
constituency, and particularly the oil and gas companies (refer back to chapter five), 
whereas the most detailed input regarding potential changes and additional 
requirement was contributed by civil society.  
The companies deployed the following active and passive strategies for influencing 
the EITI on topics such as project-level-reporting and contract transparency: Active 
engagement in discussions, thereby arguments presented against specific 
suggestions include references to completion law, impracticalities and financial 
burden, and sensitivity to political issues. However, if a proposition was regarded 
unacceptable, the representatives would refuse to participate in the conversations 
thereby effectively blocking the decision-making process in a consensus-based 
setting (refer back to chapters five and six on corporate political practice). 
However, examining the result of the strategy review process it becomes evident that 
the stakeholder decided in favour of measures strengthening the existing standard 
instead of broadening the scope of the EITI (see chapter three, part two for details). 
The revision of the rules and the assessment system were prioritised. In an attempt 
to facilitate implementation and improve the quality of the EITI reports, existing EITI 
requirements were clarified, additional included and at the end the 27 requirements 
have been reduced to seven. In this revision of the rules, however, the influence of 
the company constituency becomes directly observable: A number of propositions 
which have been discussed but would have required more detailed disclosure by 
companies, including the highly controversial discussed topic of contract 
transparency, have not been included into the new regulatory framework. In addition, 
the Board managed to include project-level reporting only as an ‘encouraged’ but not 
mandatory requirement which, with obvious reference to demands made by the 
company constituency, needs to be ‘consistent with requirements in the US and 
EU’.220 As an “encouraged” requirement, it is up to the national multi-stakeholder 
                                               
220 As stated by Moberg in a contribution to EITI’s Blog (2013). Available from: 
https://eiti.org/blog/charting-next-steps-transparency-extractives. 
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group for each specific country to decide whether or not they want to include this 
level of disclosure which makes it far less likely to be adopted with reference to the 
power-asymmetries between companies and resource-rich countries described in 
previous chapters. 
This is of particularly interest when related to a declared lack of an overall strategy or 
vision towards EITI’s evolution by the company constituency. Although, right from the 
beginning, the motivations for joining EITI have been as clear as the red lines - from 
the constituencies perspective it is evident that disaggregated data has over time 
found its way to the Board table and into the regulatory framework:  
I think that one of the things that I certainly learned as being part of this process was 
that if I look at where the companies’ position ended up compared to where it started 
I think actually what the companies were not so good at doing was working at a 
proper strategy. It was fine for looking at (...) an individual meeting or topic. What we 
as companies were not good at doing was to actually say: These are the desires of 
civil society, this is what society as a whole seems to be moving towards. What do 
we really think we could accept? Where do we think we could end up that we would 
actually be prepared to accept? Part of the reason for that is that companies, 
because we compete with each other, do have general limits of cooperating with 
each other. That is something that civil society organisations find very difficult to 
accept. They think that actually as companies we were making up strategies in the 
longer term. We were very scrupulous in not doing that because we were very careful 
to not engage in anti-competitive behaviour. So we were very careful about that, we 
tried to do that probably, but it’s not an easy one. 
    (Company constituency interview, 31 October 2012) 
This lack of an overall strategy reflects on two things: Firstly, it can be interpreted as 
a profound underestimation of the political dynamics within the EITI (and 
subsequently the ambitions of civil society) which would somehow mirror the 
statements separating political from “technical” or “managerial” issues. Secondly, 
however, it signals that the company’s entered EITI out of a position of strength, 
being confident that they would have the resources to keep the process evolving in a 
direction which does not have negative consequences for the industry. As the result 
of the strategy review reveal, they still hold this position. 
In summary, this section illustrated directly observable consequences of corporate 
influence at EITI’s international level which confirm the assessment of a privileged 
position.  
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7.4. Conclusion 
This chapter assessed the consequences of corporate power on EITI’s design and 
performance. Bourdieu suggests that social spaces like EITI are structured by 
unequal distribution of resources in which the well-resourced have considerable 
advantages over the other players and thus ultimately dominate the field (see 
chapter three). This is consistent with the findings of previous chapters, particularly 
chapter four which established how the companies’ participation is legitimised 
through a depiction as positive, responsible and exceptional agents in natural 
resource governance and chapters five and six which exposed businesses’ 
contribution to rely strongly on a variety of forms of capital. The relative advantages 
of the companies could be expected to strongly impact the Standard.  
This chapter demonstrated that the companies are indeed in a privileged position, 
particular in comparison to stakeholders from resource-rich countries, which is not 
only traceable in EITI’s principles and procedures but also widely acknowledged by 
other stakeholders. The resulting scale and impact of their influence, however, is 
rarely discussed, which also reflects the degree to which their position has become 
“normal”. Thus, the once highlighted responsibility and complicity of companies in 
corruption and mismanagement, which was so crucial in the early days of the 
transparency movement and for EITI’s establishment (see chapter three), has been 
lost over the course of EITI’s existence. This is most evidently demonstrated by the 
discussions on evolution and strategy of the process which shied away from openly 
acknowledging existing power asymmetries and conflict between companies and 
stakeholders from resource-rich countries at the international and national level and 
instead focused predominantly on data quality and country assessment. At the same 
time, and as Bourdieu would expect, the disadvantages of the members from 
resource-rich countries became more directly observable. Therefore, the scale of the 
problem suggests that the counter-measures taken by EITI’s international Secretariat 
can only mildly be expected to water-down the most apparent problems, but will, 
however, not be able to level the playing field.  
Furthermore, this chapter argued that these observations are important in 
combination with the findings on EITI’s performance and evolution already discussed 
in chapter four which rightly point towards the need for reform. EITI’s most important 
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challenge consists in proving that implementing the Standard can make a difference 
in terms of outcome and impact, that it can actually contribute to policy reforms and 
change at the societal level and not just increase information. This challenge has 
been further increased by the passing of mandatory disclosure rules in the US and 
EU which are expected to produce information on revenues which are overlapping 
with EITI’s disclosure requirements (see also chapter three). As many authors have 
rightly pointed out, there are ample opportunities for making EITI implementation 
more effective by refining and adding reporting requirements (O’Sullivan 2013; 
Bleischwitz 2014) and surely there is more that can be done to increase revenue and 
financial transparency in resource-rich countries. However, in retrospective and 
taking into account our examination of EITI’s transparency principle, it appears very 
optimistic to presume that improving transparency can induce the quality of policy 
reforms that could minimise or even demolish power hierarchies in complex social 
structures. Firstly, because of the fact that for the causal link between information, 
society and government accountability to work the political system needs to be 
democratic and the people need to be aware of and ready to use their 
constitutionally guaranteed rights, e.g. this usage of information requires a number of 
pre-conditions in existence. Secondly, because of the inherent dilemma which arises 
from too much information, on occasions effectively decreasing instead of increasing 
transparency. But ultimately, because information in itself in neither value-neutral nor 
exists in a power-vacuum. Instead, and again following Bourdieu’s general line of 
thought on power in social structure, the amount and quality of information is likely to 
reflect underlying power structures or/and simultaneously serve a re-enforcing 
purpose. Against the degree of companies’ privilege as suggested in our findings, it 
is concluded that increasing transparency and improving data quality is a limited tool 
for addressing the resource curse.  
It was demonstrated through the course of this chapter that despite EITI’s emphasis 
on inclusiveness, equality (in voting-power) and transparency, the fundamental 
power asymmetries at the heart of the problems associated with natural resource 
extraction (see chapters one and three) have been incorporated into the Standard. 
Even more problematic, the principles and procedures constantly re-established and 
thus further perpetuate these structures and thus effectively undermine the 
normative aim of empowering citizens, which is highly problematic and needs to be 
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addressed. However, as the literature on the resource curse points out, opportunities 
for irresponsible or bad governance as well as mismanagement and corruption lie at 
the heart of the problems which produce large-scale poverty. These opportunities 
fundamentally originate from existing power-asymmetries – between governments 
and companies, and more importantly, between both these players and the people in 
resource-rich countries. It is their existence which makes the abuse of power 
tempting and impunity so likely. In conclusion, the discourses and practices in the 
EITI need to acknowledge and address this privilege and the underlying power 
asymmetries much more openly and directly in the future.  
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8. Conclusion: Refining theories of corporate power and companies’ influence 
in the EITI 
This thesis began by outlining the importance of large corporations in the everyday 
life of people all over the world. The introductory chapter described how the recent 
decades saw changes in the numbers, sizes and scope of MNC’s which indicate a 
significant, qualitative shift regarding autonomy and presence of large companies, 
particularly vis-à-vis the state, which resulted, for instance, in substantial bargain 
power or the ability to avoid and in cases override national legislation. In addition, it 
was described how corporations have been included into international governance 
processes in an attempt to close global governance gaps, an approach championed 
by the United Nations. Resulting from these developments, these days not only a 
variety of companies are engaged in international governance processes, but it has 
been established that corporate power has increased significantly over the last 
decades. This is most obviously epitomised by the consensus in the academic 
literature on corporations as political actors which the findings of this research 
substantially confirm (see chapter one). 
Against this background and in addition to the fact that corporation as actors at the 
international stage have not been the most prioritised subject for academic study, 
this research engaged with questions of corporate power and the political role of 
large corporations in international governance processes. It explored the political 
engagement of some of the largest MNCs from the extractive industries in a 
standard setting mechanism at the international level, called the EITI. The EITI 
Standard operates against a fascinating paradox: the majority of the world’s 
impoverished people live in countries rich in natural resources. The Standard aims at 
empowering civil society and people by increasing transparency on the revenues so 
they can demand a fair share of the enormous profits generated in the resource 
sector. At the international Board level of this Standard, corporations hold decision-
making rights. Company representatives sit at the same table as delegates from 
governments and civil society. Thus, they are directly involved in the prescription of 
global requirements for transparent and accountable governance as well as in the 
evaluation of countries’ performance towards implementation. Due to its multi-
stakeholder design, EITI is a prime example of what has been described as co-
regulation, or governance with governments, in the introductory chapter. 
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Examining EITI’s principles, informal procedures and the initiative’s performance, it 
was concluded that the stark power asymmetries which exist between companies 
and stakeholders from resource-rich countries and which characterises the issue 
area of natural resource extraction have been imported into the Standard. On the 
one hand, the companies’ privileged position has been consolidated and is widely 
acknowledged while their influence is directly observable. On the other hand, the 
EITI attributes very little actual responsibilities and requirements for action to the 
companies. Thus, the initial impetus for change which emphasised the role of 
companies in corruption and illustrated potential conflicts of interest has been lost 
over the course of EITI’s evolution. These days, the spotlight of regulation is on 
policy reforms of governments.  
Meanwhile, evaluations of EITI’s performance have shown mixed-results. They 
indicate that the Standard has definitely improved transparency on natural resource 
revenues. However, there is only sporadic evidence suggesting that it actually 
contributes to public-sector reforms or empowerment of citizens. Thus, EITI is in 
urgent need to reform and evolve. This conclusion argues that until the privileged 
status of companies, and the multiple ways by which corporations influence the EITI, 
are openly acknowledged, discussed and addressed, these limitations are unlikely to 
be overcome. 
Furthermore, this research presented the argument that by including corporations 
into international governance processes, and particularly the granting of decision-
making rights to companies at the Board level as practiced in the EITI, these actors 
not only gain direct access to decision-making, but additionally to political capital and 
symbolic authority. This allows companies to consolidate and enhance their 
influential status further. As a form of power, corporate symbolic authority is 
extremely effective as it has a tendency not to be recognised as exercise of power. 
Consequently, as much including corporations into political processes at the 
international level might appear reasonable against their influential position in the 
global political economy, and prevalent functionalist arguments in part of the 
academic literature, this inclusion comes with significant problems attached.  
The following sections explore these concluding arguments further and in doing so 
outline the distinctive contributions to knowledge which this thesis makes. This study 
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undertook what was, to our knowledge, the first ethnographical account of corporate 
political power in practice in multi-stakeholder global governance Overall, this 
research generated findings on corporate power which can be characterised as 
falling into the following categories, corresponding to the research questions posed 
in the introductory chapter. These are findings on operational aspects of corporate 
power and the political role of companies in the EITI, on legitimacy of corporate 
power and on direct and indirect consequences of corporate power for the EITI. 
8.1. Towards an improved understanding of corporate political power 
From an analytical perspective, this research contributed towards a refined 
understanding of corporate power by introducing corporate political practice and 
symbolic corporate authority as conceptual tools for interpreting a type of political 
engagement of companies at the international level which takes an institutionalised 
and representational form and requires socialisation and recognition. Both concepts 
are embedded into a broader theoretical framework elaborated by Pierre Bourdieu 
and follow his argumentative logic.  
Chapter two elaborated the concept of corporate political practice which was defined 
as institutionalised, competent and meaningful performance (in accordance with 
previous elaboration on practices by Adler and Pouliot 2011). It is an analytical tool 
for approaching, depicting and interpreting the empirical phenomenon of 
corporations’ active, institutionalised and recurring contribution to governance 
mechanisms. This concept has had the following advantages for answering the 
research questions: Firstly, it focuses on action, e.g. the performative or operational 
aspect of power. As an analytical category, the concept provides access to action 
and individuals and thus allows for a profound engagement with the practices 
through ethnographical methods such as observation (see chapters five and six). 
Thus, it helps to overcome the overall reliance on ex post facto explanations of 
corporate power, a limitation of conventional approaches to corporate power as 
identified in the introductory chapter. Secondly, corporate political practice as an 
analytical concept is distinct from more traditional forms of corporate political 
influence, as for example lobbying, because it is codified by and embedded in an 
institutional framework and consequently highlights the importance of socialisation 
and recognition for effective exercise of power (see chapters six and seven). Thus, it 
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is a concept which captures the newly established political practices taking place in 
various MSIs and PPPs. Following Bourdieu’s logic, corporate political practice in the 
EITI was identified as resting on various forms of economic, social and cultural 
capital (see chapters three, five, six and seven). Importantly, however, the practice 
requires a context-specific form of resource, which was identified as EITI-specific 
expertise. In addition, corporate political practice translates into a distinct form of 
legitimacy, symbolic authority, which is based on political capital. 
With the concept of symbolic corporate authority a particular, relational form of 
legitimacy was introduced which a) is based on political capital acquired by the 
companies as a result of the granting of decision-making rights, b) is composed of a 
delegational and personal element allowing the researcher to assess the role of the 
company constituency as collective representational body as well as the role of the 
individual corporate Board Directors, and c) comes with a tendency to be 
“misrecognised” as a form of power in the Bourdieusian language. The concept 
includes an element of empowerment by which the individuals representing a 
collective entity, in our case the individual corporate Board Directors representing the 
extractive sectors, are entitled to certain privileges and political authority as they 
become delegates of this collective. At the same time, the influence these delegates 
exercise in the arena is attributed to their individual leadership qualities and not 
recognised as exercise of power. As an effect of symbolic authority, the other 
stakeholders in the arena recognise that this particular player is influential, but fail to 
understand the complexity of interrelated materialist, cognitive and ideational 
structures on which this influence, and thus ultimately their subordination, is based 
(see chapter six). 
It could be argued that symbolic authority comes close to the concept of private 
authority as encompassed in Fuchs dimension of discursive power and proposed, for 
example, in Cutler et al. 1999 or Hall and Biersteker 2002. From an analytical point, 
however, they are not identical to Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic power for reasons 
which specifically relate to Bourdieu’s comprehensive understanding of what power 
is: Hall and Biersteker for example, explicitly differentiated between power as 
coercion and private authority as a legitimate form of power. They argue ‘that there is 
some form of normative, uncoerced consent or recognition of authority on the part of 
the regulated or governed, ”the normative belief by an actor that a rule of institution 
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ought to be obeyed” (Hurd 1999: 381, cited in Hall and Biersteker 2002: 5). In this 
line of argumentation ‘consent is the product of persuasion, trust, or apathy, rather 
than coercion’ (ibid.). However, from a Bourdieusian perspective this conceptual 
difference between authority as legitimate form of power and power as coercion 
makes only sense for academic purposes as for Bourdieu they both depict different 
sides of the same phenomenon which is social domination. In fact, ideational or 
normative structures can have equally subordinating effects than what is understood 
as “coercion”, and therefore might not make a difference for the ones being 
dominated in a social setting. To illustrate Bourdieu’s comprehensive perspective 
even further, it can be highlighted that he understands one form of capital/power as 
translatable or exchangeable into other forms of capital. ‘There exists an “exchange 
rate” between different types of capital, which permits the holder to profit from a 
social investment in a number of connected fields’ (Pouliot and Mérand 2013: 34). In 
comparison, it would be difficult to assume a situation in which power as coercion is 
translatable into power as authority if relying on the concept of private authority, as 
the way in which both elements are analytically defined, for example in Hall and 
Bierstecker (2002), makes them mutually exclusive.  
8.1.1. Companies’ political representation in practice 
This research contributed towards an improved understanding of corporate political 
power in practice by examining the collective and individual components of corporate 
representation in the EITI, particularly in chapters five and six. From a critical 
perspective it can therefore be argued that understanding exactly how businesses’ 
interests are represented, e.g. in practice, is a necessary precondition for assessing 
the scale of corporate influence (Moran 2008: 64).  
Examining the functioning of the company constituency more closely, the differences 
between oil and gas, miners and institutional investors and their respective reasons 
for participating in the EITI were explored. Chapter three, elaborated on how the 
rights granted to companies can be interpreted as the result of a power struggle 
between the stakeholders at the time of EITI’s establishment, which the business 
actors managed to decide in their favour. Their influence resulted in a shift of the 
focus from responsibilities of companies to requirements for governments, and 
additionally brought the UK government on the table. This confirms constructivist 
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arguments of companies as norm-entrepreneurs, as put forward by Flohr et al. 
(2010). In addition, the EITI became established as an inclusive multi-stakeholder 
initiative which focused on regulating governments and opted for voluntary 
implementation instead of mandatory disclosure rules. The vital role businesses’ 
played for EITI’s establishment is also reflected in the composition of the Board 
which grants six seats to the business community, five seats each to civil society and 
implementing countries and three seats to supporting or donor countries. 
Corporate political practice in the EITI a) is based on institutionalised access; b) is 
relatively formalized in terms of procedures, with communication lines predominantly 
running within instead across sectors; c) relies strongly on individual company’s 
willingness to take on a leadership role and grant access to their resources; and 
finally d) as a practice, is characterised by consistency in participation, whereby the 
industry leaders take on role as Directors at EITI’s Board table. These findings 
confirmed the assumption that the practice is substantially based on the availability 
of resources, most evidently economic capital, to which companies have access in 
far greater quality and quantities than the other stakeholders. Moreover, the directly 
observable strategies deployed by members of the company constituency for 
influencing the process were described: Firstly, through active contributions to the 
discussions thereby usually referring to business-centred arguments, e.g. 
complexity, practicality, costs and sensitivity towards impositions on national 
sovereignty which might jeopardize their relations to their host countries. Secondly, 
the decision-making is influenced through passive opposition, e.g. non-participation 
in discussions and decision-making, thereby explicitly relying on EITI’s consensus 
principle.  
These observations correspond to more classical analytical categories of corporate 
power, as for example differentiated by Fuchs into direct/ instrumentalist and 
structural power. Whereby according to Fuchs, instrumental approaches to power 
‘employ an actor-centred, relational concept of power based on the idea of individual 
voluntary action and focus on the direct influence of an actor on another actors’ 
(Fuchs and Lederer 2007: 4; see also Fuchs 2007: 56).221 In this category ‘power 
                                               
221 This approach is considered “relational” in that sense that it does not simply identify an actor as 
powerful because he is in possession of particular resources but follows Dahl’s classical definition of 
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came to be seen as a political actors’ ability to achieve results’ (Fuchs and Lederer 
2007: 4).222 In contrast, structural power is commonly associated with agenda-setting 
but needs to be extended to include rule-setting ability (Ibid.: 7).223 However, is it 
through the concept of resources or capital where Bourdieu’s approach differs from 
instrumentalist approaches to power as defined by Fuchs and is more precise than 
her dimension of discursive power. For Bourdieu ‘power is not in the resource as 
such, but defined through its role within the field. Only what affects a field’s logic and 
hierarchy counts as capital’ (Guzzini 2013: 86). And further: ‘Capital is never only in 
the material or ideational resource itself, but in the cognition and recognition it 
encounters in agents’ (ibid.: 87). In this analysis it was illustrated how corporate 
representatives are considered influential agents mostly based on their individual 
qualities which are well suited for international diplomacy, and how this status 
depends on access to symbolic authority which is based on political capital (see 
chapter six). In this example, corporate power operates in a specific form against a 
particular contextual setting. Consequently, and contrary to assumptions made by 
instrumentalist approaches to power, it is neither simply deducible from mere 
possessions of particular resources, e.g. military capacities or financial assets, nor 
only from behavioural changes. In addition, power is not directly translatable to other 
fields (although, as will be described further below, it can be brought into other 
fields).  
The identification of the privileged position of business in the EITI affirms findings in 
the literature on business power in global governance which portraits corporations as 
being in a ‘special position’ and ‘endowed with particularly power resources’ 
(Ougaard 2010: 22), exemplified for instance by Fuchs (2007) or Falkner (2008). 
These authors strongly emphasise businesses’ structural power which is attributed to 
their central role within the capitalist economy. 
In addition, the practice of individuals representing companies as Directors at EITI’s 
Board was explored. Examining educational background, recruitment, mandate and 
                                                                                                                                                  
power as  ‘A  has  power over  B  to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not 
otherwise do’ (Dahl 1957: 202-3).  
222 As a consequence, instrumentalist approaches to corporate power tend to focus on the classical 
way by which business is understood to influence politics in their favour, e.g. lobbying and party or 
campaign financing. 
223 With regard to corporate power, agenda-setting is predominately associated with the ‘ability to 
punish and reward governments for their policy choices by moving investments and jobs’ (Fuchs 
2007: 59). 
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personal qualities of their representation, it became evident that their participation 
essentially relies on three forms of capital – social, cultural and political capital – 
which are all to a certain degree derived from economic capital. The qualities and 
quantities in which corporations hold these capitals in relation to the other 
stakeholders at EITI’s international level makes them highly influential players. In 
addition, the chapter identified and elaborated on the fundamental importance of 
context-specific expertise, also a form of cultural capital, for EITI participation. EITI-
expertise combines knowledge on the operational aspects of resource extraction 
with understandings of the complex interrelation between economic, political, 
environmental and legal aspects related to the business in addition to insights on 
and experience with the functioning of the EITI process. This form of expertise is 
significantly enhanced through a relative consistency of participation over time by 
some of the representing individuals (which adds to a consistency in company 
representation, as found in chapter five). These findings complement existing 
elaboration on the importance of expertise for explaining corporate power inherent in 
structuralist approaches to global governance (see chapter one). At the same time, 
arguments on companies’ expertise are extended as it becomes clear that expertise 
does not need to be limited to specialised knowledge on economic issues, such as 
production processes, but instead can also encompass experience with and 
understanding of political arguments and regulatory processes such as the EITI. 
Moreover, and albeit implementation of the EITI is voluntary, studies show that most 
countries who implement the Standard do so in an attempt to attract aid by donor 
agencies, improve their international reputation, and ultimately their investment 
climate (David- Barett and Okamura 2013). Therefore, it can be concluded that EITI 
reports provide the background against which not only the international donor 
community and the international financial institutions evaluate the support for these 
countries and modify and adapt their programs and conditions, but also the business 
community takes investment decision. In consequence, EITI implementation does 
play a vital part for regulating implementing countries’ governance performance and 
companies hold decision-making power in an institution which sets a global standard 
and which stipulates requirements against which a country’s governance 
performance is evaluated. It can therefore be argued that this institutionalised form of 
companies influence encompasses a substantial potential for dominant companies to 
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use the EITI as instrument for prescribing and inducing business-friendly governance 
reforms in these countries. 
Broadly, these findings reaffirm the necessity for additional research on companies 
as political actors at the international stage, and illustrate the benefits of applying 
ethnographical methods for generating comprehensive details: Varieties of 
engagement displayed between companies and sectors highlight the importance to 
deviate from the standard account of the unitary (and often rational) business actor, 
as criticised in the introductory chapter, and instead engaged more profoundly with 
individual companies and their internal culture and decision-making processes, 
supporting respective calls in the constructivist academic literature for example by 
Brown et al. (2010). Particularly interesting has been the companies’ conduct in the 
EITI with reference to the strategy review which displayed great varieties from strong 
and active opposition to open encouragement to changes in strategy as for example 
illustrated by Statoil’s open disassociation with the API lawsuit after pressure from 
civil society (see chapters five and seven). This confirms findings in the constructivist 
literature on IPE, for example by Woll (2010), who argues that far from being pre-
determined and transparent, firm’s interests are socially constructed and require time 
and effort to crystallize. They also affirm constructivist claims identifying companies 
as social actors (Hofferberth et al. 2011; Brown et al. 2010) who are sensitive to 
norms (Kantz 2007; Kollman 2008, Abdelal et. al. 2010). 
The findings also highlighted the valuable contributions made by a focus on 
individuals, particular on political representatives of companies, for understanding 
corporate influence in a specific social setting. This adds to findings from Dashwood 
(2012), who highlighted in her examination of CSR norms and their adoption by 
Canadian mining companies the important role played by senior management.224  
As stated in the introductory chapter, the predominant perspectives on corporate 
power which generally rely on structuralist explanations, such as materialist and 
ideational factors, have limited options for approaching the level of individual 
companies or individuals agents. And apart from the literature on global elites, such 
as Sklair’s study on the transnational capitalist class which deals with individuals as 
agents of an influential elite, individuals as category for research has not been paid 
                                               
224 For a summary of findings regarding management leadership, see Dashwood (2012: 265ff). 
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much attention in the academic literature on business and global governance. As this 
research’s findings suggest, however, individuals can be a very fruitful category for 
investigation since their experiences and reflections allow for a more insightful 
understanding of company’s political practices and thus ultimately the personal and 
direct exercise of corporate power. Particularly the focus on practices allowed for a 
comprehensive picture of company’s political representation by which it became 
possible to understand it for the formalised, resource-intense and influential 
endeavour it is.  
8.1.2. Contributions on legitimacy of corporate power 
This research contributed towards an improved understanding on the legitimacy of 
corporations as political actors in the EITI relying on Bourdieu’s concepts of shared 
beliefs and political capital. Thus, a complex picture was portrayed of pre-reflexive, 
embodied and institutionalised elements legitimising companies which operate 
simultaneously and result in a privileged status for these agents. Whereby the 
concept of symbolic authority helped to identify a form of legitimacy which is 
deduced from political rights for representation and delegation, shared beliefs 
illuminated a supporting knowledge structure which, embodied into actor’s 
dispositions, legitimises the companies as a collective.  
Guided by chapter two’s conceptual framework and primarily relying on Bourdieu’s 
concept of shared beliefs, this research began to understand the basis of corporate 
legitimacy in the EITI by investigating core underlying assumptions in international 
discourses on natural resource extraction and the messages transported in them on 
corporations. Three such underlying beliefs were identified which legitimise the 
company’s role and status in natural resource governance more broadly and in the 
EITI Standard more specifically, by portraying a picture of corporations as positive, 
e.g. resourceful and contributing, responsible and exceptional agents. At the same 
time, these beliefs transport a particular interpretation or perspective on natural 
resource extraction – a viewpoint which rests on liberal political and mostly economic 
premises, highlighting the prospects for sustainable development while attributing 
responsibilities for social, economic and environmental problems to the governments 
of resource-rich countries. It was further explained why in the case of natural 
resource governance this is a highly problematic perspective as it has not only a 
235 
tendency to downplay the status of extractive industries as powerful independent 
agents which pursue their own interests, but also effectively to conceal an existing 
power asymmetry which roots in this sector’s high investment, cutting-edge-
technology-requiring operations on the ground, as well as the sheer economic, social 
and environmental impact of their presence in resource-rich countries. As became 
evident through the course of this study, this privileged status has not only been 
enshrined into EITI’s principles but is also directly observable in formal and informal 
procedures as well as in the actions of the stakeholders.  
Moreover, this privileged status underlines corporate argumentation and action in the 
EITI and provides substantial space for manoeuvre, for example apparent in the 
inconsistencies in chapter five. Hence, arguments on what is political, e.g. evoking 
the politics/market dichotomy, need to be understood as attempts by an already 
influential actor to impose a particular meaning on a problem, e.g. in the case at 
hand by linking refined disclosure requirements to the sensitive topic of impositions 
on sovereignty. These findings confirm critical perspectives on dichotomies in social 
science which already highlighted how depictions of “naturally” separated societal 
spheres which follow a distinct logic of action, are biased perspectives which have 
discriminating tendencies (for the effects of the state/market dichotomy on IPE for 
example, see Bruff 2011). At this point, Bourdieu’s conceptual framework was very 
useful as it enabled the researcher not to reproduce these dichotomies (as was 
lamented in the introductory chapter to be frequently the case in research on 
business), but instead to access and interpret them as an instrument for distinction 
and domination. 
In addition, these findings confirmed what Bourdieu describes as the institutionalised 
and embodied nature of power. Not only can shared beliefs become prescriptions for 
interpretation and action, but they have consecutive effects when institutionalised: 
Particularly chapters five and six explored how the status of corporations as 
legitimate actors is further enhanced through participatory and decision-making 
rights. Furthermore it was described how these rights translate into political capital. 
And political capital, as already stated, is a form of power which produces symbolic 
authority. This authority is granted to individuals for representing institutions or 
collectives, in our case being a Board Director representing the extractive 
companies. As a result, corporate political power as symbolic authority is embodied 
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by the individual representative who is granted an exceptional and influential role 
epitomised as leadership-status. Moreover, this research observed how shared 
beliefs operate through agents dispositions: When for example company 
representatives in debates at the Board table emphasize how the problems 
addressed by EITI are by nature technical/managerial, than this depiction disguises 
not only the political nature of the process, which ultimately aims for inducing liberal 
political and economic reforms, but automatically also the role played by companies 
in making this change happen. The highlighted differences between political and 
managerial/technical issues are strikingly similar to findings made by Catherine 
Weaver on decision-making processes in the World Bank which lead to the 
establishment of the good governance agenda. Observing the driving forces behind 
changes the author illustrates how the World Bank’s bureaucracy and particularly the 
Bank’s senior management, consisting predominately of economists, has been 
socialised into an ‘apolitical culture’ (2010: 55). These agents were cautiously 
guarded against suspicion of partiality or political interference, of a ‘break of 
sovereignty’ associated for instance with politically sensitive terms such as 
“corruption” by insisting on the technical nature of their support (ibid.: 56-7).225  
At this point it is important to note that these struggles for understanding and 
meaning might be influential or, as Jacqeline Best has put it, serve ‘a powerful 
political purpose – containing conflict by denying political influence in place’ 
(2005:16). However, they are not necessarily deliberate or conscious strategies. In 
fact, as elaborated in chapters five and six, the company constituency did neither 
prepare nor operated on the basis of a coherent strategy. In addition, it became 
evident that communication lines between sectors were limited. It would therefore be 
insufficient to explain their apparent influence on the EITI only relying on Fuchs’ 
discursive power dimension, as discursive power presuppose intentional, interest-
based actions by players or elites. Here Bourdieu is very helpful: From an analytical 
perspective, shared beliefs and agent’s dispositions encompass more than social 
action based on the recognition of norms and ideas, such as proposed in March and 
Olson’s logic of appropriateness in constructivist perspectives (Abdelal et al. 2010). 
                                               
225 Weaver further describes how modification in the Bank’s aims and policies, and particular a 
prescriptive focus on governance capacity in the 1990s, became acceptable after the strategic usage 
of a the more neutral language of good governance: ‘Promoting the governance agenda became 
much easier within the Bank, now that it was confined to language and modes of argumentation that 
stripped it of its political content and made it appear a more technocratic task’ (Weaver 2010: 57).  
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Bourdieu’s logic of action implies a dimension of embodied knowledge which 
precedes conscious strategising by the agent, e.g. is understood as pre-reflexive, 
because it is based on the “fit” between an agents positioning in the arena and the 
game’s implicit logic, captured in both, the notion of disposition and the idea of doxa 
(see chapter two). This idea is summarised in following illustrative example: 
A scientist is a scientific field made flesh, an agent whose cognitive structures are 
homologous with the structure of the field, and, as a consequence, constantly 
adjusted to the expectations inscribed in the field (Bourdieu 2004: 41, cited in Moore 
2008: 111). 
Bourdieu’s emphasis is also summarised by Eagleton-Pierce: 
Bourdieu rejects ideology and consciousness as suitable concepts (...). In contrast, 
Bourdieu repeatedly argues that power often works through very obscure processes, 
especially involving the space occupied by the body, for which the conventional 
definition of ideology in terms of representation and false consciousness has trouble 
accounting. (...) On the related question of intentionality, Bourdieu asks researchers 
to probe against the Marxist or compulsory-power vision of totalizing control, how 
behaviour is often regulated without necessarily being the result of ‘strategic’ purpose 
(2013: 53-4, quotation marks in the original). 
Bourdieu’s analytical concepts shift the emphasis towards pre-reflexive, embodied 
exercises of power which are nevertheless effective as illustrated in chapter six by 
the influence of individual representatives or in chapter seven by the recognition of 
companies as influential players in the arena by all stakeholders. Highlighting the 
importance of dispositions and shared beliefs, it can be explained why company 
representatives do not necessarily self-identify as political actors, as elaborated in 
chapter five, while still emphasizing the necessity of diplomatic skills and cooperation 
as vital requirement for constructive contribution, thereby reflecting the rules and 
principles under which the arena functions. 
In addition, this perspective differs from Neo-Gramscian approaches to corporate 
power, such as Levy and Newell, who use the concept of hegemony for analysing 
how business influences international environmental governance processes: 
Gramsci’s most significant contribution to political thought is the concept of 
hegemony, referring to the persistence of specific social and economic structures 
that systematically advantage certain groups. Hegemony is not dependent on 
coercive control by a small elite, but rather rests on coalitions and compromises that 
provide a measure of political and material accommodation with other groups, and on 
ideologies that convey a mutuality of interests (Levy and Newell 2002: 86). 
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As this quote illustrates, the concept of hegemony also presupposes an intentional 
engineering of discourses by a dominant elite. This emphasis on conscious 
strategising is shared by constructivist approaches to discursive power (Fuchs 2007) 
or private authority (for instance Hall and Bierstecker 2002; Cutler 2003). For 
example, in Fuchs’ conceptualisation of discursive corporate power, ideas, norms 
and discourses take a centre stage. The author describes how the literature on 
global governance and IR more broadly elaborate on concepts such as framing, 
naming and campaigning to explain how non-state actors have gained authority in 
the international realm (Fuchs 2007: 62). As examples of discursive corporate power 
Fuchs states attempts to influence the public debate and societal norms or to 
legitimise corporations as ‘good corporate citizens’, all of which are active, intentional 
strategies.  
In general, Fuchs’ and Bourdieu’s conceptual frameworks can both be called 
comprehensive, albeit in different ways. Fuchs’ framework is comprehensive 
because it is a synthesis of existing perspectives on corporate power into a single 
analytical framework. Bourdieu’s approach is comprehensive because of his integral 
understanding of power as resource corresponding to a field. Therefore, Bourdieu 
would not necessarily agree to the idea that Fuchs’ dimensions are in fact 
‘analytically distinct’ (Pouliot and Mérand 2013: 38). Rather, he would understand 
them as ‘different sides of the same coin, which is social domination whether 
observed in direct social interaction or in large social structures’ (ibid.). Bourdieu 
would argue that conceptualising power on different levels – individual, structural and 
ideational/discursive – can have a tendency to obscure the simultaneous and 
interdependent ways by which power operates in favour of an academic exercise. 
Fuchs is obviously aware of these limitations, as she suggests that it would be 
interesting to investigate workings of power which are ‘not even (...) perceived as an 
exercise of power and therefore not be questioned’ (Fuchs 2007: 63) – and as this 
research has demonstrated, it is precisely at this point where Bourdieu’s conceptual 
framework and particularly the concept of symbolic authority is most fruitful, it 
explores a form of power which, unmeasured and unnoticed, becomes the “norm”. In 
the case at hand, it helps to understand how significant the influence of the company 
constituency on the strategy review process was, despite the fact that corporate 
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representatives openly acknowledged that they did neither prepare nor pursuit a 
formal strategy for EITI’s evolution. 
In summary, this thesis explored how corporate political practice operates in 
international governance processes, how it is legitimised, and also discovered the 
consequence the inclusion of companies has had for the EITI. It was demonstrated 
on the one hand, how corporate power can have effects on the institutional, 
procedural and outcome level, and that there is still a lot to learn about the role of 
individual representatives and individual companies for exercising it. On the other 
hand, however, the findings illustrated the limitations of conceptual approaches 
which separate power as operating through different dimension or/ and have a 
tendency to prioritise particular approaches to power, such as structuralist accounts. 
It is therefore argued that these approaches limit the researcher’s ability to 
understand the complexity of power’s modes of operation and consequently the 
multiple, directly and less directly observable effects of power. 
8.1.3 Consequences of corporate power on the EITI and MSIs 
In addition to generating insights into how corporate power operates in practice and 
its sources of legitimacy, corporate power’s effects on the EITI were examined in 
chapter seven. Broadly speaking, less-directly observable consequences which 
relate to EITI’s institutional design, and more directly observable consequence such 
as corporate influence on the strategy review process were identified. 
Chapter seven elaborated on how the perspective on transparency promoted in the 
EITI – identified as instrumental, retrospective, downwards approach – is based on 
liberal principles and induces a focus on numbers and data. This emphasis, 
however, fosters the importance of expertise and enhances the standing of actors 
holding this form of capital while further disempowering ordinary citizens from 
resource-rich countries who are the least likely to hold it. At the same time, the 
emphasis on data strengthens the importance of assessment, or validation, in the 
EITI, further reaffirming the company’s privileged status. The resulting disadvantages 
of EITI members from resource-rich countries became directly observable in the 
procedural aspects. Furthermore, taking the example of the strategy review process, 
it was illustrated how the influence of the companies has direct observable effects on 
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strategy and policy outcomes. Thus, the findings suggest that the company’s 
privileged status is widely acknowledged and affirmed instead of being contested.  
Evaluating EITI’s performance as Standard, it was concluded that EITI achieved the 
first part of its purpose which is to increase transparency of revenues in resource-
rich countries. However, the initiative falls short on the accountability goal as the 
available data is used by a small audience and there are no indicators for 
widespread inducement of public sector reforms, improved living standards or other 
measurable effects for the ordinary citizens in these countries. These findings 
indicated the necessity for EITI to evolve, and prompted some changes and 
refinements in the regulatory framework proposed for EITI’s Global Conference in 
May 2013. In addition, the upcoming effects of the US and EU mandatory disclosure 
rules can reasonably be expected to put additional pressure on EITI for 
demonstrating benefits of implementation in outcome and impact. Meanwhile, 
however, the debates on these new legislations acutely illustrate how “Western”-
centred discussions at EITI’s international Board table are, thus further confirming 
the disadvantage of stakeholders from resource-rich countries (see chapters three 
and seven). If the question of whether EITI can be reformed is answered following 
EITI’s inner logic, than an appropriate way forward are indeed more refined and 
comprehensive disclosure requirements and the inclusion of stakeholders from 
emerging economies, such as India or Brazil, as for example articulated in 
Bleischwitz (2014). In addition, for overcoming existing capacity problems regarding 
understanding and usage of data by local civil society, regularly held trainings in 
resource-rich countries, as currently organised by the Revenue Watch Institute, 
could indeed be useful. Moreover, NEITI’s experience, as outlined in chapter three, 
suggests that information on revenues generated needs to be complemented by 
broader contextual information (as demanded in the EITI 2013 Standard) and, in 
particular, by information on how this money has been spent by the local or national 
government.  
However, in the majority of resource-rich countries the empirical reality of abundant 
resource wealth and simultaneous extreme poverty prevails. A situation for which, as 
empirical studies have shown, EITI implementation is a limited remedy. As findings 
by Smith et. al. (2012) or O’Sullivan (2013) have illustrated, natural resource 
management at the national and regional level is not only a fairly complex and 
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challenging process, but that it is an asymmetry of power – between local and 
national governments; governments and people; governments and companies; and 
companies and people – which characterises the situation and thus can reasonably 
be assumed to lay at the heart of the problem. Against this background, it is difficult 
to see how the suggested measures can have lasting effects for improving 
government accountability in non-democratic, authoritarian countries. Therefore 
unsurprisingly, this research’s findings on EITI’s international performance suggest 
the existence and prevalence of stark power asymmetries and severe inequalities 
between participants from industrialised or Western countries, including 
corporations, governments and Western-based civil society organizations, and 
participants from non-Western, less-developed countries (see chapter seven). This 
affirms critical findings on civil society contributions to global governance, made by 
Dany (2014).  
In summary, what became evident is that the EITI Standard, despite an official 
emphasis on transparency, inclusion, and equality in decision-making rights, strongly 
reflects and re-establishes the existing power asymmetries which privilege 
companies. Therefore it is argued that EITI as an international governance 
mechanism is in danger of becoming little more than an instrument for inflicting 
business-prone governance reforms in resource-rich countries instead of 
empowering citizens to recognise corporate power and address its consequences.  
This research’s findings and critical conclusion contributed to the growing academic 
literature on the EITI which assesses the Standard from a critical perspective (see 
also chapter three), pointing out the importance of reputational concerns for joining 
EITI for companies (Gillies 2010) and countries (David-Barrett and Okamura 2013); 
limitation for international multi-stakeholder governance due to differing “visions” on 
the endeavour (Aaronson 2011), or predominantly lamenting lacking results in 
implementing countries (Smith et al. 2012; O’Sullivan 2013; Van Alstine 2014). 
Moreover, by further exploring some of the inherent tensions of transparency as 
theoretical concept (see chapter three), this study contributed to critical voices such 
as Kolstad and Wiig (2008); Gupta (2010) or O’Sullivan (2013) which caution against 
the idea that transparency is “the cure” for the resource curse and demonstrate that 
‘the hopes associated with transparency policies are often unrealistically high’ 
(Dingwerth and Eichinger 2010: 91). 
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Although, it could be deduced that these findings of corporate power suggest that the 
companies’ contribution in the Standard should be significantly downgraded, the line 
of argument presented here suggests otherwise. As described by Bourdieu, social 
arenas are structured by an unequal distribution of resources between the players. 
Thus it is little surprising that EITI reflects the power asymmetries in the broader field 
of natural resource governance and ultimately the realities in many resource-rich 
countries, the same could be argued for many international organisations. Therefore, 
limiting the companies’ presence and influence would indeed make the EITI less 
representative with regard to the problem. However, corporate power needs to be 
understood and acknowledged by all partners involved, it is important to re-shift the 
focus of attention in debates on natural resource governance back on the 
companies, explicitly highlighting their position and influence. It is only through 
acknowledging their privilege and embracing corporate leadership for what it is, 
namely an exercise of power, that the disadvantaged agents in the game can 
become empowered. In practice, this would implicate that the EITI as an institution 
as well as the companies participating in it, need to openly acknowledge and discuss 
corporate responsibility and influence to reach a degree of awareness which is then 
reflected in principles, procedures and actions. This also includes active, attentive 
and costly engagement with and contribution to local communities on the ground, 
beyond the standard CSR rhetoric. 
This research corresponds and complements findings by Smith et. al. on EITI 
implementation at the national level, in which the authors conclude: 
In many developing countries, where there is a lack of transparency and high levels 
of corruption, the value of this engagement, however, is debatable. Findings from this 
study indicate that the power relationships which exist between stakeholders in the 
highly lucrative mining industry override efforts to achieve ’’good governance’’ 
through voluntary community engagement. The continuing challenge lies in 
identifying where the responsibility sits in order to address this power struggle to 
achieve fair representation (2012: 241, quotation marks in the original). 
Thus, this research argues that wanting to increase transparency and democratic 
accountability in resource-rich countries cannot be achieved without first 
acknowledging the fundamental and influential role played by the companies and the 
resulting responsibilities. Following a Bourdieusian logic, corporate power in the EITI 
can only be fundamentally contested by another well-resourced stakeholder. As it 
stands, however, the underlying power structure of the broader field of natural 
243 
resource extraction and the unequal distribution of resources amongst the players, 
points only towards international civil society as a potential candidate who can 
reasonably be assumed to perform this function in the years to come.  
Furthermore, this study’s findings on the EITI Standard can contribute towards an 
improved understanding of the pitfalls and prospects of multi-stakeholder 
governance mechanisms. As introduced in chapter one, MSIs were initially 
conceptualised as instruments to tackle specific issues of global or international 
relevance which were difficult to solve by state-action due to lacking resources or 
political will. By pooling the resources of stakeholders who all share an interest in 
solving the problem, the assumption was that MSI’s could improve the effectiveness 
of global governance (see chapter one). At this point the EITI example suggests that 
business contribution can in fact help approach a specific problem, in the case 
discussed the lack of transparency (see chapter three). However, EITI’s example 
can also illustrate the danger of MSI’s which are underlined by strong power 
asymmetries between the partners, as it becomes very likely that the most well-
resourced stakeholders exercise the greatest influence. In the EITI, companies used 
their resource-based influential status throughout the strategy review to oppose more 
rigid disclosure requirements which are considered as non-beneficial for business. 
Similar findings (albeit with far more drastic and direct consequences) of how MSIs 
and PPPs can be used as instruments benefiting private interests have been 
presented by Horta in her examination of the failure of the Chad-Cameroon Oil and 
Pipeline Project, summarizing: ‘While public underwriting of the risks for ExxonMobil 
and its partners has contributed to record profits for the oil companies, local 
populations, including Cameroon’s vulnerable Pygmy communities, have been 
further impoverished’ (2012: 204). This project also contributed to the literature on 
MSI’s by providing the first ethnographical account which describes in detail the 
inner workings of an MSI at the international level (see chapters five to seven), a 
perspective which complements the standard evaluation of MSIs performance based 
on output and impact criteria (as performed in chapter three). This ethnographical 
engagement helped to identify and grasp the degree of political engagement by 
corporations in international decision-making processes as well as the effects of this 
engagement on EITI’s performance. In depicting corporate symbolic authority as 
based on political capital, it was identified how the inclusion of corporations into 
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international governance processes which is based on the granting of decision-
making rights provides an already powerful player with an additional and highly 
effective source of power. This needs to be considered carefully in future research 
on the legitimacy of MSIs. In addition, the EITI example indicates that multi-
stakeholder arrangements are limited in achieving their goals because of an inherent 
tendency to perpetuate the prevalent asymmetries and inequalities between 
stakeholders at the international level. This directly undermines arguments which 
were made, albeit in a minority position, from the perspective of pluralist democratic 
theory, which stated that MSI’s could help decrease the legitimacy problem of 
international governance by increasing the number of voices at the international 
realm and thus the likelihood of congruence between rule-makers and rule-takers. 
Contrary, EITI’s history serves as a good example for how MSI can help to shift the 
focus from one object of regulation to another, serving the interests of the well-
resourced.  
In summary, it is argued that these observations help to explain why the EITI is not 
having an impact on the ground, e.g. does not seem to have improved the everyday 
life of the impoverished people in resource-rich countries. In addition, these findings 
highlight how important the question and examination of corporate power is, not only 
in natural resource governance but also for multi-stakeholder initiatives. 
8.2. Limitations of this research 
There are conceptual and empirical limitations to consider with regard to this 
research which will be outlined in this section.  
Theoretical limitations 
From a critical perspective it could be argued that the first limit on the findings and 
the analysis of this project is imposed by the basic assumption underlying Bourdieu’s 
conceptual framework which is the idea that social arenas are always structured 
based on an uneven distribution of capitals. In result, Bourdieu’s theory is ultimately 
a theory of social domination. Consequently, one could say if it is domination you are 
looking for then domination is what you will find. This is a valid general critique on 
Bourdieu’s framework, but, of less importance for this project which already started 
from the empirical observation of increased corporate power (as outlined in the 
245 
introductory chapter). This focus is also clearly reflected in the research questions. 
Obviously, this does not exclusively translates into corporations as the only 
influential players in the EITI Standard, such a view would be reductionist towards 
Bourdieu’s framework while ignoring empirical findings which clearly suggest that 
members of EITI’s inner-family, particularly international civil society and the 
Secretariat, are highly influential players too. 
In addition, this research selectively applied and partially re-elaborated Bourdieu’s 
concepts. Some of Bourdieu’s disciplines would argue that such an approach is 
problematic as it does not do justice to the complexity of Bourdieu’s framework. 
However, such critics can be answered on two accounts: Firstly, re-conceptualisation 
and re-elaboration was a vital part of Bourdieu’s understanding of how social science 
should operate (as demonstrated by the fact that his concept constantly evolved over 
time). Secondly, it is important to note also that this project does not aim at 
elaborating on an international perspective to Bourdieu’s conceptual framework (for 
such an attempt see Bigo 2011). Instead, the study applied the concepts for the sake 
of introducing a new perspective on a particular social phenomenon – in this case 
the political practice of corporations in international governance mechanisms. In the 
quest for an alternative, relational perspective, Bourdieu’s concepts have proven 
very helpful. 
Moreover, it is important to note that this research did not aim to provide a 
comprehensive, new theory of the corporation as a political actor in global 
governance which includes all types of business actors as well as all varieties of 
political activities on the international level. Such a comprehensive theoretical 
framework is not only not likely to be possible due to the existing variety of business 
actors and political activities on the global scale, but furthermore hardly derivable 
from an empirical study limited to a specific issue-area, natural resources, and with a 
particular focus on the extractive industries which, as already elaborated elsewhere, 
have characteristics which they do not share with other business actors such as 
retailers or financial institutions. As a result, it appears only plausible that this 
research aimed at portraying an accurate picture of the global governance of natural 
resources though the lenses of the EITI process and with a particular focus on 
practices. This study made selectively use of Bourdieu’s comprehensive conceptual 
framework, which was originally designed to understand the operations of power in 
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social reality, to understand a particular actor – the status of extractive industries as 
political agents in the EITI Standard. However, this does not mean that the findings 
and conclusions may not have significant implications or interesting insights for the 
study of business actors in world politics in general, it is simply to say that the scope 
is limited and this should be acknowledged. 
Empirical limitations 
Pierre Bourdieu’s conceptual framework requires an in-depth engagement with the 
empirical data, with attention to details which is extremely difficult to achieve in 
studies on the international realm. To gather such detailed findings, Bourdieu, 
usually accompanied by a team of investigators, applied in the majority of projects a 
mixed-method approach combining quantitative and qualitative methods, such as 
adding statistical analysis and network theory to semi-structured interviews and 
questionnaires conducted over a period of time. This is illustrated in the following 
quote in which Bigo summarises Bourdieu’s approach: 
Bourdieu’s approach to “practices” offers (...) an attempt to combine empirical 
research with political and philosophical reflexivity (...). His theoretical arguments are 
rooted in detailed research in very precise locations. He chooses these locations very 
carefully and examines with a team of researchers, taking on board discursive 
frames, prosopography, ethnographical interviews, historical formations of the 
different kinds of capital, as well as large-scale surveys (2001: 233, quotation marks 
in the original). 
Such an approach naturally results in an empirical thickness of data which is not 
likely to be achievable within a PhD study due to limitations in time and financial 
resources. Nevertheless, it is argued that by carefully selecting the EITI as case 
study and deploying a mixed-methods approach, this study aimed to increase data 
quality and generate as many rich and verified empirical findings as possible.  
In addition, it could be argued that the relational emphasis of this approach also 
points towards limitations for the prospect of generalising the findings of this study. 
This is a fair point to the degree that the generated insights into EITI’s functioning 
are indeed very much context-specific. Nevertheless, as the reflections in this 
concluding chapter demonstrate, a single case-study can provide valuable insights 
which complement existing ‘big picture perspectives’, as was proved, for example, 
through elaborations on multi-stakeholder governance. 
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8.3. Concluding thoughts 
Investigating corporate political power is a very intriguing subject: Not only because 
large corporations as influential actors at the international stage are a fairly recently 
discovered topic for scientific research, but also because the question of power is at 
the very core of political science as academic discipline. Thereby, research aims at 
identifying, conceptualising and understanding the manifold workings of power, 
sources of legitimacy and the various ways by which actors are affected by, obtain, 
and exercise power. It could be argued that almost every other subject of interest for 
politics – including topics such as inequality, cooperation and conflict – is directly or 
indirectly related to the fundamental question of power. Power as a concept in 
political thought has a long tradition and is as essential as it is contested, with 
definitions and conceptual approaches varying depending on the (meta-) theoretical 
perspectives of the authors.  
However, what makes understanding power in general and corporate power in 
particular important, apart from the academic exercise, are the resulting 
opportunities for contestation and empowerment, the emancipatory effect which 
unfolds from understanding its sources of legitimacy and modes of operation. In 
consequence, it can be argued that for power to be contested it needs to be 
recognised for what it is. Otherwise, the privileged continue perpetuating and 
expanding their position at the expense of the disadvantaged who remain in the dark 
about the nature of their subordination. 
Reflecting on this research’s findings as well as the general trends at the 
international level, this research stresses the need for additional studies on corporate 
political power. It encourages research on corporate political practice and individual 
corporate representatives for improving and refining our understanding of how 
corporate power operates. Particularly, what needs to be explored further is the role 
of individuals as agents of influence and change in both fields, the arena in which 
they exercise corporate power through political representation, and the corporation 
as a field of power on its own rights. Our findings specifically point towards a 
fascinating opportunity for future research as it would be extremely interesting to 
assess systematically the impact of individuals influential at EITI’s Board level on 
internal decision-making processes in their respective companies. Based on 
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Bourdieu’s emphasis on the embodied component of corporate power such studies 
could generate innovative new insights into the ways by which corporate power 
transcends various fields. Thus, it is argued that the conceptual tools elaborated in 
this study can facilitate future engagement on the topic.  
More generally, this research’s findings demonstrated that despite the fact that the 
international realm lacks an overarching authority, prevalent power-asymmetries 
have a structuring effect for prospects and limitations of governance processes. The 
inclusion of MNCs into global governance processes at times in which these agents 
already dominate the global economy, results in institutional structures which 
privilege them further. A development which not only poses serious questions of 
legitimacy and effectiveness of global governance, but also, points towards the 
paramount importance of mandatory global regulatory frameworks which stipulate 
explicit boundaries for MNC’s operations and codifies the environmental and social 
responsibility of these agents. To establish essential ingredients of such a framework 
as well as assess options and identify preconditions for how this could be 
established, will be the challenge for future research.  
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